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ABSTRACT

The thesis covers two troubled years in Australian science:
April 1983 to April 1985. The two years began with the arrival of
Barry Jones as Minister for Science and Technology, with his vision
of a high technology future, and the growth in expectations amongst
Australian scientists -

resulting from this vision -

of increased

government support for scientific research. They ended in dismay
following the fall from grace of Barry Jones, the dashing of expectations from the 1984 federal budget, and the resolve of scientists to
form a national political organisation FASTS (the Federation of
Australian Scientific and Technological Societies), to act on their
behalf to lobby government.
The magnitude of the crisis in 1984 which produced FASTS indicates. the essentially internal nature of the crisis. The marginal and
powerless position of the scientific community in 1984 demonstrates
the inadequacy of any definition of science which does not accommodate the broader social and political nature of science.
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Chapter 1.

INTRODUCTION

"FASTS" is the only major social initiative by Aus"t.::=alian
scientists since the Australian Association of scientific
Workers folded up back in 1949.
A. PRYOR and J. COLLINS, 1986 1

1.1.

Australian Science

The Australian science in the title of this work refers to the
political and social structure and function of science in Australia
and not to what professional scientists would normally regard as
science, that is, the theoretical and experimental detail of their
scientific disciplines. Indeed, many scientists are uncomfortable
with the term Australian science. Professor Bert Bolton, of Monash
University,

w~en

asked to speak on a related subject, the history of

Australian physics, at the Bicentenary Congress of Australian Physicists in 1988, refused to use the term - Australian physics - preferring instead the history of physics in Australia. The history of

2

"science in Australia", therefore, is a history of the research
undertaken by scientists in Australia; whereas the history of "Australian science" is more a history of scientific organisations and the
relationships of these organisations with government and the public.
The two histories are, of course, interrelated in a

complex and

personal way. The history, in this thesis, covers the years 1983 to
1985 and attempts to show the complex interaction between individuals, organisations and underlying social and political ideas and
structures which formed those years, from the enthusiasm of 1983, the
apprehension and dismay of 1984, to the formation of FASTS in 1985.
The founding of FASTS, in 1985, was a political act and its task
of lobbying government, industry and the public is a continuing
political activity; and yet scientists generally are not comfortable
with a political role for science, preferring instead to work away at
their research with a minimum of government interference. Indeed,
some of the more conservative scientists at the time -

and despite

the crisis - were critical of the political involvement of scientists
which led to the founding of FASTS. This dilemma, between a political
and an apolitical science, lies at the heart of the crisis in 1984;
the magnitude of this crisis may be judged by its products: FASTS, an
umbrella organisation for scientists and technologists established to
lobby government; NSTAG (the National Science and Technology Analysis
Group), comprising FASTS, the Institution of Engineers, Australia,
and the two Academies of Science and Technology, to review science
and technology in the Federal Budget; and . the other prong of successful lobbying, the NSTIS (the National Science and Technology Information Service) established by the Academy of Science, when FASTS

3

failed to take on this added responsibility, to keep the media and
the Australian public informed of the achievements of science and
technology.
Many authors have attempted to define "science"; and most
scientists, science analysts and others interested in science would
have some personal, working definition of science which suits their
particular purpose, and be disconcerted by the variety of definitions
used by others. The obvious difficulty in reaching a consensus on a
single definition of science does not, however, prevent people from
defining science. Their definition is often then used to justify some
particular role for science, and most definitions of science involve
some political or apolitical role for

science. For example, if

defined merely in terms of the papers in scientific journals, as a
set of abstract theories and experimental results which test those
theories, then science appears divorced from society and from politics. Such a definition may then be used to justify scientific
autonomy, on the grounds that political interference has nothing to
contribute to science and therefore will only serve to hinder or
distort science. "Nothing seems more hostile to science,"

writes

Jean-Jacques Salomon, "than to have to render account to any auth,o rity except its own internal discussions." 2 If, on the hand, science
is defined as an . instrument for the exploitation of people and the
environment, then science is an evil requiring a maximum of public
scrutiny.
Salomon has argued that the definition of science as theory and
experiment is inadequate because theory and experiment "cannot be
divorced from the activities which nourish them" ; 3 and the defini-

4

tion of science as exploitation is inadequate because it confuses
"the evils of a social practice of science" with the nature of
science. 4 He, in turn, defines science as "the activity carried on
by researchers -

scientists, engineers, and technicians". 5 David

Dickson adopts a similar definition in The New Politics of Science:
science is "the activity of those who define themselves as research
scientists." 6
Though these two definitions, in effect, avoid defining science
by shifting the onus onto "activity" and "research", they are satisfactory for the purposes of this thesis because they emphasise the
role of scientists in science. Within Australia, research scientists
form a readily identifiable group, being largely concentrated in
university science departments and in government research laboratories, principally the CSIRO. The number of industrial research
scientists, in 1984, was relatively small. FASTS was an attempt to
bring these research scientists, and technologists, together into a
single community of science and technology. But to build a cohesive
community, FASTS would need to share more than common survival and
self-interest. "The idea of the 'scientific community'," Salomon
writes, "calls up the picture of a professional group united by the
similarity of its intellectual interests and the norms by which it is
guided." 7·
All definitions exclude; indeed, one of the principal purposes
of definition 'is to exclude. By identifying science with the work of
scientists, the definition excludes all high school teachers of
science from science, it excludes the majority of science graduates
who go into computer programming, into production, sales, or other

5

areas of business; it excludes the Department of Science and the
Minister for Science. It isolates scientists, justifies their defence
of "real" science, increases their paranoia when under attack from
outside, provides a barrier to dealing with wider social and political aspects of science, and substitutes no internal sense of the
importance of these broader issues or the means to deal with them.
Sociology, management, and politics are not a standard part of any
science degree.
Early studies of the sociology of the scientific research
community, especially in the USA, attempted to identify the "norms",
or "moral consensus", which distinguishes the scientific community
from other social groups. 8 The norms identified mostly to R.K. Merton -

and attributable

were: universality of scientific content,

communality of knowledge, disinterestedness in experiment, organised
skepticism, originality, humility, rationality, and individualism. 9
Universality, for example, implies a

;'successful and amiable"

consensus within the scientific community. 10 Scientists are meant
to appear "open-minded, impartial and self-critical" . 11 Or, as
Daniel Kevles has written, on the convention of the supposed,
impersonal nature of science: "only the truth about nature is worth
having. Knowledge of the human beings who seek it is relatively
unimportant." 12. In extreme, the scientist is, as Janna Thompson
writes, merely "a scientific instrument, which observes, measures,

'
'
calculates and
deduces. nl3 Most scient·ists
would accept many of
these norms as an ideal for scientific endeavour, while recognising
that they are often lacking in their own work and the work of their
colleagues; besides, Thompson argues, most scientists would allow

6

some room in science "for aesthetic appreciation, passion and imagina-

.
..14
t ion.
But, i f scientists have, in fact, universally shared such norms,
why is there no code of ethics for science? As sociologists have
taken great pains to point out, these norms do not generally coincide
with the actual behaviour of scientists, are imprecise, and are not
homogeneous throughout the scientific community. 15
Moreover, it is argued, universal scientific values come from
shared

paradigms,

rather

th an

"from

an

overall

scientific

'ethos' ." 16 The uncritical acceptance of norms by scientists is an
expression of this paradigm rather than of a critical study of
reality. This acceptance of norms forms an ideology of science,
which, in turn, affects "the choice of priorities and directions of
scientific development"; and yet the appeals to objectivity, to
expertise and to universality attempt to hide this ideology . 17 "The

.

ideological crisis in science," J.-M. Levy-Leblond writes, "arises
from the contradiction between this reality and the image". 18
During the Nineteenth Century, academic science split into the
formal disciplines of physics, chemistry, biology, geology, etc.
During the Twentieth Century, this differentiation continued with the
formation of subdisciplines and inter-disciplines, each developing
its own societies and networks of formal and informal links, holding
its own conferences, and publishing its own journals. 19 Science
became not one community but a complex network of highly specialised
communities. Hence physics became solid state physics, nuclear
physics, upper atmosphere physics, surface physics, etc. So specialised have these areas become that Salomon was able to comment:

7

"It is in the restricted circles of specialists that the researcher
finds his (sic] identity as a scientist." 20 In these circles, the
scientist learns a particular outlook on science enced colleagues -

from more experi-

and searches for recognition. "Each field," M.

Hales writes, "has a sub-cultural identity", a form of tribalism,
which leads to "real obstacles to communication, cooperation and a
wider relationship within a popular culture." 21 FASTS is an attempt
to bridge these tribal barriers between specialist societies.
Science has become a craft. 22 "Membership in a

scientific

research community," M.J. Mulkay writes, "entails acceptance of the
intellectual standards defining what kinds of problems and solutions
are legitimate, ... only research which is generally regarded as
meeting

those

standards

. .
..2 3 Assessment o f
recognition.

is

rewarded

with

professional

qua l i' t y comes f rem peep l e war k'ing

closely in the same field and generally from those most eminent in
the field. These eminent leaders then interact with other eminent
leaders in other fields to spread the network of control of science.
Professional recognition amongst peers is clearly important to
scientists as may be judged by the number of prizes, awards, and
medals, by the importance of establishing priority of discovery, and
by the high prestige afforded some leading-edge research areas.

24

The quest for recognition may, at times, assume such importance as to
distort research priorities and overcome the "accepted norms" of
science, such as disinterestedness.
The specialisation of science, with its key role

fo~

eminent

scientists and areas of special prestige, leads to a science hierarchy and elitism. Science, therefore, is "inherently political" .

25

8

The bulk of leading scientists are professors, or their equivalents in the non-academic sectors; they form "the ruling groups of
scientific work." 26 Professors are "the main defenders of scientific -

or departmental -

autonomy, accept or resist innovations in

their fields, play a leading part in fighting scientific controversies or establishing consensus." 27 A study in the USA in 1972
showed that science professors tended to be less conservative,
politically, than their juniors, less conservative than scientists in
business, less conservative than engineers, but more conservative
than professors in the humanities. 28 Professors, or their equivalents, are the heads of most scientific societies; and FASTS can be
seen as the outcome of the activities of these professorial heads of
societies. In establishing FASTS they claimed to be representing the
"grass-roots" of science; it is difficult, therefore, to know whether
FASTS is an establishment of the leaders of science or of the
"grass-roots", expressed through its leaders.
Scientists and technologists have adopted three main political
roles: as advocates, for research and higher education; as advisors,
to government; and as adversaries, "in public questions on technical
issues" . 29 The necessity of political involvement stems from the
dependence of much of scientific research on government financial
support, and from the recognition that science and technology are
playing an increasingly important role in modern society; and yet, as
we have seen; a political role for science does not sit easily with a
supposedly apolitical science. The approach often adopted .by scientists in response to this dilemma is to attempt to remove the "passion" from politics

30

and to propose purely technical solutions to

9

political questions, "whether or not the parties to a particular
conflict will accept them." 31 To politicians, then, scientists
often appear naive.
Paradoxically, scientists often enter politics to reduce the
involvement of politics in their science. 32 In effect, they enter
politics to improve politics, by placing it on a more rational and
informed basis, and to improve science, by keeping politics away from
science. But the battle between science and politics is inherently an
unequal fight. As Salomon comments: "science has no special claims to
challenge the rationality of politics, but politics challenges the
rationality of the scientific institution." 33 The entry of science
into politics was initially seen as the "scientification" of politics, but, as Peter Weingart concludes, it has ended with the "politicalisation" of science, with science becoming subject to political
conflicts. 34
Weingart argues that the concept of a scientific power elite
operating behind the scenes in government policy making is a "chimera", because there is no coherent scientific community to wield that
power, there is no common set of values and beliefs amongst scientists to motivate that power, and scientific knowledge is not the
sole preserve of scientists to delineate that power.

35

In dealing

with politics scientists do not have a coherent political stance,
"alliances and fractions emerge [amongst scientists] which run along
the lines of political convictions rather than of systems of knowledge." 36 For FASTS to survive, in the long term, it must develop
mechanisms to handle such divergent political views within its
community of science and technology societies.

10
Haberer's historical study of science from the days of Bacon and
Descartes to the Twentieth Century shows that, in major confrontations between science and politics, the latter has always prevailed.
"what is remarkable,"

he writes,

is that when the interests and values of science confront those
of politics, the community of science has ultimately tended to
acquiesce with astonishing ease permitting, with only token
opposition, the destruction of colleagues and scientific institutions, and the perpetuation of obvious assaults upon the integrity of science itself. 37

The reason for this acquiescence, he explains, rests with the apolitical and instrumental ideology of science which removes the desire
amongst scientists to sacrifice themselves for

science.

A good way, Haberer contends, to study a community is when it is
facing a crisis; a crisis he defines as a situation "of great stress
and conflict". 38 At such times, the leaders of science often hope
to manipulate politicians but usually end up being used in turn and
discarded, hence the acquiescence. M.D. King claims external threats
to scientific status and autonomy produce an "identity crisis" in
science, in which "alternative conceptions of the distinctive skills,
rights and responsibilities which . constitute the profession's idea of
itself are thrown up and debated." 39 It . is essentially an internal
crisis, the depth

of

which

may

not be fully

appreciated by

non-scientists. A personal observation by Daniel Greenberg shows
another aspect of science in crisis:

11

having made a rapid ascent from deep poverty to great affluence
[in the USA], •.. , [the science community] still tends to be a
bit excitable -

not unlike a nouveau riche in a fluctuating

market. The denial of a grant is equated with the persecution of
Galileo; a harsh word from a know-nothing congressman, and the
Cosmos Club simmers with talk of a new Dark Age. 40

The crisis in Australian science in 1984 is interesting to observe
from these three differing perspectives.
Science came under increasing attack in the 1960s for its
contribution to war and to "the deterioration of the natural and
social environment". 41 From a radical perspective, the war in
Vietnam was a struggle "against the science and technology of profit
and oppression". 42 In the 1970s, governments took increasing
interest in controlled economic growth and the role that science
might play in this. During these years scientists, also, began
re-examining their social responsibility; many saw a completely
autonomous science as socially irresponsible. 43 But as the government calls for more planning of science coincided with many of the
earlier suggestions from the radical movements of the 1960s, for more
public participation in science, many of the more conservative
scientists saw governments of the 1970s and 1980s becoming progressively more "anti-science". 44
In his book, The Physicists, a historical analysis of physics in
the USA, Dan.l.el Kevles ends with a summary of the dilemmas facing
modern physics, and by extension, modern science: the

nee~

to sepa-

rate technical opinions from "political and ideological convictions";
the position of the "disinterested expert" versus loyalty to an

12
employer or granting body; pure science versus "practical goals"; a
dangerous alliance with "big business and the military"; and a
"best-science elitism" in a pluralist democracy. For over two hundred
years, Kevles concludes, physicists have remained "a special establishment ••• destined to function in an uneasy tension with the
democracy from which they derived vitality, sustenance, and purpose." 45 The crisis in 1984 carried with it all of these modern
dilemmas.
The development of science policy as a separate discipline
coincided with the growth of government involvement in science.
Science policy has two general aims: a "policy for science", to allow
science to function optimally; and "science for policy", to allow the
optimal exploitation of the fruits of science. 46 Salomon describes
two extremes of the planning of science: M. Polanyi's "republic of
science", with science left to the scientists and no outside intervention; and C.F. Carter's "integrationist" concept of no autonomy for
science, with science fully planned according to economic needs. 47
Polanyi was a Nobel prize winning scientist and Carter an economist.
Science policy tends to steer a course somewhere between these two
extremes, attempting to relate government support for science to
. l , economic
.
socia
an d

.
1 priori
.
•t•ies. 48
po 1.itica

External priorities pose at least two major difficulties for
science. Non-science derived priorities disrupt the peer review
system - so central to peer recognition -

for assessing the quality

of scientific work; and a community of science, split into small
enclaves of specialities, where individual recognition is largely
from within the speciality, finds it difficult to assess the relative

13
importance of differing specialities. How does a scientist from one
discipline assess the status of another discipline when the content,
the paradigms and indeed the very language of that other discipline
may be foreign? Reduced autonomy, therefore, is a threat to the very
"character of the scientific endeavour." 49 To a less sympathetic
eye, the reluctance by supporters of scientific research to set
interdisciplinary priorities may be seen as a desire to keep control
over the ultimate distribution of the funds, and therefore be seen as
merely self-serving.so

1.2.

Earlier Crises in

Australian Science

Barry Chiswell, in 1983, warned Australian chemists of the
dangers of ignoring history:

For so long chemistry has been taught without any sense of
history, that now we have come to believe that the pattern of
our corpus of knowledge and our methods of teaching it, are both
unalterable. 51

Suggestions for change - for example, to the balance between pure and
applied research or in priorities between different fields of research - may then be seen as attempts to change the very basis of
this immutab.le pattern and corpus of knowledge and, in so doing,
precipitate a

crisis.

14
When I graduated in 1978 with a PhD in surface physics, I knew
very little of the history of science in Australia or of the way
science in Australia was organised. In retrospect, this is surprising
because physics is generally taught with a strong sense of history:
in a reverence for great physicists of the past, for fundamental
experiments and theoretical breakthroughs, and in the attributing of
variables and equations to their inventors (for example, the newton
for the unit of force, or the Schrodinger wave equation); but these
historical events are viewed in isolation, as individual events, so
that the underlying historical and social processes are not seen. A
mere collection of events in this sense is not a history.
The roots of many of the problems which emerged in the 1980s can
be traced back to the Great War and beyond, problems at the core of
Australian science, like the long dependence on British science, the
late development of science policy, the rifts amongst the three
research sectors, the universities, government laboratories, and
industrial R&D, and the paucity of industrial R&D.
The funding crisis in university research seems all the more
terrible when one is unaware of just how recent adequate funding has
been for universities and how little research universities in the
past actually did in comparison with today. Without this historical
perspective, a major research effort appears the natural thing for a
university. It may also clarify the reluctance of today's academics
to give up.their relatively new found

wealth.

Ignorance of the history of science is, of course, not limited
to scientists. The heavy commitment of the CSIRO to primary industry
rather than to manufacturing industry appears reprehensible, today,
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when one is not aware of the historical origins of the CSIR (predecessor of the CSIRO) with its early reliance on agriculture, of the many
great successes of the CSIR/CSIRO in agriculture, or of the distinctive structure of Australian industry with its heavy reliance on
primary industries and the effect that hiding behind tariff barriers
has had on its innovative capacity.
Crisis, or at least a time of prolonged difficulty or of major
structural change, is not new to Australian science. The CSIR took
ten years in the making from 1916 to 1926; ASTEC took even longer,
from 1957 to 1978; the great depression of 1929 to 1933 brought tough
years for science, as it did for most sectors of the economy; the
universities did not get anywhere near enough research funding until
they obtained Commonwealth support in the 1960s; and the 1970s
brought a growing disenchantment with science and technology over
Vietnam, and their contribution to "environmental and social deterioration". 52 But the three episodes of most interest for comparison
with the events of the 1980s are the turbulent years 1939 to 1949
which saw the rise of the Australian

Association of Scientific

Workers in 1939 and the fall of it and of the CSIR in 1949; the ARGS
(the Australian Research Grants Scheme) funding crisis in the last
year of the Whitlam Labor government in 1975; and the AIRDIS (the
Australian Industrial Research and Development Incentives Scheme}
funding crisis in 1982. There can be no coincidence that two of these
crises occurred within ten years of the present one. The 1970s and
1980s were a period in which Australian science lost much of its
post-War prestige and influence.
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The Australian Association of Scientific Workers (AAS W) was in
some ways a forerunner of FASTS. It was formed in July 1939, largely
by young scientists returning from post-graduate studies in the
United Kingdom where they were exposed to similar politically minded
organisations and movements, such as the British "social relations of
science" movement, the British Association of Scientific Workers and
the Cambridge Scientists' Anti-War Group. The AAS w was formed with a
constitutional aim of "securing the wider application of science for
the welfare of society." 53 The founders

hoped "to attract the

broadest possible membership" by avoiding "party politics and vested
interests". 54 This same attitude of the broadest possible membership and the welfare of society would be taken up in the 1980s by
FASTS; but, while membership in the AAS W was by individual scientists, membership in FASTS would be through their societies: the
group representation in FASTS is likely to be the more conservative
of the two structures.
By 1944, the AASW membership had peaked at about 1,000, or "more
than 30 per cent of Australia's total scientific population", estimated then at some 3,000 to 4,000 people. 55

But the year of its

greatest success in terms ·of numbers was also the year when strong
internal divisions emerged in the organisation, over the political
role of science, which led rapidly to many of the more senior,
"respectable" and conservative members resigning from the AAS W. 56
The remaining core of members, therefore, was younger, more radical,
and more defenceless.
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In 1946, with the beginnings of the Cold War, the Liberal Party
accused the AASW and its industrial arm, the Federation of Scientific
Workers (FSTW), of working for Russia, in particular of acting as a
"fifth column" for the infiltration of communism into the

cs IR.

Eventually, the AAS W collapsed and, as a direct consequence of the
parliamentary attacks on the credibility ·O f the CSIR, the CSIR was
reconstituted in 1949 and renamed the Common wealth Scientific and
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO). Thereafter, CSIRO officers
were subjected to security screening, 57 to keep out undesirable
scientists. Given the events of the 1980s, one might now mourn the
premature end to that scientific democracy promised by the appearance
Of the AASW in the 1940s.
In post-War Australia, science became progressively apolitical
as the attention of scientists in Australia Kingdom and the USA -

as in the United

was diverted to ensuring the autonomy of

science from further government interference. commenting on the
period to 1965, Ron Johnston and Jean

Buckley write:

The government's decision-making about key directions in the
development of science were made _with the advice and influence
of a small elite behind closed doors; there was almost no
discussion with the wider community of scientists, let alone the
general public. 58

While times were good, and science was growing in prestige and
government support, scientists were generally prepared to allow this
cosy state to continue.

18
The position changed dramatically in 1975. In the middle of that
year, the Minister for Labour and Immigration, Clyde Cameron, was
demoted to Science and Consumer Affairs. In stark contrast to Barry
Jones in 1983, Cameron expressed no interest in his new portfolio of
science.

His

attitude

may

explain

in

part

the

staggering

administrative error in the Federal Budget which cut 66% from the
allocation to the Australian Research Grants Scheme (ARGS) and 47%
from the National Health and Medical Research Council (NH&MRC). 59
The mistake was aggravated in the minds of scientists by an earlier
election promise not to cut either scheme. 60 Gough Whitlam, in his
"full" account of the Whitlam years, 1972-1975, published in 1985,
makes no mention of this incident, though, in erudite fashion, he
does mention at length his correspondence with Cameron on the correct
pronunciation of the "kilometre". 61 Such is the relative importance
to prime ministers and academics of the ARGS.
Professor Westfold, of Monash University, then became words -

in his

"the spearhead" of academic attempts to have the Budget

decision reversed. Press releases, and telexes, and letters, to the
Prime Minister and relevant ministers, deploring the reductions and
predicting the dire consequences for Australian research, were signed
and issued by the chairs of university research committees and the
chairs of scientific societies. The Chairman of the ARGC, Professor
Street, also of Monash University, began negotiating with the Government to restore t h e

cuts, "b ut a 1 1 to no avai.·11162
•

Protest meetings were held simultaneously at universities in
Melbourne and Sydney on 10 September 1975. A message of support for
the aims of the meetings was received, signed by all 37 CSIRO Chiefs
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of Division. Dr Douglas N. Everingham, Minister for Health, attended
the Melbourne meeting and read a long statement from the Prime
Minister. ·The audience was amazed when they heard his statement
challenge the meeting to provide figures setting out "the actual
financial benefits flowing from ARGC grants." 63
Extra money was rapidly organised for the NH&MRC, by Everingham
and the new Treasurer, Bill Hayden; but the case for the ARGC required more argument. The success of the NH&MRC throughout the 1970s
and 1980s and the apparent ease with which it could justify large
increases in support would become an increasing annoyance for
non-medical scientists as they watched the NH&MRC funds rapidly
overhaul and pass the ARGS. Professor Str.e et continued negotiations
with the Prime Minister's Department and with Treasury. Fin ally a
package was worked out on 25 September 1975 which, though not reversing the Budget, did provide the ARGC with $ 7 .2 million, down 20% on
the $9 million from the previous year.
Representatives from the universities in Melbourne and Sydney
met on 11 October 1975 at La Trobe University to plan a future
strategy. Westfold comments:

Those of us who had been involved in the events of this sorry
saga which had taken place withiii the short space of one month,
resolved th.en that steps would have to be taken to remedy the
almost total ignorance within the ministry and Government
bureaucracy as to what basic research is all about. 64
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On 14 April 1976 the university representative committee established
the Australia Committee for Research (ACR), with Westfold as Convenor. This committee kept in contact with the two succeeding Liberal/National Party Ministers for Science, Senator Jim Webster and
Brig. David Thomson, before complacency once again set in. The
Australia Committee for Research was never formally dissolved. In
1985, Westfold welcomed the founding of FASTS as the natural successor to the ACR, with the hope that FASTS would be in a position to
prevent a repeat of the shock of 1975, by informing parliamentarians
of the value of scientific research. 65
The early 1980s saw the formation of the Department of Science
and Technology, with Thomson as Minister, and the department's first
formal interest in high technology with a public forum on "Creating
High Technology Enterprises", in February 1981. In those early years,
Thomson worked closely with the new shadow minister for Science and
Technology, Barry Jones, to develop a bipartisan policy in an area he
considered too important to hamper with party politics. Under the
influence of the differing philosophies of the two men, the Department of Science and Technology, developed an uneasy, dual approach of
both key technologies and key industries. The early 1980s also saw
the release of an ASTEC report recommending increased incentives for
industrial· R&D, in particular tax incentives, because of the declining levels of industrial R&D; 66 the release of the controversial
Myer report on technological change in Australia, which promoted the
concept that technological change meant economic growth,

th~t

Austra-

lian industry needed to keep pace with overseas technology, and that
Australia needed to increase the general level of technological
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expertise within its community 67 ; and Prime Minister Malcolm
Fraser's promotion of a minerals boom, as the Australian economy
headed into recession.
The Department of Finance became concerned, in 1981, that the
Australian Industrial Research and Development Incentive Scheme
(AIRDIS) was forward committing too much of its funds and hence
robbing the government of control of the scheme. The Department of
Finance, therefore, towards the end of 1981, arbitrarily set a limit
of $38 million on forward commitment for the AIRDIS. Since this sum
had already been committed, their decision meant no more money was
available for new projects, and this in turn left $14 million unspent
and 160 projects unsupported. The backlog of over 300 1981-82 project
applications was carried over to the next year causing a pile-up of
1982-83 applications. The Department of Finance had blundered in not
understanding the nature of R&D, with most projects taking 2 to 5
years to complete and therefore necessitating a high level of forward·
commitment. The Department of Finance, and the Treasury, would become
a continuing hindrance for Barry Jones and his Department of Science
and Technology in succeeding years.
To heighten the difficulties of the scheme, the Industries
Assistance Commission brought out a paper critical of the effectiveness of the AIRDI scheme 68 and then decided to hold a hearing into
its future. All submissions to the inquiry favoured some form of
government assistance for industrial R&D, many preferring tax incentives, and a number supporting AIROIS, including the Confederation of
Australian Industry, Email, and the Department of Science and Technology. Some opposed the scheme, including the CRA mining company and
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the Australian Industries Development Assistance. In July 1982, the
Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, announced that no major changes would
be made to AIRDIS and that the forward commitment money would be
freed to allow the scheme's grants to flow again. The argument over
tax incentives versus grants, however, did not end here.
The reaction of Australia's scientists to the two funding
crises, of 1975 and 1982, were characteristically different as were
the targets of the funding cuts. When the ARGS was cut in 1975, the
universities, with CSIRO support, combined to form an action committee to protest at the cuts and to argue for more money. When AIRD IS
was cut, admittedly less drastically, in 1981-82, scientists in the
main left the protesting up to the industry organisations. The
scientists affected in the former crisis were academics; while the
scientists affected by the latter were mostly in industry. They were
fewer in number and less easily motivated and organised than their
academic colleagues. Few of them would have seen a cut to AIRDIS as a
threat to their livelihood. This difference in reaction would carry
over into FASTS, with the difficulty of attracting industry based
societies into joining FASTS.

1.3.

Other Science Organisations

FASTS was formed in 1985 because, at a time of perceived crisis,
Australian scientists found they had no other, appropriate or powerful enough, voice to air their concerns or to lobby government on
their behalf for a better deal for science. Individual scientists and
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the heads of individual scientific societies had spoken out, but
their protests had not produced the desired effect. The urgency of
the crisis was accentuated by the conviction amongst scientists that
science offered the only long term solution to Australia's economic
problems. As Greenberg has remarked, the scientists sincerely be.
" 69
lieved "that what was good for science was good for society

None of the existing science organisations satisfied the necessary
criteria: of representing all Australian scientists and of having the
resources and the will to lobby government.
ANZAAS was formed in the 1880s to bring Australian scientists
and the Australian public together to discuss scientific developments
of mutual interest. It had no specific political purpose and effectively ceased to exist between meeting's, with a new management
committee being appointed after each meeting simply to organise the
next meeting. This left no continuity in its management to act as an
effective voice for science, even if ANZAAS were to see this as a
legitimate activity.
The CSIRO, being the largest research organisation in Australia,
contains a large proportion of Australia's scientists. The CSIRO was
reformed from the CSIR iri the 1940s with an emphasis on security,
secrecy and public service control. CSIRO officers, in the main,
quickly became .reticent to speak in public, even about their own
work, let alone about political issues which were critical of the
government, to whom they were responsible and on whom they depended
for virtually all their funding.
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The Australian Academy of Science initially exerted influence on
government through the prestige of its membership and through personal contacts with politicians and policy makers. This influence
appeared to diminish in the 1970s and 1980s as the size of government
increased and the prestige of science decreased. Nevertheless many
scientists expected the Academy to play a stronger role in averting
the crisis in 1984, while others saw the elitist nature of the
Academy as preventing the Academy from truly representing the interests of all Australian scientists from the so-called "grass-roots".
The Australian Research Grants Committee (ARGC} was in a position to argue for better funding for the ARGS, which it did in every
year of its existence, but the ARGC represented only academic research and included both the sciences and the humanities. The ARGC
was also totally dependent on government grant support.
The Australian Science and Technology Council reported directly
to the Prime Minister and therefore was in a relatively influential
position. ASTEC sought advice on technical matters from leading
scientists but its membership was not composed entirely of scientists
and ASTEC steadfastly refused to lobby government on behalf of
science or scientists, seeing in this the risk of losing its credibility as a

source of independent advice to government.

· The Commonwealth Department of Science and Technology (DST) was
formed in 1980. It had responsibility for the public service administration of Australian science; for implementing government policy on
science and technology; and for the development of new science and
technology policies to

~resent

to government. The DST, however, was

always viewed by professional scientists as part of the government
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rather than as part of science and, being on the opposing side, so to
speak, was the primary target for science lobbying.
The Australian Institute of Physics played a central role in the
founding of FASTS, with the first President (Professor Fred Smith)
and first Past President (Professor Geoff Wilson) both coming from
the Institute. Indeed, the second and current President (Professor
Frank Larkins), though representing chemistry, is also a Fellow of
the Australian Institute of Physics. A key committee in the Institute
is its Science Policy Committee and Wilson chaired this committee
from 1983 to 1984 and Smith from 1985 to 1986. I was a member of the
committee from 1983 to 1988 and so played a small part in the events
of those years.
In the thesis I have included my role as an interested observer
as this necessarily colours my analysis. It would be dishonest to
pretend otherwise. To focus the work on Australian science and to
heighten the historical feel of the study, where possible I

have

deliberately quoted only from Australian literature published or
released in Australia during the years 1983-1985, except where
required to relate the work to a more general science and technology
studies context. Because of the relatively inaccessible nature of
parts of the study, especially the goings-on in government circles in
Canberra and the informal recording of many science conferences, I
have been -forced . to rely more heavily on
secondary sources than would
.
be desirable 'in a purely historical work; chief amongst these sources
is the journal Scitech, edited and published by Jane Ford. In using
these, I have concentrated, where possible, on the actual words of
the primary author as quoted in the secondary source.
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So the stage is set for the events of 1983, leading up to the
crisis in 1984 and the forming of FASTS in 1985. In this political
drama there are many intertwining subjects: the key role of high
technology in the political debate and the falling world position of
Australia in the world economy, the battles between the Department of
Science and Technology (DST) and the economic agencies, the battle
between Barry Jones and the CSIRO, the position of the DST and a
marginalised science of being politically on the outer when seen to
be rightfully on the inner, the pressing of science to bail out the
ailing industrial research sector, a halt to the growth in funding
for the universities and for the large government research agencies,
and finally the non-fulfilment of expectations over promised increases for the ARGS.
The thesis covers the two years from April 1983 to April 1985.
It was always envisaged that it would eventually form part of a
larger work covering, in addition, the activities of the Interim
Federation Committee (from April to llovember 1985), the Foundation
Meeting of FASTS on 12 November

198~

and the first years of opera-

tion of FASTS and NSTAG, from 1986 to 1989 -

the year when Barry

Jones was rehabilitated, as Minister assisting the Prime Minister,
and the National Technology Strategy was revived, as the policy
statement, Science and Technology for Australia. 70 The thesis ends

in April 1985, at the National Meeting of Concern for Science and
Technology, to concentrate on the causes, the nature, and the outcomes of the crisis in 1984.
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CHAPTER 2.

GROWING EXPECTATIONS

1983

Our timorous social history, the feeble grasp of complex matters
that is exhibited by too many of our leaders, the low level of
intellectual vitality, our lack of national self-confidence, our
national tendency towards bureaucracy, conformity, obedience and
fatalism, and the mediocrity of the business and academic
establishment do not give us

much ground for optimism.
B.O. JONES, Hansard, 1980 1

Part 1: The 1983 Election and the Economic Summit

2.1.

Barry Jones and the Post-Industrial Society

When Barry Jones -

lawyer, historian, politician -

rose to

.

speak, on a matter of public importance,
on 4 December 1980, he began
.
a new phase in his outspoken public career, venturing into the new
field . of science and technology policy. "Australian I he began, "the
poor little rich country, has fallen almost to the bottom of the list
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of technologically advanced nations in expenditure on research and
development •.• This is a national disgrace." 2 Jones had identified what he saw as the causes of the problems facing Australia: the
government's failure to stimulate Australian research and development, the domination of the Australian economy by foreign multinational companies, and the progressive introduction of labour displacing
rather than labour complementing technologies. Now he must find the
solution. A little over a year later, he was shadow minister for
Science and Technology, had released the ALP's "science and Technology Policy", which he modestly described as the best party policy in
the English speaking world, and had published his most successful
book, Sleepers,

Wake!, Technology and the Future of

Work. 3

Amongst the generally favourable reviews of Sleepers, Wake!,
Christopher Freeman, of the University of Sussex, described Jones'
book as "one of the best", "an extremely interesting and provocative
book"; 4 and Ken Tucker, of the David Syme Business School, in his
review, described Jones as "a thinker of refreshing originality and a
writer of persuasive conviction." 5 The title, Sleepers, Wake!,
comes from a J .s. Bach Cantata (No. 140, Wachet auf):

"sleep er s,

Wake! The watchman on the heights is calling ••• " 6 It was more than
a simple appeal from Jones for Australians to waken to the danger of failing to deal with post-industrial change -

which Jones

perceived was threatening them, it was an appeal to look up, to view
the danger from a more lofty position: "In the 1970s," he writes,
"politicians,

bureaucrats

and

economists

were too

close to

post-industrial changes to see them in perspective, recognise what
was happening and work out appropriate responses." 7 So fundamental
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was this change, he warned, that it threatened to "destroy the
fragile consensus on which the democratic system depends." 8
Such a threat was clearly beyond the ability of c ,o nventional
economic wisdom to handle effectively. It called for a fundamental
reappraisal of the relationship between technology and society.
"Technology is a political instrument," he writes, 9 and in placing
the solution outside conventional economics, Jones set himself and
conventional economists in opposing political camps. Jones anticipated this opposition from the beginning; he described his conventional
opponents as "economic optimists'' who put their faith in market
forces, insisting "that market forces

regulate employment." 10

Economists, as a group, he writes, are "the most irrepressible
Micawbers to be found anywhere" . 11 In asserting the inadequacy of
conventional economics, Jones would be challenged in turn to demonstrate whether radical thinking can provide better, or more effective, economic policies. 12
In his book, Sleepers, Wake!, Jones was principally concerned
with the impact of technological change on employment and work. In
pre-industrial society, he writes, the dominant form of employment
was agriculture; in the ensuing industrial era, employment was
dominated by industry; and in the current post-industrial era,
beginning perhaps in the 1970s, emplotment is shifting towards
services; this era, he predicts, will be followed rapidly by a
post-service 'era of education, leisure, and tourism. 13 The society
of the post-industrial era, he describes as an

informatio~

society,

indeed Jones describes Australia as an information society. 14
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Despite the apparent inevitability of these changes, from
agriculture to industry to services, and the danger of not adapting
to them, Jones wisely rejects the concept of "technological determinism": that society has no choice in the adaptation and control of
technology; and proposes instead that governments should "assert
their right to shape, influence and -

where necessary -

control

technological development" . 15 He recommends increases in the
retention rates in our high schools, and greater access to information, so that our society may be better able to deal with the demands
of an information society; an increase in expenditure on R&D; a
series of social and work reforms; and finally

he calls for the

raising of the level of consciousness towards technology - implicit
in the title of his book -

and asserts the right of any society to

choose its own future. 16
Technology in its broadest sense is an organised "way of doing
things" • 17 It therefore includes social, political, economic and
scientific factors; and when the term is applied to things, people,
companies, or governments, it includes not just what they "do", but
all those factors which motivate, support, allow, and shape what they
do and how and why they do it. This multi-dimensional, political/cultural nature of

techn~logy

offers society choices in the

selection and .management of technological change. A nation need not
accept the inevitability or immutability of any form of technological
change.
Writers on Post-industrial Society divide economic history,
broadly, into three phases: a pre-industrial phase, dating from
pre-history to about the middle of the Eighteenth Century and based
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on agriculture and trade; an industrial phase, dating from about the
mid-Eighteenth Century to at least the middle of the Twentieth
Century, based on the Industrial Revolution (or several industrial
revolutions); and a post-industrial phase, which we have just entered, or are about to enter. The major political issue in the model,
then, is society adapting to technological change, rather than
redirecting technology to overall social goals.
This broad description of economic history as three discrete
phases ignores the facts that different countries have undergone such
changes at different times, and at different rates, and that all
countries carry mixed economies, with varying dependencies on agriculture,

trade,

manufacturing

industry,

and

the

so-called

post-industrial industries. The developed countries, then, in the
post-industrial society model, are those which have advanced most
down this path. The concept also carries with it the assumption that
the post-industrial phase is in some way inevitable, that countries
must follow this path or fall behind - hence its links with technological determinism; that it is economically superior to the past, since
less advanced countries will not be able to compete - hence its links
with the idea of "progress". The model also glosses over differences
between capitalist and socialist economies. A socialist perspective
would see a

post~industrial

capitalist society as a continuation of

capitalism without much revolutionary change.
The theory of Post-industrial Society is also closely linked
with various theories of long-waves in economic activity. The existence of "long waves" or cycles of boom and bust in economic activity
was first proposed by J. Van Gelderen, in 1913, and Nikolai Kondra-
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tiev, in 1926. 18 Kondratiev associated ·"important discoveries and
inventions" with the downswing in the wave and a large-scale application of these inventions with the next upswing. 19 In 1939, Joseph
Schumpeter suggested that the long waves were associated with clusters of key innovations and that, consequently, technological innovation was "an essential input into economic growth". 2 O Later, in
1975, Gerhard Mensch developed sch umpeter' s ideas, proposing that
depressions give rise to surges in innovation which then promote the
new wave of economic growth. 21 The ingredients, then, for a " new
age" were key innovations, the right economic climate (such as a
depression) and new markets. 22
The Mensch scheme began with key inventions. In the scheme, key
inventions occur irregularly; but, during depressions, the promise of
big profits from key innovations which flow from these inventions,
attracts capital, and a rapid growth phase results. Later, stagnation
sets in as saturation of demand is reached and other companies
entering the market produce over-capacity. Capital is then used to
displace labour, to cut costs. Mergers lead to further economies of
scale; but a lack of "demand-inducing innovations" finally leads
again to recession and depression. 23 The lesson for a wise company
- or country - therefore is to keep an eye out for key innovations,
so as to jump . onto the band-waggon for the new wave.
Christopher Freeman in studying structural relationships between
technologicai change and unemployment, initially became a "fervent
promoter" of Schumpeter and Kondratiev, and stressed the role of "new
.
" in
.
.
k ey inven
.
t'ions. 24
branches of fundamental science
pro d ucing

More recently, concerned with the shaky statistical evidence for
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clusters of key innovations, he has proposed a different mechanism
for cyclical economic activity: basic innovations occur irregularly,
often associated with breakthroughs in basic science and technology;
but only when a swarm of imitators joins in is there a significant
economic effect. 25
The evidence linking innovation surges to economic recovery has
always seemed rather tenuous, and a small number of cycles (typically
four), of debatable duration, in 200 years gives little confidence in
the theory's predictive ability for the future. 26 D.E. Weiss in his
study of the history of the chemical industry found

statistical

support for Mensch's ideas, but there was considerable latitude in
his definition and selection of which key innovations to include in
his analysis. In contrast, H.D. Haustein and E. Neuwirth, in a more
global study of industrial production and innovations, have found
their analysis does not support Mensch. 27
Opponents of the post-industrial society concept, and of the
technology-driven cyclical models, dislike the way the long waves
exclude politics. To justify their opposition, they emphasise the
disagreements amongst supporters of the models on the duration of the
long wave cycles, and the disagreements over causes; they assert
instead that political networks drive the economic trends. More
radical opponents of the Post-industrial Society model question the
indicators of progress, deplore the increasing alienation and the
continued erosion of limited resources from continued industrialisation and economic growth, reject scientific control of nature and
planning, promote decentralisation, seek to decrease the importance
of experts, to demystify science, and to promote public participation
in decision-making. 28
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There seems little new, therefore, conceptually, in Jones'
appeal to the image of a post-industrial society, a society which is
undergoing profound structural change as it moves from the dominance
of manufacturing industries to that of service or "knowledge-based"
industries.
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What is remarkable is the enthusiasm with which Jones

brought the concept before the Australian people.
Dickson attributes the interest in Kondratiev "long-wave theory", which developed in the 1970s, to the depression in the 1970s and
early 1980s and the theory's "implicit message of hope for the
future". 3

° For

traditional economists the 1970s were an "unusual

bunching of unfortunate disturbances", such as the OPEC oil crisis,
which were temporary, unlikely to be repeated, and if managed with
normal monetary policies would eventually allow national economies to
resume their post-war expansion. For the proponents of the
post-industrial society (or the related cyclical, technology-driven
models), the 1970s were an indication of fundamental, structural
change which could not be handled effectively through monetary
policies alone. Jones quite clearly stood with the latter, in opposition to the former, and the fundamental and entrenched differences in
the two position.s would mean a protracted and, at times, a bitter
debate. This is perhaps not the place to argue, at length, the
weaknesses

in

the

concept

of

technological

change

in

a

post-industrial society - essentially the way it over simplifies the
complex political nature of social and technological change
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suffice it to say, that such weaknesses were eventually exploited by
Jones' opponents to undermine his credibility.
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By stressing the central role of technological change, the
models had important consequences for science and for science and
technology policy: a central role for technological change meant
expertise in science and technology would become increasingly indispensable in a post-industrial society. But indispensable does not
necessarily mean politically powerful since, as Lakoff explains,
scientific expertise does not carry with it any special "moral or
legal authority". 32 This absence of political control has brought
frustration to those scientists who expected control to come with
expertise.
Kevles has noted, on the contrary, at least in the USA, that the
last three economic downswings have resulted in calls for cuts in
science funding, by "budget-cutting conservatives and socially
purposeful reformers". 33 To counter such a move in the 1980s, the
promotion of a central role for innovation in a

post-industrial

society, it would seem, should allow scientists, as a

source of

invention, to argue for greater support. But, in adopting this
argument, scientists must then deal with the criticism that in
Australia there has often been a failure in bringing inventions to
the innovation stage. Government policies must also be redesigned to
foster the new technologies, leading to a debate on how to select
these new technologies, and whether Australia could compete in these
new areas. Scientists would then be dragged into the debate on
priorities in'R&D spending and into the links between R&D and economic success. In arguing for increased support science would become
entwined in these political debates, with the threat of politicalising science. Freeman warns: "Those countries who wish to compete
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successfully in international trade in the closing decades of this
century will be obliged ..• to look to the link between their technology policies and their economic policies." 34

2.2.

The Federal Election 1983

Facing a tough economic climate which promised only to worsen
through 1983, Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser made the difficult
decision to call an early election, for 5 March 1983. He had expected
that divisions within the Australian Labor Party, over its leadership, would weaken the opposition's election campaign; but on the
same day, and almost to the same hour, that Fraser approached the
Governor General to issue a writ for the double dissolution of
parliament, Bill Hayden stepped down as leader of the Labor Party in
favour of the former trade union leader, Bob Hawke. To Fraser's
dismay, instead of a divided Labor Party, on the following morning,
the newspapers were able to announce the forthcoming election as:
"Fraser versus Hawke". 35
The central issue in the election was the economy. As Davis et
al. have remarked, "A government [in Australia) considered incapable
of managing the .economy is invariably condemned as unsuitable to hold
office, whatever the impact of its other policies. " 36 Unemployment
stood at a long-term high of 10% of the workforce; industrial disputation appeared out of control; inflation was running at over 10% and
interest rates were unaccustomly high at 13%; wages were expected to
blow out during 1983; drought was affecting the rural economy; and
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the

overall growth

rate

had

dropped

below 1%, threatening

recession. 37 It would be a difficult election for Fraser to win.
In the months before the official election campaign, the Australian Labor Party (ALP), in anticipating an early election, had
attempted to seize the initiative on the economy. The ALP portrayed
the Australian economy to be in "crisis", and accused the Fraser
government of "missed opportunities" to prevent the crisis. Its
leaders depicted the ALP, on the other hand, as having the only
"realistic" solutions to the crisis: consensus, recovery, reconstruction, and technological development, in particular, "sunrise industries". Shadow treasurer Paul Keating blamed the Fraser government's
contractionary policies for Australia's economic troubles and offered
instead

to

expand

the

economy

into

recovery

and

then

reconstruction. 38 Jones, as shadow minister for Science and Technology told the press that the ALP's sunrise industries policy meant:
" Labor

has a

policy for the future. "39

Hawke, his personality a major election issue as he tackled
Fraser, set the Labor Party, and the nation, the task of national
.
.
th e d ivision
. . .
h e c 1 aime
.
d
reconci'liation
an d consensus, 40 .t o overcome
the Fraser government had encouraged in setting Australian "against
Australian and

grou~

against group " • 41

As a . first . step in the new consensus, the ALP, before the
'

election, struck a "prices and wages" accord with the union movement
to contain inflation, industrial disputation, and the anticipated
wages explosion. As the second step, Hawke offered to call, after the
election, a national economic summit to achieve consensus on the
difficulties facing the Australian economy, and to bring Australians
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together to tackle their mutual economic problems. He promised to
create 500,000 new jobs over the coming three years, as part of a
$2.8 billion economic expansion package. 42
The value of Jones' overall contribution to the ALP winning the
Federal election in 1983 is difficult to assess. On the one hand, his
rhetoric of technological change reinforced the sense of crisis in
the Australian economy and the inadequacy of the government's attempts to handle the crisis; but, on t}'le other hand, science and
technology received little direct coverage by the major newspapers in
the weeks leading up to the election. Jones worked hard to make
science and technology an election issue. He presented the spectre of
technological change sweeping the advanced nations of the world,
threatening to reduce Australia to the rank of a less developed
country, and to reduce the living standards of all Australians. By
linking technology policy with economic reconstruction Jones offered
a hope for the future; and undoubtedly his efforts created interest
amongst scientists and others concerned with science and technology
policy.
The ALP science and technology policy which Jones promoted
promised, amongst its major initiatives: support for 16 "sunrise"
industries; a 10% real increase for the Australian Research Grants
Scheme (ARGS), which, with inflation running at 11% per annum, meant
a 21% increase .in the first year; increases for the Australian

.

Industrial Research and Development Incentive Scheme (AIRDIS);
greater availability of venture capital; expansion of the Department
of science and Technology (DST), and increased funding for Antarctic
research. 43 The science and technology community stood to gain a
good deal from

a

Labor victory.
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David Thomson, in his years as Minister for Science and Technology, had also worked hard to promote science and technology (S&T)
issues, in a bipartisan fashion with Jones, and in particular he had
supported the idea of key technologies; but in all his efforts as
Minister he had been unable to generate the public interest and
response that Jones was now doing for the ALP. 44
Having lost the initiative in the early part of the election
campaign, the Liberal/National coalition decided to take up the
technology challenge. And "high technology" became an election
issue. 45 Malcolm Fraser, who rarely mentioned S&T matters in the
past,

and

his

senior

Ministers

began

talking

up

"high

technology" • 46 In a speech to the Young Liberals in Adelaide,
Fraser announced: "We will •.. need to examine whether Australia
spends enough on research and development and the application of new
•
tee h no 1 ogy ••• ; 47 an d in
his election speech, Fraser promised a
II

30% real increase in medical research funds and the creation of an
Advanced Technology Corporation to assist innovators by providing
venture capita1. 48
Increasing the impact of the high technology issue in the weeks
leading up to the election, both the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences (ATS) and the Australian Scientific Instruments Association - (ASIA) released reports on venture capital and high technology.
Under pressure, the government announced a National Biotechnology

.

Scheme, $10 million more for AIRDIS, and consideration of a tax
incentive scheme for high technology companies.
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44
The Liberal/National Coalition lost the election. Malcolm Fraser
stepped down as leader of the Liberal Party; David Thomson lost his
seat of Leichhardt, in northern Queensland; and both men retired from
federal politics. Hawke and the ALP had won, with a massive 25 seat
majority in the House of Representatives; Jones and the election
climate had generated a widespread interest in high technology. Gone,
for the moment, were concerns over the adverse effects of high
technology - on employment, on social stability, and on the environment; high technology was seen, by both sides, as beneficial and
linked with future prosperity. 5 O The scientific comm unity was
optimistic; they identified science and technology, and in particular
research and development, closely with high technology, and Jones had
promised major increases in funding for R&D.

2.3.

Jones, Minister for Science and Technology

Barry Jones was made Minister for Science and Technology in the
new Hawke Labor government; he was also appointed to three of the
nine key ministerial committees, those on economic policy, industry
policy and infrastructure. On the strength of his book, Sleepers,
Wake!, and the ALP science and technology policy, and on his prodigious memory too perhaps, and despite his lack of formal scientific
training, Jon·e s was viewed as having a "strong grasp" of science and
technology issues. Dr C.K. Coogan, in Laboratory News, described him
as "the most constructive critic ever to give his considerable
talents to the field of S&T"; 51 and Jane Ford, in Scitech, wrote
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that Jones "seems sure to bring a totally new look to the (S&T]
portfolio, energetically promoting many new initiatives and catalysing the normally staid bureaucracy." 52
After the election, Jones continued the rhetoric of crisis and
the need for immediate high growth in technology-based industries. In
a radio interview shortly after the election, he commented: "What I'm
concerned about is that time ..• is running out for us ..•. We really
have to move very quickly indeed, or else (I] think you are going to
find our standards of living deteriorating"; 53 and some days later
in The Herald, he added: "Australia is losing ground steadily in
economic and employment growth, standards of living, and national

~

cauita income". 54 A key indicator, for Jones, of the state of the
Australian economy was the adverse ratio of 9.5 to 1 for imports to
exports

of

high

technology

products.

For

Jones,

with

his

post-industrial society vision of the future, this meant having "to
change Australia's technological base". 5 5 Top policy priorities
would therefore be: increasing the availability of venture capital,
and increasing the level of industrial R&D by 100% over the next five
years. 56 In implementing his industrial policies Jones looked to
support from John Dawkins, Minister for Trade, and John Button,
Minister for Industry and Commerce. 57
Thinking that, at last, Australia had a science and technology
minister who was literate in - and committed to - science and technology, many in' the scientific community looked forward keenly both to
his implementing his science and technology policies and his stimulating greater attention within the government as a whole to science and
technology matters which scientists saw as crucial to economic
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recovery. 58 This enthusiasm was further fuelled

by his talk of

increased funding for research and development and of greater support
for AIRDis. 59
But the enthusiasm was not universal. The ALP science and
technology policy had stated as one of its aim the need to encourage
the "cSIRO to diversify its research activities in new fields such as
information technology, safety, transport and the environment." 60
Despite the conciliatory word "encourage", the policy was seen within
CSIRO as a threat to CSIRO's autonomy. A further motivation for what
followed may well have been concern within the bureaucracy of the
CSIRO that, given Jones interest in science and technology, he was
more likely to interfere in the running · of the CSIRO. Immediately
after the election, Dr Paul Wild, Chairman of the CSIRO, contacted
Jones and then wrote to Hawke requesting that the CSIRO be moved from
the Department of Science and Technology to the Prime Minister's
Department, in a position similar to ASTEC, on the basis that Department of science and Technology (DST) was mostly interested in technology while the CSIRO had broader interests spanning several departments. 61 Jones, supported by Thomson, strongly opposed this move
which would have greatly diminished the responsibilities and prestige
of his portfolio and Hawke quashed the suggestion.
· Jones had clearly looked to the CSIRO to support his initiatives
in sunrise industries. 62 In the light of future events and the
troubled relationship between Jones and Wild which would develop,
this was a most inauspicious beginning. It is a pity that Jones would
be left without the support of the CSIRO in his promotion of a
greater role for science and technology in government policy, and
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that the CSIRO should not have realised that it would need the full
support of Labor's only science and technology literate minister to
deal with a Labor Government which must inevitably challenge what it
saw as a bastion of elitism and privilege. In the previous Whitlam
Labor government there had been "many areas of conflict" between the
ALP and the CSIRO; the then Minister for Science, William L. Merrison, for example, had considered the "CSIRO to be too big and insufficiently attuned to the needs of industry and the wishes of the
government " • 63 The Hawke Labor government would

continue this

uneasy relationship.

2.4.

Jones on

High Technology and Sunrise Industries

Jones' promotion to Minister of Science and Technology was
keenly received by Australian industry. Pursued by technical journalists, Jones' face began appearing in professional, scientific and
engineering journals. Bob Mills, in the Financial Review, described
him as "the long-time evangelist of the necessity for Australian high
technology"; 64 Paul Coombes in Rydqe's described Jones as "an
enthusiastic apostle for getting Australia up and running in new
ventures"; 65 for Justin Paine in Engineers Australia, he was "the
disciple of high technology"; 66 for Susan

Woods in Australian

Business, he was the "Brains Trust Minister"; 67 and for Peter
Vernon in Electronics Australia, he was a "passionate advocate of
high . technology". 68 I

can remember, in 1983, seeing research

managers within BHP avidly reading his book, Sleepers Wake! Technolo-
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gy and the future of work, to get some insight into the thinking of
this man who promised to bring so much change to industrial R&D.
Given the nature and extent of the changes Jones wished to
introduce, his words to industry could not be just promises and
exhortations. "Business," he told them, "is really going to be
divided between the quick and the dead"; many Australian businessmen,
he added, "don't know what you are talking about" ; 69 and, more
pointedly, "a lot of people in big business haven't had a new idea
for years. You'd need a tin opener to prise an idea out of them." 70
This was fine for businessmen - provided they thought he was talking
about someone other than themselves; it also touched a sympathetic
response from academics and government research workers who saw
business as chiefly responsible for the low level of industrial R&D
and for the recognised low level of interaction between government
funded research and industry. Another remark by Jones at this time
which reinforced the position of Australia's scientists was: "What we
are concerned with very much is picking out talented people and
letting them get on with it." 71 This was indeed how university and
CSIRO researchers saw themselves, talented people, working hard at
what they were good at, at what interested them, and at what would
eventually benefit mankind. "It was argued," echoing Greenberg in the
1960s, "and sincerely so, that what was good for science was good for
society". 7 2
Since tne 1983 ,e lection, the term "high technology" has been
associated, in Australia, with the name Barry Jones. Indeed, Jones
generated so much inte_rest in high technology that the term, high
technology, has become part of the political landscape. 73 Part of
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the success of the term "high technology" rests with the difficulty
of actually defining it, which gives both its proponents and opponents a great degree of freedom in its use and abuse. This flexibility of definition has resulted in the term being continually redefined
to suit different political ends; Richard Joseph associates this
political dimension of the term with attempts "to alleviate anxieties
and fears" about the social impacts of technological change and to
"promote visions of the future", such as Jones' po st-industrial
society. 74
Joseph has identified four basic classes of definition in the
term "high technology", in Australia, in the 1980s, depending on
which of the following four criteria is selected: product complexity,
the number of people employed with science and technology backgrounds, the level of R&D, and the degree of value-added in the
product. 75 Jones, for example, associated high technology with his
16 sunrise industries, selected, at least in part, because of Australia's leading R& D position in these areas; and it is only natural
then that scientists, such as Dr Paul Wild, Chairman of the CSIRO,
should take Jones' lead and define high technology as originating
"from science and scientific research" .• 76 Irrespective of which
criterion is used, however, the total employment in high technology

in Australia in 1983 was only 2 to 5% of the workforce, acknowledgement of which led Jones to shift from the employment-bias of his
book, Sleepers, Wake!, to wealth generation, wealth which could then
be used to fund other government programs, and later, to shift to
high technology as a means of overcoming Australia's deteriorating
balance of payments figures, a major preoccupation of the government
in later years.

so
The key or linchpin to Jones' strategy for healing the Australian economy and for bringing about the needed structural change was
not so much "high technology" as his 16 "sunrise industries". The
future,

he

believed,

lay

with

high

growth,

brain-based

industries. 77 The 16 were chosen because of Australia's leading
research position in these areas, because of their domestic market
potential, their niche potential in international markets, and
because of their capacity to generate wealth. "we isolated 16 sunrise
industries in our policy," he told Peter Vernon of Electronics
Australia:

It wasn't really a matter of going out and picking them. It
could be fairly said that the areas picked themselves. They were
the areas where we were recognised as being world leaders or
very close to it, with a few exceptions. The exceptions were
areas where we had a very large recognised domestic need which
could be filled. 7 8
Of the 16, Jones admitted biotechnology was "a personal passion". 79
Many

of

the

areas,

biotechnology,

computer

software,

custom-built computer chips, scientific instruments, medical technologies, lasers, ceramics, solar energy, and shape-memory alloys were
areas where Australia had well established, world-class research
efforts in government and academic laboratories. So initially they
were enthusiastically supported by scientists.
'
Dr W.J.McG.
(Greg) Tegart, Secretary of the Department of

Technology and Science, described Jones' effort to develop _ new high
technology industries as a "central aspect of the new Government's
industry policy". Industry policy, however, is one of the most
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difficult areas of government policy making, because of the great
diversity of policies and the widespread· impacts of these policies,
and because of the large number of federal and State departments and
agencies, committees and task forces, involved in industry policy
making.so Already anticipating opposition, Tegart said the policy
was not about "picking winners" but about selecting broad technological priorities and then allowing industry to decide the particular
applications. The selection of key technologies, he added, borrowing
.
"'in d ust ry an d communi' t y consensus " . 81
Haw k e , s p h rase, wou ld require
Jones's promotion of high technology · and sunrise industries was
part of a worldwide trend. David Dickson begins his book, The New
Politics of Science, with the words: "advanced technology has become
the key to •.• economic and military power. And ••• science has
become the key to advanced technology." 82 Martin Ince in his book,
The Politics of British Science, comments that many industrialised
countries are casting around for "the key industries of the future";
increasing their funding of basic research; and "promoting stronger
links

between

academic

laboratories

and

industry". 83

And

Jean-Jacques Salomon warns: all of the industrialised nations are
looking in the same fields -

"electronics, computers, robotics,

biotechnology, energy, materials, communication" -

and not all will

emerge "victors.". 84 The effect on science, in the 1980s, has been
that the non-industrial concerns of science, such as environmental
issues and the advancement of knowledge for its own sake, have been
forced into the background. Science has become "a commo~ity", and
research results "intellectual property". 85
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2.5.

The Espie Report on High Technology

The high technology financing committee of the Australian
Academy of Technological Sciences published its report entitled
"Developing High Technology Enterprises for Australia" in April
1983, 86 though draft copies were available before the election. The
committee was chaired by Sir Frank Espie, a mining industry representative and director of a number of Australia's largest companies.
Subsequently this influential report became known as the Espie
report. The report was aimed at detailing "the high-technology and
venture-capital environments in Australia" 87 and was based in part
on a survey of about 60 high-technology companies. What the committee
found was a worrying long-term decline in economic growth and employment relative to the rest of the world, especially in traditional
manufacturing areas, such as textiles, clothing and footwear; and
that Australia's performance in high technology was not keeping pace
with this decline. The result was a growth in imports to compensate
for dwindling home production, and, in importing more goods, Australia was effectively also importing unemployment. 88
New high technology industries were needed, as a source of
"wealth creation. and employment growth" and as a "cutting edge" for
"a more internationally competitive, export oriented and dynamic
industrial s"ector. " 89 The major obstacles were identified as: the
lack of appropriate risk or venture capital, chiefly because of the
conservative attitude of financiers; "the lack of a technology
infrastructure"; of a favourable environment in government policies,
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for example, in purchasing priorities and taxation; the poor
relationship between entrepreneurs and the scientific community; lack
of management skills amongst entrepreneurs; community attitudes
averse to risk taking; and difficulties in entering large international markets. 9

° Chief amongst the committee's

recommendations was the

establishment of what the report called "venture capital companies" but which would later be known as Licensed Management Investment
Companies, or MICs -

"to provide management guidance and equity

capital", "to encourage private investment in the start up and early
growth

of

defined

'eligible

businesses'

with

high

growth

potential." 91 Some, or perhaps most, of these "eligible businesses"
would clearly be sunrise companies.
The venture capital measures in the Espie report were supported
by Senator Button, Minister for Industry and Commerce, Jones, Minister for Science and Technology, and Chris Hurford, Minister for
Housing and Construction, but were opposed by the Departments of the
Treasury and Finance, and by the Industries Assistance Commission.
Indeed the Department of Finance set up a committee "to discuss the
Espie proposals", as "a delaying tactic". 92 Jones fought back,
describing obdurate members of these government departments as
"unreconstructedly sceptical". 93 But the criticism continued. Bob
Mills, writing in. The Financial Review, denied there was "a shortage
of venture capital in Australia for sound, new, high technology
ventures." 94 'He described the Espie report as "the cottage industry
approach to building companies" and concluded that "high technologies
are no panacea for Australia's economic woes. Even if they grow as
fast as their greatest boosters project," he declared, "we can expect
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them to generate only three to five per cent of gross domestic
product in ten years." 95
The battle over the venture capital market was prolonged throughout the lengthy budget process into August 1983, with Treasurer
Keating making no mention of it in his budget speech. By the Friday
of budget week, however, Jones had won; it was announced that Hawke
had decided to back the scheme. 96

2.6.

The ASIA Report on Technology and Industry

Shortly before the election in 1983, the Australian Scientific
Instruments Association (ASIA), also published a report on Technology
and Industry, through a committee chaired by Professor Peter Farrell,
of the Department of Biomedical Engineering, University of New South
Wales. The ASIA report stated: "The socio .... economic environment must
be set up to encourage a massive evolution of Australian industry
away

from

low-value-added,

low-technology industries into

high-value-added, high-technology and high-growth industries". 97
The report recommended support for venture capital, a

150% tax

incentive scheme for R&O, an increase in the ARGS from $20 million to
$50 million immediately, a doubling of AIRDIS, a shift in the CSIRO
over the next 10 years to conduct 50% of its activities in new
technology arid new industries, government priorities to "buy Australian", reductions in tariffs, and the establishment of a national
. f orma
.
t•
.
98
in
ion service.

SS

All these recommendations, no matter how desirable in themselves, could be seen as self-seeking by an organi.sation whose
members st·o od to benefit from them all. Despite this, a surprising
number of the report's recommendations were implemented in succeeding
years and the remainder continued to be hotly debated. The Chairman
of the Committee, Peter Farrell, continued a high profile in subsequent policy debates.

2.7.

The Anti-Sunrise Industries Debate

Both these high technology reports were clearly supportive of
Barry Jones and his high technology policies, without actually
referring to him specifically by name. But as soon as Jones entered
the Ministry, the criticism of him and his "sunrise Industries"
policy, in particular, began. The government , should not be picking
winners. Let the market ·decide. The 16 sunrise industries were
"merely a repetition of the 'shopping lists' of other countries,
which have larger markets and more expertise and against which
Australia cannot compete." 99 It seemed Australia had lost confidence in its ability to produce and export quality products; other
countries would necessarily do it better.
In their established, large companies, business leaders saw the
sunrise industries policy as not supportive of their traditional
industries, industries responsible for 90% of Australia's GDP. Small
improvements in existing, large industries, they claimed, would have
a bigger impact on GPO, at least in the short term, than all the
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sunrise industries combined.lOO They were concerned that their
industries would be viewed as "sunset industries" ; 101 that sunrise
industries · would be seen as good and sunset industries as bad. 102
High technology sunrise companies were "risky", they argued; 103 and
even if they succeeded it would be 10 to 20 years before they became
fully established. The concerns of the business community were echoed
by some Labor members and union leaders, who saw sunrise industries
as a threat to government support for existing industries and traditional employment. 104
The Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) produced, in mid
1983, a discussion paper entitled "New Technology and Industry

Assistance". 105 The paper criticised the sunrise industries policy,
arguing that government support for predetermined sunrise industries
would jeopardise other emerging activities by preventing them from
attracting finance and resources. The paper also criticised other
government industry policies, including venture capital measures,
purchasing preferences and offsets policies, and provoked in return
sharp criticism from both Jones and Senator Button. 106
Following the release of the IAC report, Andrew Peacock, the new
Leader of the Opposition, reversed Thomson's selective technology
approach and accused the government of trying to pick winners in the
marketplace and of risking taxpayers funds rather than allowing
. k t h eir
.
.
.
entrepreneurs to ris
own or th eir
companies
money. 107

In resp'onse to the mounting criti9ism, both Jones and the
Department of Science and Technology were seen to modify, or weaken,
their position on sunrise industries. Jones admitted that high
technology industries were not big employers, emphasising instead
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that they were wealth generators, wealth which could then be used to
support other programs. 108 The Department of Science and Technology
began by arguing for a dual policy: of support for sunrise industries
and for the development of key technologies in existing industries.
Later, by redefining sunrise industries, to avoid Treasury/Finance
arguments against picking winners, the Department switched to a
single policy of "key technologies " .
These policy shifts, Joseph claims, "weakened Jones' credibility"; Senator Button, Jones' chief ally in cabinet, became more
sceptical and his Department of Industry and Commerce slowed its
initiatives in high technology. 109 Joseph attributes much of the
shift in emphasis, within the Department of Science and Technology,
from high technology to key technologies to a lack of a clear understanding within the Department of how, in fact, to define high
technology and sunrise industries. 110

2.8.

Consensus, Interest Groups, and the Economic Summit .

The central political principle in the first Hawke government
was consensus. The Labor party had won the election largely on the
hope within the electorate that consensus would reunite the nation to
meet its economic problems. An essential element of the Labor party's
consensus was a wages accord forged with the union movement before
the election. This accord promised to lower the high levels of
industrial disputes and to moderate wage ·claims. But wage restraint
by workers had to be matched by price restraint by Australian busi-
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ness. Hence for consensus to function effectively, Hawke also needed
the agreement of Australian business, to moderate price increases,
thereby reducing inflation and hopefully, in conjunction with wage
restraint, of increasing employment. Consensus therefore came to be
identified strongly with a tripartite agreement amongst Government,
business representatives, mostly big business, and the trade union
movement through the ACTU. To be a part of this consensus it appeared
you needed a large and powerful voice. The formation of a large and
potentially powerful voice for scientists which FASTS represents is a
typical response to this consensus.
Superficially at least the tripartite consensus of the Hawke
government fits neatly into various theories of "State corporatism".
Two models of the State which appear to conflict sharply in their
descriptions of how the State operates, are pluralism and corporatism: many would identify pluralism with an ideal form of democracy
(though it is also seen as unstable), an·d corporatism with elitism
and fascism.
Briefly, pluralism asserts that power is dispersed amongst a
variety of social and sectional groups, none of which dominates, with
each pressing for its own interests. The State therefore functions
through bargaining and compromise amongst these various interests. 111
In this perspective, FASTS would simply be one of the many social
groups struggling for attention. Suzanne Berger claims pluralism
works best in times of affluence and minimal government intervention
or in countries "where consensus depends on common and deeply rooted
political beliefs and not primarily on assessment of the [political]
,

n

system s performance and output •

112

The conditions for pluralism
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appear less favourable, then, during times of economic difficulties
when there are calls for a properly

man~ged

State and economy. In

such difficult times, pluralism may lead governments into a condition
of policy "overload", when there are insufficient funds to maintain
all the activities demanded by interest groups. 113 Pluralism may
also being criticised for not be fully representational, since not
all interest groups have equal say and not all citizens form interest
groups -

for example, the poor.

Corporatism, on the other hand, maintains that a number of the
major interest groups have gained a special, and privileged, position
in the control of the State. In the corporatist State, certain
interest groups, such as trade unions and employer associations, are
given a "representational monopoly" in their interest area in exchange for recognising the monopoly of other interest groups. "The
effect of corporatism," Ham and Hill conclude, "is to maintain
harmony [or consensus 114 ] and avoid conflict by allowing these
groups to share power." 115 Claus Offe contends a corporatist trend
has arisen since the 1970s because of the anarchic tendencies of
interests groups in the 1960s and the need "to impose a certain
measure of self-restraint, · discipline, and responsibility on interest
groups" •116 In its most authoritarian form, as in Nazi Germany and
Fascist

Italy,

it

erodes

the

democratic

input

of

other

non-enfranchised social groups. 117 In Sleepers, Wake!, Jones expressed his'concern for the advancing . corporatism in Australia:

Australia is moving towards a 'corporate state' in which
major areas of society are run autonomously: e.g. industrial
relations are left to the employers, . unions and the Conciliation
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and Arbitration Commission, ..• The areas parliament can tackle
are increasingly limited. 118

Within a corporatist state, there are clearly dangers in any
attempt by scientists and technologists to form a major interest
group, for in achieving sole recognition as the voice for science and
technology in Australia this group then runs the risk of accelerating
the corporatist trend and of being subsumed within government in
exchange for compromises with other interests outside science and
technology. This danger is implicit in Dickson's comment on the
political power of science: "scientists and technologists wield power
only through their adhesion and allegiance to an existing political
base." 119
Davis et al. remark that only under Hawke, with his "penchant
for summits as an approach to policy making", has the participation
of pressure groups, in Australia, become "very public." 120 Whether
this amounts to corporatism or a less sinister group incorporation
has been a matter of extensive debate. 121 Peter Loveday, for example, besides pointing out theoretical difficulties in the corporatist
concept, argues that Australia has never had a fully pluralist system
of interest groups, let alone that Australia is moving from pluralism
to corporatism. 122
Davis et

al~

have described some of the general characteristics

of interest groups. Interest groups are readily divided into insider
and outsider groups: insiders develop working relations with government, assist in formulating and implementing policy, and · generally
include business and professional associations; outsiders prefer to
be more distant from government, are either of more marginal concern
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or are seen to be extreme, and include many minority representative
associations. 123 FASTS would clearly qualify as an insider group.
Claus Offe argues that a full understanding of any interest
group requires analysis on three levels, "ideological, economic, and
political"; 124 it is not sufficient to concentrate on the reasons
why a particular interest group was formed, in isolation from the
society in which it emerged. On an ideological level, one should
consider the sense of identity and shared values that hold the group
together; on the economic level, one need study the ttopportunity
structure" of the society in which the group operates; and on the
political level, the opportunities and status afforded to the group
by the political system in which the group operates.
"Most major Australian pressure groups," Davis et al. note, " are
national organisations", and many of these are umbrella organisations, that is, "aggregates of sectional interests." 12 5 some of the
more influential umbrella organisations include the ACTU, formed in
1927 and extended in recent years with the inclusion of several white
collar Councils, the Confederation of Australian Industry, formed in
1977, the National Farmers Federation, formed in 19 7 9, and the
Business Council of Australia, formed in 1984. The formation of FASTS
in 1985 appears part of this especially "modern" trend.
Because pressure groups are generally only concerned with a
limited area of government policy, the leaders of pressure groups
tend to meet'with government representatives concerned with those
same policy areas; the two sides often share similar professional
backgrounds, sit on similar committees, and share many of the same
resources and sources of information. As a result, they tend to form
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• nl26 an d Davis et al.
what Weingart has called a " hybrid community
call a "policy community", 127 and still others might more loosely
call the "old boys network", with each side reliant on the other. As
each policy community works internally from its own viewpoint, the
formation of policy communities has been blamed for the lack of
overall, coherent, government policies. 12 8
In line with Hawke's consensus approach to government, the Labor
Government called a National Economic Summit in April 1983 to deal
with the macroeconomic problems facing the Australian economy. (Peter
Beilharz and Rob Watts, in Australian Society, described the economic
situation they faced as a "crisis" . 12 9 ) The Summit brought together
the government, union leaders, business interests, mostly representing big business, and the economic professions. 130 Beilharz and
Watts contend that Hawke, in emphasising consensus, "by claiming to
represent all the people yet actually excluding the outsiders, the
unorganised, the powerless and those on the left", was, in fact,
"building a

bogus consensus." 131

Amongst those interests not directly represented was the science
and technology community. Traditional economic theorists in the
government were not convinced that science and technology were key
elements in the macroeconomic solution to Australia's woes, and
consequently saw no need to include scientists and technologists in
the debate. A number of scientists for their part criticised "the
lack of emphasis on technology in the summit". The Institution of
Engineers, Australia sought representation but was denied.

~ones,

who

saw science and technology as the key to industrial restructuring,
asked to address the Summit but was refused permission: his sunrise
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industries policy was being criticised by the unions; he may also
have been unpopular in the Labor Caucus; and refusal was seen by some
as "a convenient way of slowing him down". 132 Thus consensus linked
the ACTU and big business against Sunrise.
Despite the absence of representatives from science and technology, science and technology issues were mentioned in several submissions to the summit, including one by the Confederation of Australian
Industry (CAI) and in Senator Button's final day address to the
Summit, in which he emphasised Australia's scientific achievement,
the reluctance of managers to move into high technology, the need for
venture capital, and the need for Australians to take risks. 133
Some months after the Summit, Dr Ian McLean and Richard Joseph,
both working in the strategic policy section of the Department of
Science and Technology which helped prepare Jones' aborted submission
to the Economic Summit, approached Professor Geoff Wilson, President
of the Australian Institute of Physics, with the suggestion that The
Australian Physicist publish Jones' paper. It was duly published in
the October issue 134 and shortly afterwards was tabled in parliament. In reading the paper it is easy to see why Hawke may have
considered it too dramatic, extreme, or diverting. It read, in part:

This conference is structured around (macroeconomics] ••••
The essence of this submission is that this is not enough ••••
the entire capacity and direction of an economy depends on its
technotogical base.
Five areas, all very different in scope and kind, warrant
.particular attention. They are: education and skills; research
and development; community · attitudes; information policy; and
'sunrise' industries and associated technologies. 135
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2.9.

The AIP President and Vice President Meet Jones

Professor G.V.H. (Geoff)

Wilson, Rector of the University

College of the University of New south Wales, at the Australian
Defence Force Academy, Duntroon, became the new President of the
Australian Institute of Physics (AIP) in March 1983. One of Wilson's
first actions as President was to write to Jones congratulating him
on his becoming Minister for Science and Technology and requesting a
meeting with himself and the AIP's new Vice President, Professor Fred
Smith, of the Physics Department, Monash University. 136 The Institute had a history of keeping in touch with parliamentarians and
ministers, and Professor Neville Fletcher, the former AIP President,
and Wilson, as Vice President, had visited Thomson the previous year.
Wilson was also a member of the Australian Research Grants Committee
(ARGC) so in seeking to meet Jones, Wilson was representing both
interests.
Wilson and Smith met Jones on 19 April 1983, for one hour. Smith
recalls it was a warm, sunny Autumn day. They presented their

. con-

cern over the in~dequateness of the ARGS in physical sciences•; the
need for "excellence in research funding"; 137 the Institute's
activities in the Nuclear Armament and Warfare debate; and the
results of the Institute' s employment survey which indicated a
shortage of scientific manpower would threaten any proposed growth in
Australian science and technology. 138 We "were most impressed,"
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Wilson later wrote, "with the Minister's understanding of and concern
.
.
d" • 139 Wh en as k e d
over th e issues
raise

.
a b out. this
meeting, so

important to the future role of the AIP, Wilson commented: "we really
were just making contact with him, discussing views on the ARGS and
the funding of physics, and generally wanted to introduce ourselves
and our society and show we were interested in science policy" . 140
"Looking back," Wilson remarked, "it was a bit weak, the lobbying,
because we only did lobby the Department of Science" • 141 After the
meeting, in the car park, Wilson and smith met by chance with Dr Hugh
Preston, then Director of the Science Policy Section of the Department of Science and Technology. It was the first time Smith had met
Preston. They discussed the proposed Nati,o nal Research Fellowship
Scheme, and, in particular, how many positions might be filled. 142

2 .10.

The AIP Science Policy Committee 1983

The Australian Institute of Physics developed from the Australian Branch of the British Institute of Physics, formed in the 1920s.
It became an independent Institute only in 1963. Approximately 80% of
its current (1986) membership comes from tertiary education and
government research laboratories. 143 In the 1970s, the Institute
established a national Science Policy Committee to discuss some of
the broader issues then emerging in the relatively new field
science policy.

of
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Up to 1983, the Science Policy Committee consisted mainly of
representatives from University physics departments, from the Australian Atomic Energy Commission, and from the CSIRO. Richard Joseph, a
physics graduate, working in the Department of Science and Technology
joined the Committee in 1981. In 1983 he became Secretary of the
Committee. The President of the Institute is automatically chairman
of the Science Policy Committee, and when Wilson began chairing the
Committee in 1983 he decided the Committee needed broadening, "to
address the political agenda of Jones" • 144 As a result of a plea
for new members published in The Australian Physicist six new members
joined the Committee, bringing the membership to 14. The new members
were Dr Barry Allen, of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission
(AAEC), who later acted as technical advisor to the Royal Commission
into British Nuclear Testing in Australia; Professor Peter Burley, of
the School of Economics, La Trobe University; Ms Jan Powe, Science
Master at James Ruse Agricultural High School, who influenced the
Institute's policies on the teaching of high school physice; Professor Allen Runciman, Head of the Department of Solid State Physics at
the Research School of Physical Sciences, the Australian National
University, who led the WO.rking Group on Nuclear Armament and Warfare; John Welch, from TAFE (Technical and Further Education); and
myself, as sole. representative of Australian industry. The more
established members of the Committee were Drs John Harries and Don
Lang, from the AAEC, George Fisher, from the CSIRO Department of Food
Research, Dr John Macfarlaine, from the CSIRO National Measurement
Laboratory; and Professor Peter Mason, Foundation Professor of
Physics, Macquarie University, a populariser of science in books and
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on ABC radio, and future member of the Commission for the Future.
Mason left the Committee in 1986 because of ill health and died in
1987. He was perhaps the only member of the Committee who expressed a

deep and continuing concern for the social impacts of

s &T policy and

the need for scientists to communicate more with the public.
The first committee meeting I attended was held on 12 July 1983.
Dr Trudi Thompson, editor of The Australian Physicist in 198 6-8 7, has
described the Council room in the Physics Department of the University of Sydney where the meetings were held, up to 1989:

The Council Room is a very pleasant panelled room modelled on
similar ones in the Oxbridge Colleges. A large painting of Harry
.
145
Messe l k eeps a watc hf u l eye on t h e procee d ings.

It was a secure, comfortable room from which to view the outside
turmoil in science policy. During the excitement of those early Jones
years, I came to feel that this distinguished committee was indeed
influencing the way Australian S&T policy was developing and, through
this policy, exerting an influence on developments in the Australian
economy.
Looking back, it is debatable whether the Committee really did
exert any direct influence on government policy. Except in its
predictable calls for more ARGS funds, which Smith believes were
effective in maintaining ARGS funds through 1983 to 1985, 146 all
the policy work of the committee was reactive to government reports
or calls for submissions to government enquiries, to an agenda set by
the government. It simply did not have the resources, given the
limited time its members could spare from their work, to initiate new
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policies or direct the government agenda. It might also be argued
that, in the absence of any obvious long-term government program in
the S&T area, the Committee could little more than respond to each
separ.a te government enquiry as it arose. Any real influence on
government actions, by scientists and technologists, at the time came
from direct contact, by Wilson and others, with members of the
government departments, or from recommendations from committees such
as the ARGC which had defined powers within the government. 147 The
former is an example of the "policy community", or old boys network,
in action, while the latter demonstrates the influence of an official
insider group. The influence of the AIP Science Policy Committ-ee was
more diffuse, in providing a sounding board and resource for Wilson,
and later Fred Smith, at the Committee · meetings and in enhancing
their role as true representatives of the wider physics community,
and for affecting the thinking of the Australian physics community
through its publications in The Australian Physicist. Of equal
importance, in the formation of FASTS, the activities of the Science
Policy Committee increased the prestige of the Institute within the
wider scientific community.

2.11.

The A.RGS in 198 3

Professor T. F. (Fred) Smith, Professor of Experimental Physics
and Chairman of the Department of Physics, Monash

Universi~y,

became,

in 1985, both President of the Australian Institute of Physics and
Foundation President of FASTS. In 1983, he was Vice President of the
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Institute and keenly concerned with ARGS funding. Under his guidance
the AIP Science Policy Committee published a paper in The Australian
Physicist on the state of ARGS funding. The paper concluded: "rev ersals (are] occurring in every discipline in the physical sciences",
and: "the AIP must continue to press for an increase in research
funding" • 148
In response to the Science Policy Committee report, Professor
Peter

w.

Sheehan, of the University of Queensland, Chairman of the

ARGC, replied by letter to Professor Wilson that a major concern of
the ARGC in the physical sciences was the inadequacy of funds for
scientific equipment:

The QEFARGC is extremely concerned about the state of much of
the equipment being used by our outstanding research workers.
Modernization of equipment is urgent, but we need more funds in
order to do it. 149

Professor Frank Larkins, of the Department of Chemistry, University of Tasmania, was another leading scientist keenly concerned with
ARGS funding. Professor Larkins, a chemist, was also a Fellow of the
Australian Institute of Physics an,d had moved to Tasmania from the
Chemistry Department, Monash University, where he naturally knew
Smith. In 1987 he became FASTS's second President. In the RACI's
publication Chemistry in Australia, Larkins recorded "a very severe
setback in 1983" for the ARGS, with "a decline in real terms for the
first time" since 1976,150 the year of the Cameron disaster. Chemietry had received only

3~%

of its requested figure and the percentage

of ARGS funds going to chemistry was continuing to decline, from
19.1% in 1973 to 15.3% in 1983.
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The concerns of the chemistry community were further expressed
by Professor D.R. Stranks, Vice Chancellor of the University of
Adelaide, in his presidential address to the Chemistry Section of the
52nd ANZAAS Congress in Sydney. In commenting on the decline in both
ARGS and CTEC (Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission) funds, he
remarked that in the past it had been assumed that CTEC funds would
adequately cover general research needs and that the ARGS would
support the best projects above this level. But CTEC funds were no
longer adequate to provide the base funds, he claimed. It was not
only chemistry which was suffering but "the nation's welfare and
advancement". An investment in chemistry, he told them, was "an
investment in Australia's future".

He concluded: "The national

investment in basic chemical science in Australia is totally inadequate

"151

Basic research is the most autonomous form of research. Though
subject of course to those social and peer pressures which restrict
full personal autonomy in any human endeavour, in basic research, the
researcher largely determines the subject, the direction, and the
pace, of his or her research. All three professors, Smith, Larkins,
and Stranks, saw it as part of their roles as professors to defend
the funding of basic research. In defending basic research they were
also defending the autonomy of science.
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2.12.

A Public Voice Needed for Scientists

Throughout 1983 there were increasing calls for a more public
voice for science. Dr Peter Pockley, of the Public Affairs Unit, at
the University of New South Wales, speaking at the ANZAAS Congress in
Perth (May 1983) called for "the establishment of a national program
for promoting public understanding of science". It was the beginning
of a campaign which would lead eventually to the National Science and
Technology Information Service. He justified the program on four
grounds: community support was needed to increase "the science and
technology base of the nation's economy"; awareness of the impact of
science on a changing world would help "personal comprehension" of
the world; public issues would be assisted by rational, scientific
processes; and science would contribute to the nation's "culture and
intellectual development." 152 Pockley sent a copy of his paper to
Professor Wilson, requesting comment from the Institute. Wilson
replied in his President's Column in The Australian Physicist that
the Institute was doing much "to relate physics to school children.
It may be that the Institute can however do more to inform the
general public." 153
Peter G. Lehman, Editor of Chemistry in Australia also asked the
question,

~·should

the Institute [in this case, the Royal Australian

.
.
.
.
?" • 154
Chemical
Institute
(RACI)] b e more ac t'ive in
pu bl'ic a ff airs.

In August 1982, the RACI's Development Committee had reported that
"there was strong support for the Institute being more active in
public affairs and government and unanimous demand for more timely
reviews of government reports and recommendations" • 155 In response
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to this demand the RAC!, in 1983, established its own science Policy
Committee, to "coordinate all input to government". 156 The RAC!
Science Policy Committee, as with its physics counterpart, however,
concerned itself principally with responding to government reports
and initiatives, which, Lehman noted, left two areas uncovered:
"proposing initiatives directly and the provision of information on
contemporary issues to facilitate rational discussion". Amongst such
issues, Lehman listed recent public interest in the health of CSIRO
staff, asbestos, and the poison 2,4,5-T.
In an obvious plea for support from the science and technology
community, during an interview with the ANU Reporter, Jones accused
Australian scientists of taking a "vow of silence", in not explaining
their work to the public. 157 Newly appointed as a part-time Executive Member of the CSIRO, Justice Michael Kirby, Chairman of the Law
Reform Commission, reinforced this theme when he said:

I believe more scientists have to speak out themselves, rather
than succumb to what I believe is snob peer pressure against
158
communicating complicated matters to society.

Scientists were speaking out, amongst themselves at scientific
conferences, and as individuals in letters t ,o daily newspapers. But,
as we have seen, there was no driving philosophical need for the
general science community to involve science in politics and, at this
stage, no coherent voice for the S&T community to speak out with,
other than through the leadership of the CSIRO which was initially
antagonist to Jones. Jones was therefore essentially on his own, with
dwindling support in Cabinet and mounting opposition from big business and the ACTU.
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Part 2: The National Technology Conference

2.13.

ANU Seminar on "science Research in Australia -

Who

Benefits?"

The Department of Continuing Education at the Australian National University organised a seminar in Canberra on 23-24 June 1983,
entitled "science Research in Australia -

Who Benefits?" • 1 Whatev-

er its motives in organising the seminar, the conference was a shock
for Australian scientists. Having identified the deficiencies in
industrial R&D as the fault of management, buoyed by Jones' enthusiasm for science-based high technology, confident in their espousal of
the economic, social and cultural benefits of basic research, and
eager for increased government support for R&D, the scientific
establishment, to their surprise, found themselves and their institutions under attack and being blamed for the poor success rate in
moving the results of basic research into commercial realisation, and
for the economic crisis which was seen to have arisen, in part, from
this.
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The conference began predictably enough with Professor Arthur
Birch, President of the Australian Academy of Science, telling the
audience the purpose of the seminar was to examine why Australia was
not "reaping the benefit of its creative achievements in science,
invention and technology" . 2 Barry Jones officially opened the
conference by stating his commitment to "giving top priority in
Science and Technology to generating economic growth". 3 During his
speech, Jones was critical of the low level of industrial R&D and
especially the attitude of managers: Australia's major problem, he
said, was the "almost Pavlovian reaction" of managers to foreign
competition. 4 He was also critical of the CSIRO, for not adopting
"a more progressive attitude to technological change." 5
Amongst the members of the science establishment present were:
Dr Paul Wild, Chairman of the CSIRO, who chronicled the successes of
the CSIRO and discussed the difficulties of switching the CSIRO's
research efforts too rapidly from rural industries to information and
service industries; 6 Professor Sir Rutherford Robertson, who spoke
in support of research, per se, "that challenging and enjoyable
occupation"; 7 and Professor Ian Ross, deputy vice-chancellor of the
Australian National University, who spoke of the general concerns of
university research staff: frustrated expectations following the
"cessation of growth" in the universities, the shortage of graduate
students, and the aging of university research staff. 8
More critical was Professor Peter Farrell, of the Centre for
Biomedical Engineering, a .t the University of New South . Wales. He
continued Jones' criticism of R&D expenditure levels by manufacturing
industry, but also called for a redirection of policies to promote

83

the commercialisation of university research. He criticised Australian universities for being far too slow "to form links with indus-

t ry " . 9
Professor Ron Johnston, of the University of Wollongong, told
the conference Australia benefited from Australian R& D only through
its international scientific reputation; the main beneficiaries of
Australian R&D were the researchers themselves, foreign companies and
foreign economies. He criticised the size and structure of Australia's science and technology effort which led to little interaction
between research and industry and to the marginalisation of science
and technology. 10 Australia, he argued, could no longer survive
with a

marginal science and technology system. 11

Dr Greg Tegart, Secretary of the Department of Science and
Technology, amongst more placating remarks, argued that Australia
could not afford to "remain locked into outmoded and inappropriate
patterns of allocating funds to R&D which have been determined by
historical circumstances that are no longer relevant." 12
Dr Stuart Macdonald, of the Department of Economics, University
of Queensland, already at loggerheads with the CSIRO over its public
accountability did not, however, hold back in his remarks: he criticised the CSIRO for preserving "research directions more suited to a
plantation· economy", and for being detached from the realities of the
recession in its demands for budget allocations above the CPI (Consumer Price Index). He described the CSIRO as "a grand old battleship,
too expensive to convert and too valuable to scuttle". 13 But he
reserved most of his criticism for government policies - and implicitly for those of Barry Jones - on high technology, and "the mistaken
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belief that Australia was well-endowed to launch into high technology
industry" • 14
Ann Moyal, honorary editor of Search, in what Jean Buckley-Moran
describes as her "inimitable forthright style", 15 spoke of what she
saw as an incestuous, academically-oriented and self-perpetuating
research system in Australia. 16 Uncompromising, she outlined "some
serious 'compass errors' in the advisory system by which resources
are allocated to R & o", such as the concentration on 'pure' research, and the gap between scientists and "the growing body of
scholars of Science and Technology Policy in Australia." 17 Afterwards she wrote, in Search:

Science is under fierce review in Australia. It is none too soon
.•.• Australia has been dominated for far too long by a - male
gerontocracy of elite scientists who appear more concerned with
pushing the barrow for their basic research disciplines than
with the overall balance and strength of national science. 18

And in

summing up the conference, she wrote:

the complacent attitudes of the scientific establishment, as
exemplified by CSIRO's Chairman and by Professor John Swan of
Monash University (whose summing up of the final session on 'New
Directions' entirely ignored every critical paper including that
of the Minister for Science), sorely tempted this writer to
subtitle this report, in Dr Wild's inimitable style, 'Wild Asses
and Dying swans'. 19

The response from other critics at the conference was as pointed
and savage. Dr Adrian Gibbs, of the Research School of Biological
Sciences, Australian National University, also complained that
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science was "controlled by a gerontocracy which controls the peer
review system, funding and advice to government." "The same old
.
" . 20 " Research, "
faces," he added, "appear on every committee

someone in the audience volunteered, "is enjoying yourself at government expense" . 21 Jane Ford, editor of Scitech, in her report on the
conference, described these "younger, more radical elements" in the
audience as a "new anti-Academy of Science push". 22 The younger
members were reacting against the apparent hierarchical, elitist
nature of science; not against the scientific credentials of this
elite - these were not in question here - but against their dominance
in urgent political issues and their conservative, non-urgent ap-

preach to these issues. This aspect of the debate, indeed, hinged on
who should speak for science, the established leaders or the community of science. The discussion, reported Ford, "was notable for its
clashes of opinion, its open criticism of accepted structures and the
willingness of even some of the more establishment figures to speak
out". 23 Birch later described the discussion as "frank, fair,
lively, informed, [and] sometimes not very polite"; Ann Moy al, he
noted, in particular, "did not pull any punches." 24 Professors Fred
Smith and John Prescott (of the University of Adelaide and Chairman
of the AIP Employment Committee) Australian Institute of Physics -

both there representing the

commented later: "the discussion

sought to determine who to blame! Fewer claimed to know what to do
about it~"

25

The virulence and unexpectedness of the attack led naturally to
defensive responses from the scientists presented. Professor Robert
Porter, Director of the John Curtin School of Medical Research, at
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the Australian National University, for example, "stoutly defended
the national and international standing of Australian medical discovery " ; 26 Professor Ian Ross remarked that the "major marketable
scientific resource produced by the universities and institutes of
technology" was "people"; and Wild commented on changing directions
in CSIRo. 27 For Wild, Macdonald's remarks about the CSIRO had hit
home. As he prepared for his retirement 1n 1985, Wild recalled this
conference and Macdonald's reference to the CSIRO as a grand old
battleship:

My experience of this world is limited. I have, all my life,
had only two jobs. The first which overlapped the war years was
service in the Royal Navy in that grand old battleship HMS King
George V; the second has been service in CSIRO. So you might say
I have spent my whole life in battleships. CSIRO, you may
remember was called a grand old battleship last year by a
disgruntled science analyst who was making an abortive destroyer
attack, ••• It was left to a London newspaper, "The Financial
Times" to respond to that taunt. It used these words:
Whether the description of the CSIRO as a "grand old battleship" is fair or not is hard to say. What is not in dispute
is the weight of its firepower, and the range of its guns.
In the campaign to haul Australia's industry and workforce
into the technological present, the CSIRO's position at the
28
head of the fleet is unchallengeable.

The conference, Jane Ford concluded, "revealed deep rifts and
antagonisms in the scientific community and led to the questioning of
many conventional beliefs on accountability, the need for fundamental
resea.r ch, peer review and in particular whether ageing, scientific
elites should continue to determine the direction of research through
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the distribution of funds." 29 Professor Rosa's comment on the
importance of post-graduate research training was a theme Fred Smith
would take up over and over again in succeeding years. In his report
on the conference for the AIP, he (along with John Prescott) wrote:

this is perhaps the most important point for the AIP. Unless
Australia produces enough scientists and innovative engineers to
staff the sunrise industries, the rising sun will plop ignominiously back into the sea. 30

The degree to which Smith and Prescott were disturbed by the outcome
of the conference is well reflected in the following passage of their
report; the passage is worth recording here at length because of its
defensive tone:

Ironically, it appeared that it was because of its success that
the pure research sector came in for so much criticism. It was
as if the pure research workers were in some way to blame for
the lack of [industrial] development .... While there may be
grounds for directing criticism at the policy makers of CSIRO
for their failure to direct more effort towards the needs of
industry, it is unfortunate that the university research sector
has also been subject to the same degree of criticism. While it
is true that more contact between university and industry is
desirable, nevertheless it should be recognised that the major
function
of . university research programmes is in the training of
.
higher degree students. 31
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2.14.

AIP Seminar on "Physics and the New Technology -

Sunrise

or Sunset?"

In July, the Victorian branch of the AIP held an evening seminar
on "Physics and the New Technology - Sunrise or Sunset?" at the Laby
Theatre, University of Melbourne. 32 The seminar may well have been
held in response to a paper by Dr Ken Mccracken at AN z AAS in May,
entitled "W(h)ither Australian Physics", in which he warned that
Australia's future prosperity lay with the creation of new "science
based" industries, and that unless physicists communicated "this fact
to government, then Australian physics will suffer that fate that
history accords to all discredited cults." 33
The seminar was attended by over 200 people, indicative of the
level of interest in science and technology policy at the time. The
principal speakers and panellists were Barry Jones, Minister for
Science and Technology, Professor Ron Johnston, from the University
of Wollongong, Professor Max Brennan, University of Sydney (and new
Chairman of the AAEC), Professor Fred Smith, Monash University, Dr
Clive Coogan, CS IR O, and

Dr Mark S ch a pp er, CR A. 3 4

Barry Jones delivered the opening ad·dress, commenting at first
on the early lead by Australian physics in radiophysics, radioastronomy, computers and electronics, and then shifting to condemning the
"absolutely minuscule contribution" of industry to R&D, which meant,
he said, that' "so many of the concepts that are developed within the
academic world, within the research community, just stay at that
level". Jones said he was battling the very strong and deeply held
view "in the Departments of the Treasury and Finance, and in the
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet" that Australia was only
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good at primary production, that Australia was "not really up to it",
that Australia was "not really capable of making an adequate contribution to research and development throughout the world". 35 Jones
ended with a

warning to scientists:

a lot of the people I find in the scientific and technological
community are wonderful people, lovely people, and all that, but
they really are politically naive, and they don't really know
how to apply political pressure. So as pressure groups go I
think the academic community are really non-starters, they're
just very poor at that. 36

2 .15.

ASTEC 1983

Professor Ralph Slatyer FAA FRS became Chairman of ASTEC in
December 1982, following the retirement of Sir Geoffrey Badger,
Chairman of ASTEC from its beginnings in 1977. Slatyer predicted an
"interesting period ahead f9r science and technology under the new
government" and "an increasingly important role" for ASTE C "'in
economic and industrial policy making". In particular, AST EC would be
moving more into industrial and economic areas and be placing a
greater emphasis on the contribution of science and technology "to
Australia's industrial and economic development" • 37 In doing this,
he said, ASTEC would remain an "effe·c tive and an independent authoritative source of advice to the government" and would not be "under
the thumb of any one department, particularly the Department of
Science and Technology which could be seen to have vested interests." 38 These closing remarks offered little support for

Barry
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Jones and his department and little joy for the scientific community.
In his Presidential address to the 53rd ANZAAS Congress in Perth
(16 May 1983), Slatyer warned scientists and the public the recession
would mean that accelerating technological change would see some old
companies decline and some new industries grow; that existing industries needed new technology to increase their efficiency; that there
was an increased need for R&D, and for education, to maximise human
resources; otherwise, he warned Australia faced lower standards of
living and higher unemployment. Of special concern, he said, were the
low retention rates in high schools, the lack of formal training in
mathematics and science amongst many high school teachers, and the
declining numbers of students in higher education. 39 Slatyer was
critical of both the scientific institutions and industry for the gap
between them. Australian scientists, he noted, produced 2% cf the
world's scientific knowledge, and were acknowledged leaders in
"agricultural, medical and biological sciences"; and yet, Australia
produced only 0.7% of the world's patents,

0.3%

of the

world's

technology intensive exports, and 0.1% of "sales of technology within
OECD". Australian industries, he continued, traditionally lacked
in-house R&D. Protected by tariffs, servicing only domestic markets,
Australian industries were not export oriented, and tended to import
technology, "simply to replace local R&D" rather than attempt to add
their own

unique, high quality

components.

40

During 1983, ASTEC issued three major reports: on the "operation
of National Research Granting Schemes" ,

41

on "Technological Change

and Employment", dealing with education and training, and on "rncen42 Th
.
.
.
tives
for Innovation
in
Austra l"ian I n d. us t ry " •
e f.irs t

repor t

recommended that granting bodies should publicise "areas of strengths
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and deficiencies in their field" to aid planning; it supported the
continuation of peer review, and called for advanced funding over 2
to 3 years to improve R&D planning and the establishment of special
grants for research equipment. 43 In commenting on this report in
The Australian Physicist, Professor Peter Burley, of the School of
Economics, La Trobe University, wrote that he saw, in the report's
recommendations regarding coordination, assessment and stronger
secretariats, an advocating of "greater bureaucratisation of what has
been largely a management by hard working committees of volunteer
experts." 44
The report on "Incentives for Innovation" backed the Espie
committee's recommendations for boosts to the private venture capital
market and tax incentives for industrial R&D, "as a matter of urgency". AST EC recommended a dual system of tax incentives and grants,
which the report estimated would cost the government $200 million in
the first year, as opposed to $163 million in existing industry
schemes. 45 The ASTEC report formed part of the growing calls for
tax incentives for industrial R&D.

2 .16.

The Debate on Science and Technology Policy 1983

Joseph has identified four broad policy approaches typically
employed by governments to influence technological innovation: the
stimulation of technological innovation directly; improvements in the
climate for innovation;

encouragement of

specific areas of

.
.
46 Po l'icies
.
.
technology; and rewards for innovation.
curren tl y b eing
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considered by the Hawke government, and being discussed within the
science and technology community, covered all four of these categories, the recommendations varying principally according to the degree
of intervention seen to be necessary by proponents of each scheme.
Two

extremes

in

intervention,

"non-interventionist"

and

Joseph

"economic

describes

as

nationalist".

Non-interventionists as their name suggests emphasise reliance on
market forces, or in other words, a "neutral economic environment for
innovation", are opposed to government support for key industries,
while still offering support for S&T infrastructure in government
laboratories and universities, provided commercial activities were
left to the private sector. 47
Economic nationalists, on the other hand, supported intervention
in the market place by the government, specifically to achieve
"government policy objectives" and to overcome structural weaknesses
engendered by long-term technological change. They emphasise planning
and coordination, and support national technology areas where there
is or could be an international competitive advantage. They are
generally suspicious of foreign-based ·m ultinational corporations.
The Liberal/National Party governments under Malcolm Fraser
between 1975 and 1983 were non-interventionist in the sense that they
"espoused minimal government intervention in the private sector" and
allowed the concept of a free market to dominate their science and
technology and industry policies,

48

though they continued farm

subsidies and tariffs. The economic departments and agencies under
Hawke were still dominated by this concept; as Davis et al. observed,
.
" • 4 9 Continua
.
t ion
.
they shared " the same paradigm
o f th.is para d.igm

93

explains their opposition to many of the Uiterventionist programs of
the Labor party, especially those of Jones on "sunrise industries".
Their opposition to intervention in the market persisted, despite
many demonstrations of market failure: in tariff barriers, subsidies,
recessions, the too slow technological development of Australia's
traditional industries, and the virtual nonexistence of new high
technology industries. Markets fail to innovate because of the high
cost of R&D, because of the fear of risky returns from R&D, and
because of the "difficulty of retaining exclusive use of technical
knowledge". SO
When the Department of Science and Technology (DST) tried to
argue the concept of market failure to support its technology programs, the economic departments argued that market failure was
difficult to measure, did not justify intervention, since intervention was expensive and not necessarily beneficial, and, rather,
market failure indicated too much government interference and so
justified less government interference, such as the reduction of
tariff barriers. 51 The market failure argument, moreover, in
isolation does not prescribe specific responses to policy questions,
such as the proper balance between pure and applied research, nor
does it guarantee that government intervention will necessarily be an
improvement on market forces. 52 Without changing deeply held views
on the appropriate level of intervention it was a difficult argument
for the DST to win.
In May 1983, a group of academics in the Technology and Social
Change program at the University of Wollongong, with Professors Ron
Johnston and Stephen Hill as editors, published the book, Future
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Tense? Technology in Australia. 53 Using Joseph's classification,
this book sat squarely in the economic nationalist camp. It unashamedly called for government intervention in the market place, recommending a coherent and broad technology policy. Technology was presented
as "a dominant, even defining element" of culture and a "constitutive" element of the economy. 54 Arguments against intervention, it
claimed, reflected a misunderstanding of the new international
economic order and of the

ro~e

of technology: "we mu st act to become

master of the tools [technology] we use, lest these tools force us to
become largely unemployed servants to the high technology interests
within the world economy." 55

With its reliance on resources,

Australia ran the risk of "becoming a mine for the large industrialized nations to exploit." 56
The book advocated policies "oriented towards developing and
controlling technological capability to support national sovereignty." These policies, it recommended, should range from "education and
training, promotion of research in universities, ... subsidies for
industrial R&D, ••• right thr.ough to procurement policy." Above all,
the policies in the various government departments needed coordination, within one coordinating body, "probably at ministerial level".
The book also supported "selective" policies, arguing "in the new
context, not to be selective is to ensure, by inaction, an eventual
multiplication of losers." 57 It is interesting to speculate what
effect this book had on the call for a national technology strategy,
later, in 1983.
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The two extremes in approaches to technological innovation were
matched by two extremes in science policy, though there was of course
no necessary one-to-one correspondenc,e between the members of each.
The "non-interventionists" in science policy believed that science
functions best when left to scientists, and that this best science
would lead to the best good for society. The "scientific nationalists", on the other hand, believed that science would best serve the
interests of society if it were planned and coordinated into areas of
national priority and related to commercial interests.
A k ,e y issue which emerged in the S&T debate in 1983 was the gap
between science and industry and the lack of commercial exploitation
of scientific discoveries resulting from this. Dr John Dixon, President of the Australian Industrial Research Group, and General Manager
of Research at Comalco, agreed:

Australia has the talent and the ability to match most other
countries. This is shown by our record in science. Where we miss
out is in the application of this scientific know-how to industry. SS

And Ian Kolm, of the CSIRO, considered this "Australia's greatest
problem in R&D". 59 But who was to blame, the scientists or the
industrialists? The general consensus was that both were to blame,
though some naturally felt one group was more to blame than the
other. "Many scientists here," .Kolm observed, "persevere in the
Oxbridge philosophy that science will automatically produce technology", .while our industrialists, he added, balancing his criticism,
were "lacking the experience to use R&D as a commercial weapon" • 60
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In the spirit of Hawke's consensus politics, Donald Weiss, President
of the Royal -Australian Chemical Institute (RACI), advocated "a broad
consensus ..• between all parties concerned -

government, industry,

trade unions and the research and educational community" 61 Weiss
was eager that the RACI should

"participate realistically and

creatively in the developing national debate on S &T policy." 62 In
particular, he recognised the need for the RACI to consider its
"interaction with other disciplines" on such matters; 63 the debate
on the gap between industry and academic science required a common
voice from the scientific community.
But any consensus with industry would not be easily won. The New
South Wales Government S&T Committee, headed by Professor Johnston,
released a report on the prospects for technological development
amongst private enterprise in New South Wales. The report revealed
that, amongst 88 companies surveyed, industrial R&D had declined
markedly in recent years, that ignorance of new technology was high
amongst senior managers, that senior managers were fearful of taking
risks, and, despite the low industrial R&D effort, many companies
thought their R&D level was adequate. 64 There could be no consensus
while the perception of the problem differed so radically between
industry and academic science.
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2 .1 7.

The Science and Technology Statement 1982/83

In May 1983, the Department of Science and Technology published
its Annual Statement for 1982-83. The statement provided government
and business expenditures on R&D for the five financial years 1978-79
to 1982-83. Over this period, government R&D funding could be seen to
be growing slightly faster than the CPI, but remained moderate by
OECD standards at 0.54% of GDP; while business R&D expenditure
declined slightly in real terms, being a dismal 0.2% of GDP for
1982-83. 65 Jones described the situation as "woeful" and presenting
"a sorry picture of Australia's technological performance". 66 He
called on industry to double its spending on R& D over the next five
years. Industry's poor performance, he said, was illustrated in
Australia's low per capita exports of high-research component goods,
with only Portugal, Greece, Iceland and Turkey in the OE CD countries
exporting less of these goods. 67
Later in 1983; the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) released its figures on long term trends in R&D. The ABS figures showed
that between 1973-74 and 1976-77, industrial R&D (both in expenditure
and employment) had fallen by half; little change had followed for
1976-77 to 1978-79; and since then industrial R&D had declined 2% per
annum in real terms, with high-technology industries showing the
greatest decline in R&D. 68 The ABS figures suggested that increases
to AIRDIS had not stemmed the decline and therefore did "not provide
.
any JOY
for the new Labor Government " • 69
In response to the ABS figures, the AIP Employment and Science
Policy committees combined to release a joint paper entitled, "Indus. trial Research and Development Continues to Fall". 70 The intention
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was clear, industry was to blame for the low level of industrial R&D.
Uncharacteristically, the AIP paper ended with a long argument
against sunrise industries, in favour of key technologies, without
showing the relevance of the ABS figures to such an argument. The
paper's conclusions showed a clear bias against Jones' policies and
towards key technologies, and one must suspect a high level of DST
participation in this report. The report was also published in
Search, but without the case for key technologies.

2 .18.

The Budget 1983

On taking over the government, the Labor Party was stunned to
find a $9.6 billion budget deficit left by the previous government.
The enormity of the deficit threatened all of Labor's plans and
election promises. All departments were asked to consider cut backs
of from

3-6% for the next financial year. 71

But the Department of science and Technology (DST} had been cut
back heavily by the previous government, much of the department's
funds were forward committed, for example, it would be difficult to
cut support for the CSIRO by 6\

witho~t

disrupting capital and

research projects, and, through its election promises, the government
was committed to increased support for AIRDIS, ARGS and other technology programs. Moreover, as Jones argued before the government's
Expenditure Review Committee, the DST programs were essential for
industrial recovery and reconstruction. 72 Jones was also considering tax incentive schemes for R&D, following many favourable representations on the matter, and, despite the need for overall cutbacks,
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Jones had created a climate, amongst scientists and technologists,
which "suggested that there would be more than enough funds and
schemes from which industry and researchers could choose". 73
The major problem for Jones in the lead up to the Budget, Joseph
concludes, was "to maintain the momentum that high technology had
during the election campaign". In this, he was supported, at first,
within Cabinet by Senator Button, and outside Cabinet by the Espie
and ASIA reports on high technology and by the calls for more R&D
funding by the ARGC, ASTEC, CSIRO and the Australian computer industry. He was opposed by Finance, Treasury and the Industries Assistance Commission, who objected to high technology "on the grounds
th a t

.
it was

,

. k .
.
, 74
pie ing winners •
If

Despite the massive deficit and threatened recession, the
1983-84 Budget increased government outlays by 16.4%, that is, well
ahead of inflation, fulfilling Keating's promise to spend the economy
out of trouble. Jones' Science and Technology portfolio, however,
increased by only 4%. The big S&T winner was industrial R&D, with
AIRD IS receiving a $17 million increase, or 31%; a

new National

Research Fellowship Scheme for research in areas of national interest; venture capital incentives (announced after the Budget); and
special funds for biotechnology. 75

Another big winner was the

National Health and Medical Research Council (NH&MRC), with a 28%
increase, while the ARGS increased by 16%, that is, a 5% real increase, and postgraduate awards increased by only 7%, or -4% in real
terms, to $7 ,330 per annum, "well below an acceptable living allowance," Scitech reported, "and providing little incentive to stay on
for postgraduate wor~". 76 Other areas to receive cuts, in real
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terms, were the CSIRO and the Australian Atomic Energy Commission,
and the energy, water, defence, and marine science areas.
The Budget results were not in line with the promises that Barry
Jones had made and the expectations he had created with scientists.
Considering "the tough economic situation", the editor of Scitech
considered it "a major victory for the Minister", 77 though this
conclusion seems hard to justify. Jones, himself, naturally emphasised the successes in the Budget, for AIRDIS especially, calling it
a "boost for sunrise industries" . 78 In an interview on ABC radio
with Dr Stuart Macdonald, of the University of Queensland, and
Kirsten Garrett, from the ABC, he was asked about the large increase
for the "widely criticised" AIRDIS and answered by blaming the
previous government for the earlier failures of the scheme, and
especially the Department of Finance in 1981. He had installed five
new members on the AIRD! board, and it was "a dramatically different
Board," he told them, "very much committed to the philosophy that
I've been espousing in the election. I have very great confidence in
them." The interview ended with Macdonald calling for more support
for Jones, "from industry and from the community at large. He's been
left far too long on his own. "79
The budget added to the differences between Jones and Wild, with
Jones claiming the CSIRO had received a 3.2% increase in funds and
Wild that the CSIRO funds had, in fact, been cut. A joint working
party from the CSIRO and the Department of Finance was commissioned
to study the two apparently conflicting sets of budget figures. The
committee reported back, in March 1984, that the CSIRO had indeed
suffered cuts in its operating, repairs and maintenance allocations
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in the 1983 budget, resulting in forced cuts to salaries and cuts in
operating funds for two thirds of its research programs. The report
also concluded that there was a poor working relationship between the
CSIRO and the Department of Finance, with misunderstandings on both
sides and differences of opinion. 80

2 .19.

The ARGS

After the Budget

The 16% increase in the ARGS to $22.4 million was less than the
21% (or 10% real increase) expected and $13 million less than the
ARGS had thought necessary. The chairman of the ARGC, Professor Peter
Sheehan, said that, despite the improvement, the scheme was still
inadequate: "we are not maintaining a minimum level of funding for
the excellent projects and I think this is very disappointing." 81
Sheehan also spoke of the need for special allocations for young
researchers and for equipment. The scheme, he argued, supports some
of the best research in the country and had not fared as well as
other schemes, such as the NH&MRC; the result had been "a serious
downgrading over time in the value of basic research " • 82
In November, the ARGC released its report entitled, "The Case
for the Australian Research Grants Scheme for 1985", which outlined a
major review of the ARGS and provided the justification for increased
support for the ARGS in the next budget. The report recommended four
new categories of grants: program grants to support the scheme's best
researchers; pilot project grants to foster you~g researchers;
equipment grants to upgrade university research equipment; and
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fellowships to provide a long-term career structure for talented
Australian researchers. 83 These new schemes, it was estimated,
would cost an extra $5.5 million, with the equipment grants alone
costing $3 million per annum. When added to the existing scheme, the
money needed in the next budget was $41.5 million or nearly double
the 1983 budget allocation. The report also emphasised the need for
Australia's best researchers to increase their international links
and

contributions. 84
The report attempted, for the first time, to identify

priori~y

areas and areas of special research strength. These included genetic
engineering, astronomy, lasers, population studies, and fluid dynamics. They also included my field of surface science, and Professor
Fred Smith's field of condensed matter physics, and many others.
Smith reported to the AIP, through the Science Policy Committee,
that the increase for the ARGS was only half the 10% real increase
promis•d by the Labor Gpvernment, and merely compensated for the
decline in funding in 1983. 85 Professor Frank Larkins conveyed
. ' l ar concerns to t h e RA CI. 86
simi

2. 2 0.

The CSIRO 1983

When the CSIRO was first formed from the CSIR in the 1940s, 58%
of its effort was directed to rural industries, 34% to manufacturing
industries, and 8% to minerals, energy, water, and community interests. Since then it has shifted its emphasis in response to external
pressures, for

example~

in the 1970s following growing community
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concern over environmental issues, the energy crisis, and the projected energy boom.

87

By 1982, the CSIRO employed over 7 ,500 people in

more than 100 laboratories and consumed one third of the government's
science budget; it devoted 23% of its efforts to community interests,
17% to minerals, energy, and water, and a much reduced 33% to rural
. d
in

88 In 1 983 it
.
.
. d ustries.
.
.
us t ries,
an d 27 % t o manu f acturing
in
was

asked to increase its effort in high technology, and reportedly
allocated 10.3% of its budget for 1983/84 to "technology intensive
industry research projects" . 89
The CSIRO received a great deal of criticism throughout 1983.
Jones was clearly disappointed with the size of its manufacturing
industry effort and with the commercial impact of CSIRO's industrial
research, commenting it "is less than might have been hoped for." 90
Industry groups were less restrained than Jones, with ASIA, for
example, describing the CSIRO as geriatric and moribund. The CSIRO
responded to this criticism by instituting a number of reviews of its
manufacturing research effort, including: a report by its Manufacturing Industry Standing Committee which recommended increases in some
high technology areas and closer interaction with industry, a new
manufacturing R&D policy which provided criteria for selecting new
industrial R&D projects, and the setting up of a panel to review its
strategic planning activities and its methods of setting priorities.
The first two members appointed to the new panel were Professor Ron
Johnston of the University of Wollongong and Dr Ken Ferguson, of the
CSIR0. 91
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Cabinet was also dissatisfied with the performance of the CSIRO,
reducing the CSIRO's budget allocation in real terms and insisting
that it become more accountable for its $316 million budget allocation. Toughening his attitude to the CSIRO, Jones directed its
Executive "to devote the same proportion of the 1983/84 appropriation
to research as was allocated in 1982/83". 92 It was the first time a
minister had issued a budget directive to the CSIRO; the task he set
could only be achieved through reductions in overheads.

"What they

are really upset about," said Jones, "is that in the 57 years of the
organisation's history it has never had a formal direction from a
Minister and from a Cabinet". 93 CSIRO's response, writes Joseph,
was "to treat Jones' efforts to promote sunrise industries with
disdain". Of his 16 sunrise industries, they selected only four key
technologies, in areas where they were already specialised: biotechnology, advanced materials, genetics and information. 94 A more
defensive explanation was provided by Dr Paul Wild, Chairman of the
CSIRO:

to make frequent major shifts in research direction [the battleship analogy comes to mind] - even if it were possible -

would

be to risk making no headway in any direction at all. Strategic
research is a long-term exercise. It must be sustained to yield
results. The bulk of CSIRO's work must continue on its course,
although continually under reviews, sheltered from the often
fickle winds of scientific and political fashion. 95

It was an argument guaranteed to gain a sympathetic response from
other scientists accustomed to the time scale, typically 5 to 10
years, required for good, long term research. But do such appeals, to
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"steady as she goes", work with people not experienced in scientific
research, the public, politicians? If this is the best reason for
persevering with research projects, and I suspect it is, then the
public, and politicians, need to be educated into the extraordinary
concentration, dedication, and time, required for

successful

research.
Implicit in the criticism of CSIRO at this time, but not expressed clearly until later, was the assumption that the CSIRO ' s
concern with long term strategic research should have meant that the
CSIRO would prepare for future trends before they were forced upon it
by outside pressures. The criticism assumed that the CSIRO should
have been working towards high-technology industries in the 1970s so
that Australia might have avoided some of the crisis of the 1980s.
During 1983, a public dispute between the CSIRO and one of its
critics, Dr Stuart Macdonald, of the University of Queensland, came
before the AIP Science Policy Committee. The dispute concerned
Macdonald's criticism of the CSIRO's dung beetle program and the
CSIRO's heavy handed response. Wild described Macdonald as "a disgruntled science analyst", 96 and Lewis T. Chadderton, Chief of the
CSIRO , Division of Chemidal Physics, called him "An ill-informed
observer". 97 I remember the Science Policy Committee meetings where
this matter was. discussed and I remember being surprised by the
strength of the committee's anti-CSIRO stance on this issue. In
attempting to moderate the committee's position, I was told that
members of the committee were privy to information which substantiated Macdonald's case against the CSIRO. Eventually, the committee
published a report in The Australian Physicist entitled, "A Commentary on the Public Justification of Public Research". In criticising
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the CSIRO's treatment of Macdonald, the report said, "the behaviour
of the CSIRO in this instance did not befit the organisation's status
.
.
, s premier
.
.
.
.
" . 9 8 Ann Moya l , e d itor
as th
· e nat ion
researc h institution

of

Search,

wrote to

the

committee congratulating it on its

report ..99 The CSIRO's reply to the Science Policy Committee's paper
- also published in The Australian Physicist - indicated the CSIRO's
executive had misunderstood the Science Policy Committee as much as
they had misunderstood Macdonald.lOO
Towards the end of 1983, the CSIRO became embroiled in another
controversy, this time over the $157 million AAHL -

the Australian

Animal Health Laboratory - at Geelong. 101 This and the dung beetle
episode were mentioned by Maximillian Walsh and Jennifer Byrne in The
Bulletin, on 4 October 1983. 102 They described the AAHL as a "pot ential white elephant". They also noted that Wild had told a recent
seminar that some people were conducting "a systematic and orchestrated campaign to discredit the CSIRo." 103 These people, Walsh and
Byrne identified as "the bureaucrats who have long resented the
privileged position" of CSIRo. 104 It takes little imagination to
associate these "bureaucrats" with members of the economic agencies.
The AAHL controversy brought about a heated debate in parliament and
led to a bitter and open rift between Jones and

Wild.
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Jones

stated in. parliament that the CSIRO was "in a position of great
embarrassment over the laboratory" •106 Wild replied that it was the
government which was embarrassed over providing insufficient funds in
the CSIRO budget. Much later, he commented:
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(The AAHL] was a very easy target for irresponsible academics.
They just had to mention foot and mouth virus ... Unfortunately
Jones li.s tened to advice that can only be described as mischievous .107

Rumours spread that CSIRO was feeding information to the opposition to attack Jones in parliament. Wild' s position as head of the
CSIRO was in jeopardy. Jane Ford described the conflict between the
two men as

"a conflict of personality and philosophy":

one, a brilliant but retiring physicist, committed to scientific
freedom, pure research and excellence in CSIRO; the other, a
rumbustious, high technology fanatic, committed to new industry
development and determined that CSIRO should move into more
industrially relevant research. 108

With the controversy over the CSIRO, less noticed w~s the
declining fortunes of another major government research organisation,
the Australian

A~omic

Energy Commission, which suffered cuts in

funds, in staff, and in particular to its uranium enrichment program.109

2.21.

Plans for the National Technology Summit

In June 1 Barry Jones announced that a National Technology Summit
would be held in Canberra on 26-28 September 1983. "The objective of
the September conference," the media release stated,
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will be to achieve a consensus on the courses of action necessary to implement the Government's technology oriented policies,
and priorities for the development of industry, as part of the
Government's overall strategy for economic recovery.~·10

Jones highlighted three areas for consideration: high technology
(sunrise) industries; making traditional industries more efficient
through new technology; and "the provision of a

scientific and

technological infrastructure for the development and diffusion of new
technologies". 111
For Jones, the National Technology Summit was a continuation of
the consensus policy of the National Economic Summit: "The National
Technology Summit is seeking the same goals. We need to plan toget:i.er, work together and seek a high level of cooperation in the struggle to build a healthy economy". 112 Implicit in the title of the
conference and in these remarks was the assumption, Joseph claims,
"that new technology had to be confronted as a national issue" . 113
So convinced was Jones in the necessity of Australia adopting a
national approach to technological change, he adopted the Hawke
consen .s us approach in an attempt to gloss over "deeper political
114 sue h
. . .
" on science
.
.
an d t ec h no 1 ogy issues,
d ivisions

as A n d rew

Peacock's aversion to "picking winners", the Industries Assistance
Commission's preference for a non-interventionist approach, concerns
amongst trade unionists on declining employment in traditional
industries, and budget difficulties in the S&T portfolio.
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The conference would be limited to 120 invited participants
chosen from government, financial institutions, large manufacturing
companies, small high technology companies, trade unions, academia,
the CSIRO and industrial and professional associations. 115 The
range of participants was wider than for the Economic Summit but did
not include public interest groups. 'selecting the 120 participants
was bound to cause problems, not so much in whom to select but in
whom to omit. · For example, Scitech brought attention to the omission
of Professor Peter Farrell (ASIA high technology committee chairman),
Professor Don Mathewson (Starlab project) and Dr Bruce Middleton,
Secretary of ASTEC, and to the inclusion of "a large contingent of
conservative

thinkers"

from

the

ACTU

and

professional

associations. 116 After the conference Jones told the National Times
that he "gave no apologies for inviting a large proportion of technological

'sleepers'

to

the

conference.

It

would

have

been

[self-)defeating to surround himself with sympathisers stroking each
other" • 117

2. 2 2.

The AIP

Preparation

Jones informed the DST that professional societies were to be
invited to the National Technology Summit and that the AIP was to be
one of them; 118 This invitation presumably arose because of the
visit by Wilson and Smith to Jones in April and because of the AIP's
obvious interest in science policy issues. Dr Ian McLean, a member of
the AIP Employment Committee, and Richard Joseph, both physics
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graduates, were working together in the DST's science policy section.
Caught up in the excitement of the planned event, McLean decided that
this was an excellent opportunity for the AIP to make a quality
submission to the conference, and he with Wilson and Joseph - often
meeting at Wilson's house -

spent many hours, including a whale

weekend, preparing the submission. In the end it read like a government document and had many features in common with the draft National
Technology Strategy which sprang from the conference, hardly surprising considering McLean and Joseph were both government employees and
therefore familiar

with the style of DST documents. 119

The Science Policy Committee had little time at its bimonthly
meetings to consider the document and was happy to leave it to the
judgement of Wilson and McLean. The AIP executive Council approved
the document after a full morning's discussion with McLean present.
In his regular President's column in The Australian Physicist, Wilson
wrote about the AIP submission and his attendance at the conference:

I believe that it is extremely important for physicists to
indicate their views [at the conference] and to draw attention
to the role which they should play in research and development.
when managers, government and unions get together there is
a tendency to ignore the need for scientific input and to
regard the encouragement of appropriate technology as requiring
only ·political and economical initiatives. It is most important
for physicists to stress their interest and their potential
in volvement. 120

The AIP submission highlighted the role of physics and physicists in technological development, the essential contribution of
physics to at least 12 of the ALP's 16 sunrise industries, and the
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need for closer links between Australian physics and Australian
industry. The submission recommended the inclusion of industrial
segments in some tertiary education courses; the establishment of
Science Centres, "to encourage positive attitudes to science, technology and industry among school children and the community"; support
for the Espie report; and a policy of government preference for
buying Australian designed and manufactured goods. 121 Later, Jean
Moran commended the AIP for its willingness to get involved in
politics but criticised the submission for its concentration on
economic matters to the exclusion of "social impact and responsibilit y " . 12.2

Little noticed by most Australians, except McLean, during the
conference the AIP submission lay on the conference table and at one
point the ABC cameras zoomed in on the AIP paper with its looping
infinity Logo and then zoomed away. 123 The AIP paper was not included in the official conference proceedings.
It is difficult to assess the impact of the AIP submission.
Wilson wrote afterwards in The Australian Physicist: "The fact that
we had made a submission was commented upon favourably by many of the
attendees - quite apart from generally favourable comments on the
substance of the submission". 124 Joseph felt it had little direct
effect on government policy; later he became involved in the writing
of the draft National Technology Strategy and at that stage the AIP
paper, he commented, "looked very much like very many others at the
time" •125 It was effective, however, in raising the prestige of the
AIP amongst the other professional societies which were either not
invited to the conference or did not make substantial submissions
themselves. 126

112

2. 2 3.

The National Technology

C6nference

When the summit finally arrived on 2 6 September 198 3 at the
Canberra Rex Hotel, its name had changed to the National Technology
Conference. 127 This presumably was to minimise any comparison with
the earlier National Economic Summit, though it could not have been
Jones' wish, since he began his opening speech with a reference to
the Economic Summit. What Jones hoped for in the Technology Conference, he said, was a "shock of recognition", a recognition of the
technological revolution sweeping around the worlct. 128 Here was
Jones, the man whose own shock of recognition had come in researching
his book, Sleepers, Wake!, arguing that "the entire capacity and
direction of an economy rests on its technological base", a concept
• h was outsi'd e
h e asserte d wh ic

II

• wis
• d om . 129 He
conventiona 1 economic
•

rl

emphasised the fundamental role of R&D, of education and skills, and
of Australia's need to face the world. He yearned to win over the
conservative members of his audience to the rightness of his cause.
The Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, in his speech at the opening of
the conference acknowledg~d Jones' contribution to "stimulating
community . awareness and understanding of the complications of technological change" •130 The Labor Government, he said, was committed to
getting Australia going again, this meant "strong and steady economic
growth", and technological change was a part of the economic recovery. Hawke criticised the protection policies of the former governments, the gap between research and development, and the lack of
marketing skills:
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Australia's research institutions are too isolated, intellectually and physically, from industry; academia has given insufficient attention to possible economic application of its research; and industry has not conducted enough of its own
in-house research and development. 131

He pointed to the government's attempts to promote structural change
and increase productivity through its support for a strong venture
capital market, an expanded role for the Australian Industry Development Corporation, and increases to AIRDIS.
Hawke was followed by over twenty representatives from big and
small businesses, from trade unions, tertiary institutions, government research organisations, and the Commonwealth and State Governments. Each spoke on technology issues, but each from their own
perspective. The speeches varied from the "ultra-conservative", 132
non-interventionist approach from the representatives of the government

economic

agencies

to

the

"enthusiastic"

approach

of

high-technology proponents such as Professor Tom Stonier of Bradford
University who argued, in a post-industrial economy, that without new
technology companies would go out of business. 133 There was much
discussion of the social impact of technological change, especially
in job displacement. Wilson commented later: "The very cautious
attitude of the unions was somewhat disappointing but understandable." If there was any consensus it was on the need for industry both established firms and new entrepreneurial firms - to pursue high
technology. 134
The conference was very much Barry Jones' "show":
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He enthusiastically introduced each speaker, usually with an
erudite historical reference, hosted the luncheons and dinner,
listened to the forums and even corrected any slip-ups in the
low technology projectors and transparencies aiding the speakers .135

But in the end - in his closing address - Jones finally admitted
his "impatience at the conservatism of the proceedings." 136 "Candor," he began, "compels me to say that the 'shock of recognition'
has not been very successful. The sleepers may be waking, but ':hey
are still very drowsy" • 137 He berated the participants fo::: not
appreciating the dimensions of the technological crisis fa=ing
Australia:

in the OECD tables, Australia ranks twenty-third of twenty-four
nations in the value of technology-intensive imports over
exports, with an imbalance of 9.5: 1. This figure alone suggests
the need for ringing a few alarm bells or the cackling of geese
- · but the conference appears to have taken it very calmly. 138

Wilson noted in Jones' final speech a reference to PhD physics
graduates: 139 "rn 1972," he said, "Australia graduated 100 PhDs in
physics: by 1982 the figure was 35. I don't think we can stand too
much of this kind of ' progress , • 11140
Jane

Ford wrote pessimistically of the conference:

Australia's first national technology conference ended with no
real consensus, no firm basis for a future technology strategy
and certainly no 'shock of recognition' pulsing through the
141
majority of old guard delegates •••
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And a despondent Jones told her, "The message seems to have sunk into
the sand ... "142
Professor Wilson's response to the conference was quite different:

I left the conference feeling that it had been of great significance. It had made plain the determination of Government to face
up to both the social aspects of high technology and to encourage industrial progress. 143

And Ann Moyal writing in Search was also optimistic about the outcome
of the conference:

Participants had done their homework .... While some entrenched
adversary attitudes of industrialists and trade unionists were
aired, at the centre of the conference lay a clear recognition
that education, training, retraining, and more education was the
core of a successful technological society. 144

The conference had one particularly unfortunate consequence, it
again highlighted the differences between Jones and Wild. During his
defence of the performance of the CSIRO, with a pointed reference to
Jones, Wild said: "rt would be wrong and quite impracticable to swing
a major part of the resources of the organisation to point in some
new direction each time a new direction is identified." 145 Later,
in a

more conciliatory mood, he added:

The Minister and I have many things in common and I mention
just two of them. The first is a strong conviction that nowadays
the introduction of new technology needs positive government
intervention; the second is a special affinity for Mozart piano
concertos. • ••
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I believe that when we meet each other half way, together we
could conquer the world - or at least get that engine going full
steam ahead. 146

2. 2 4.

Jones at the End of 1983

At the end of 1983, Jones was still pushing the "crisis" rhetoric. On returning from a two-week visit to Japan and Korea, he told
reporters:

Australians must pull their collective fingers out .... The
lead times are short, the niches for many high technology
products are small and we've got about 12 to 18 months to pick
up the opportunities if we are to succeed in the high technology
field.
we've got to set national objectives and get moving
now.147

But there were signs that interest in new technology was growing, even i f slowly. In June, the Confederation of Australian Industry established its Technology Development Policy Committee aimed at
ensuring that the business community had a voice in national technology strategies; and in November, the Business Council of Australia
established its Science and Technology Committee to ensure, likewise,
that the interests of big business were not overlooked, in the
enthusiasm over "small, high growth, high technology enterprises" . 148
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CHAPTER 3.

GROWING APPREHENSION 1984

The (successful] transfer of technology does not mean the mere
importation of capital goods. It means increasing the ability of
a society to reproduce and extend the technology as a result of
the transfer.
T. SHISHIDO, 1983 1

3 .1.

Hawke and the Japanese Experiment

Japan emerged as ~ustralia's largest trading partner in the
1970s and 80s. While most other developed countries were experiencing
short term and even long term economic problems, the Japanese economy
continued to grow, steadily and with growing confidence and relative
wealth. By 1987 Japan was the wealthiest nation in the world. Japan's
success appeared as a model of industrial and technological progress
which many other nations, including Australia, wished part -

at least in

to emulate. The Japanese success was seen to depend on a

combination of factors: long term government planning, in cooperation
with the banks and trading companies, specifically to facilitate the
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transfer of resources from ailing or "sunset" industries to selected
sunrise industries; high productivity through the careful selection
and adaptation of imported technology; employee involvement in
production practices; and, underlying all, a national, social unity
in commitment to economic success. 2 The exclusion of outside
consumer goods from the Japanese domestic market, through trade
restrictions, only emerged later as an issue when Australian companies attempted to penetrate the wealthy Japanese market. The early
Japanese succ,e ss with technology was heavily based on the development
through engineering of imported technology, rather than the development within Japan of radically new technology through scientific
research. This "Japanese" emphasis on engineering success rather than
scientific success was taken up a little later by Australian industry
and by government policy, so that Australia began to shift its R&D
effort from the hitherto strong emphasis on "R", to the "n" side of
innovation, at the very time that Japan, and the USA, were placing an
increasing emphasis on basic research as a means of maintaining a
longer term economic advantage in technology.
T. Shishido, in reviewing the technological success of Japan,
and the key role played by the importation, adaptation and exploitation of imported technology, emphasised

~is

country's total, societal

response to new technology. 3 "To appreciate Japan's ability for
technological development," he wrote, "it is necessary to consider
not only the' country's policies but also her historical and cultural
background." 4 But the very social, and political, nature of Japan's
success was a warning for policy makers elsewhere against the slavish
copying

of

Japanese

or

any

other

nation's

economic,
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industrial, and technological policies, since these might not
transfer effectively, and equitably, into a different political and
cultural environment.
By January 1984, Jones' arguments on the need for technological
change were apparently winning over the Prime Minister. Hawke told a
science student summer school that the task before the nation was "to
make technology work for Australia". Australian companies, he said,
needed new technology if they were to compete in international
markets. 5 During a visit to Japan, some weeks later, he told a
business conference he was aware people were afraid of losing their
jobs through technological change, but added, in true Jonesian style,
that without this change they condemned "themselves and their children to lower relative living standards and a diminished future." 6
Hawke returned from Japan determined to follow the Japanese
lead, to restructure Australian industry through an integrated,
national approach "involving innovative industrial and economic
planning, retraining, new technology programmes and fresh trade
initiatives". 7 In the following

month, he established a

high

rankin,g minist,e rial committee ,o n industry restructuring; included
were Chairman, Senator John Button (Industry and Commerce), Paul
Keating (Treasurer), Senator Susan Ryan (Education and Youth Affairs), Ralph Willis (Industrial Relations), Lionel Bowen (Trade),
and

Barry Jones (Science and Technology). 8
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3.2.

Jones in

1984

Jones was a much sought after speaker at official ceremonies.
Early in 1984, he addressed the graduation ceremonies at both
Macquarie and Sydney Universities. At Macquarie he spoke, along the
now familiar lines, of an intellectual cringe in Australia which
honoured sporting achievements above scientific ones, and of the
reliance on digging things up which had led to Australia slipping in
its international position, especially in the export of high technology goods. There was a need, he said, for the long term planning and
insight provided by the research worker, the reforming judge, and the
politician ahead of his time. 9 Finally he articulated a

major

concern of academic scientists: "young researchers in the prime of
their professional lives ..• are finding it extremely difficult to
secure permanent positions." 10 He concluded: "we face a serious
risk of a brain drain in this country, perhaps even a massive haemorrhage." 11
At the University of Sydney, he began: "I am not a scientist. My
own training, such as it was, has been in education, history, law and
political science •.•• I have described myself, with some justice, as
the Minister for the Future and I often feel that the constituency I
am serving best .is not yet b orn •••

.. 12

The expression "Minister of

the future" may well have originated with Clyde Cameron, Minister for
Science and Consumer Affairs in 1975, whom Gough Whitlam records as
saying, when he belatedly realised the importance of his new portfolio: "I am now convinced beyond all doubt that it will be the Ministers for Science and Technology who will be the Ministers of the
future." 13
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There was more than a hint in these speeches of a lone prophet,
crying in an intellectual wilderness. The hard slog to convince
government, industrial leaders, and even scientists, of the need to
bring Australia to a knowledge-based economy was beginning to take
its toll on Jones' almost limitless enthusiasm. At Sydney University,
he continued:

Candor compels me to report that the scientists generally have
not been particularly helpful in raising community understanding
about the relationship of science and society. Often they have
concentrated on the work in hand, without much -

if any -

consideration of long term applications .•.. So far the academics have been extraordinarily silent. The universities and the
scientific community have taken a

profile so low as to be
indistinguishable from the horizon. 14

The desire of Australian scientists to be left alone with their work,
he concluded, must bear some of the responsibility for the failure of
Australian companies to bring pure research into commercial products.

3.3.

Opposition to Jones

In a submission to the 1984 review of the Industries Assistance
Commission (IAC), and in support of the IAC's conservative approach
to industry policy, the Federal Treasury once again demonstrated its
continued opposition to sunrise industries and to government intervention in support of high technology industries. The Treasury pre-
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ferred, so their submission stated, to leave such matters to the
market place: the market will eliminate unsuccessful ventures through
"loss-making", whereas government-nominated industries will merely
ask for more support. Government intervention acts only to weaken
"private innovation and risk taking ..• as potential investors and
innovators decide that the best way to 'succeed' is to concentrate on
lobbying for government support." 15 The government should only
intervene when normal market mechanisms fail and only then, to
eliminate the source of the market failure. To combat the argument
that the market in Australia had indeed failed to bring about new
high technology industries and products, the Treasury suggested,
perhaps facetiously, that the Australian community should take
advantage of generous high technology subsidies in other countries,
"by way of cheaper imports". 16 But, how was Australia to pay for
these imports? The Treasury was, in effect, advocating the increased
importation of high value added goods at a time when Australia's
balance of payments figures were beginning to cause major concern.
In an interview for the DST magazine, Ascent, Alan

Coates,

General Manager of the Australian Mutual Provident Society said, in
typical fashion for big business at the time: "Demand for investment
funds in the next few years will not come from the so-called sunrise
industries ••• ", but from "re-equipping what remains of our industri·
'
al base with
the latest techno l ogi.es
••• " l 7 H e argue d th a t

su b s t an-

tial growth i'.n real wealth would come only from revitalising existing
industries and that any high technology industries which _s prang up
would act merely to improve the effectiveness of existing industries.
It was simply not in the immediate interests of big business to
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advocate separate, small, high growth industries, outside their
business control.
Following the establishment of the Ministerial committee on
industry reconstruction, rumours began spreading of the possible
formation of a new Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce
with the majority of policy personnel from the Department of Science
and Technology moving into the new department. The advantages were
seen to be that Technology would move into the Cabinet, and therefore
be more influential, that Technology would be more closely linked
with industry policy, that a clear sign would be given to industry of
the importance of technology in industry reconstruction, and that the
more active, committed, and innovative technology policy makers from
the Department of Science and Technology would help balance the
conservative bureaucrats with "hidebound and outdated attitudes" and
little knowledge of technology, in the existing Department of Industry and Commerce. 18 The disadvantages would be the effect on Barry
Jones of losing such a crucial part of his portfolio and the disruption which would result between technology policy and the research
and academic communities. There was, however, no immediate and
concerted response from the academic community to these rumours, and
hence no effective participation in the political in-fighting going
on behind the scenes in Canberra in support of Jones and his Department of Science and Technology.
Nevertheless disquiet was spreading in the science community. In
response to fears from the rural sector that the government was
planning to cut agricultural research funding in favour of high
technology, Jones told a meeting of the Australian Institute of
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Agricultural Science that the government would maintain agricultural
research funding at present levels but that its funding would not
increase as rapidly as other higher priority areas. Besides, he told
them, agriculture would benefit directly from developments in high
technology, especially in biotechnology. 19

3.4.

Industrial R&D

1984

The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) figures for industrial
R&D, released in March 1984, showed that, for the three years 197 8/7 9
to 1981/82, spending on R&D by private business had fallen by 4% (in
real terms), and employment in business R&D by 8%. The private
business sector (excluding government business enterprises) was now
contributing only 12% of total R&D funds and, combined with government business enterprises, only 18% of total R&D employment. In
contrast, 49% of R&D employment was in government research laboratories and

41% in universities. 20

In May 1984, the OECD released its figures on Australian R&D.
These confirmed the ABS results, showing that the business sector
(private plus government enterprises) was providing only 20% of R&D
funds. In response Jones called on industry to boost its share to 33%
by 1990/91 and to 50% by 1995/96. Since it was the government's aim
to double the total R&D funding by 1995/96, this meant business R&D
would have to increase its spending fivefold, by 1995/96, to meet its
enlarged share. The OECD report also identified R&D areas where
Australia was relatively weak; these included electronics, chemicals,
transport equipment, machinery and basic metals. 21
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The poor figures also prompted Sir Gustav Nossal, Director of
the Walter and Eliza Hall Institute, and 1984 President of ANZAAS, in
his presidential address, to call for the introduction of a 150% tax
deduction scheme for industrial R&D, as the only way to boost industry's effort.

3.5.

The ARGS

1984

In June 1984, Scitech reported the ARGS was facing "a serious
funding crisis with a record number of applications for grants bu-::
little possibility of increased funding." 22 Chairman of the scheme,
Professor Peter Sheehan went to Jones to discuss the possibility c=
increased funding, but returned far from optimistic. The committee,
he told the press, had received a 40% increase in the number cf
applications, the biggest increases being in engineering, applied
science, and for

equip~ent,

but, with the present indication, no

equipment applications were likely to be funded in 1985.

3.6.

Relevance in University Research

With the growing criticism of the level of industrial R&D, of
the need to restructure industry, of the vital role of technology and
R&D in industry restructuring, and of the gap between g _o vernment
funded R&D and industry, it was only a matter of time before university R&D would be brought into the debate. In May 1984, the editor ·of
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Scitech noted "growing government dissatisfaction with uncoordinated,
undirected and indiscriminate university research policies which pay
little heed to national priorities". 23 Senator Susan Ryan, Minister
for Education and Youth Affairs, told a graduation ceremony at the
University of Newcastle she was surprised at the low level of public
concern over the way universities were funded. "university research
enjoys support from Commonwealth regardless of how well or badly
those funds

are spent", she said. 24

With dwindling university research funds and increasingly
difficult access to ARGS grants, the university research cake was
being continually split into smaller pieces amongst increasing
numbers of university researchers. The number of technical support
staff previously able to make up the short-fall in equipment grants,
by making specialised equipment, for example, was also diminishing.
Despairing of increased funding, many began to consider the idea of
more focused support for top quality projects: hence the proposal
from ASTEC for a National Research Council (NRC) - incorporating the
ARGS, the national fellowship scheme, and other funding schemes - to
supervise a more managed allocation of resources. ASTEC proposed the
NRC should be sited within the Commonwealth Tertiary Education
Commission (CTEC) but this suggestion was opposed, naturally, by the
Department of Science and Technology which would lose a prestige area
of its responsibility. Fears were expressed that ARGS funds might be
reallocated to other areas within the Department of Education and
Youth Affairs which contained CTEC. Professor Sheehan, Chairman of
the ARGC, suggested moving some CTEC funds into the ARGS but this
' turn, oppose d · .b y ·-, CT EC •25 A s a consequence, th e NRC proposa l
was, in
was rejected, for the time being.
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In August 1984, in Engineers Australia, Professor Peter Farrell,
former ASIA Committee Chairman, on leave from his position as Director of the University of New South Wales's Centre for Biomedical
Engineering, and an R&D executive for a large pharmaceutical company
in Japan, launched a stinging attack on the structure of Australian
universities:

It is my belief that Australian universities are, by and large,
too inflexible, unimaginative and uninnovative .... Our system
... entrenches sameness and mediocrity and encourages conservatism. 26

It is all very well, he wrote, for Senator Susan Ryan to call for
greater links between universities and the private sector, the "fact
is they [in the university system] do not know how to do it". 27 He
advocated the government should "employ management consultants to
make recommendations as to how responsibility and authority can be
delegated more adequately within the system to make universities more
productive, responsible, alert and aware of their responsibilities."
The leaders necessary to bring about this change, he continued, would
not come from the present university administrators, must not be
chosen from the sciences or arts, and must have "industrial experience, high academic qualifications and, more importantly, a track
record of productive management at senior levels." 28
Farrell was described at the conclusion of his paper as a "rebel
~

professor", and as "thoroughly disillusioned with what he described
as th.e

'

•
•
troglodytes and sycophants • of the university
sys t. em. n29 I n
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the light of subsequent events, especially with Senator Dawkins'
later handling of tertiary education, Farrell's views on the university system were reflected - or, at least, were influential - in later
government thinking. In Farrell's paper and a related talk of his
which I attended, at the CS I RO National Measurement Laboratory, in
Sydney, about this time, Farrell extolled the virtues of the Japanese
system of worker commitment, and of John Elliott's unregulated
private enterprise, both concepts I

found disquieting.

Hugh Preston, from the Department of Science and Technology,
adopted a more conventional approach to the gap between industry and
university research when he addressed the Australian Industrial
Research Group, in February 1984. The barriers to interaction, he
said, arose from three causes: institutional rigidities restricting
the movement of personnel between the two sectors; an historical
dependence on government funded R&D, in both sectors; and different
cultural objectives. "Basic research is an intellectual activity
motivated by scientific curiosity and a desire to understand the
nature of phenomena"; whereas "Industrial research," he claimed, "has
. l a d vantage as its
.
.
.
. h er
commercia
main
goa l" . 30 In my experience,
neit

definition is strictly true, both basic and industrial research are
often motivated by a common desire for recognition, in basic research
for recognition amongst scientific peers, and in industrial research
for recognition by management; nevertheless, the distinction does
provide a partial description of the difference in attitude and the
resultant "talking at cross-purposes" between academic scientists and
industry.
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3.7.

The National Technology Strategy: Discussion Draft

At the end of the National Technology Conference in September
1983, Jones had proposed that the conference reports be analysed by
his Department of Science and Technology and then used to form the
basis of a draft National Technology Strategy (NTS). The strategy
paper would then be sent out to the conference delegates for careful
consideration, before calling another conference in 6 to 12 months to
discuss "the refined draft and attempt to reach a consensus on a
national technology strategy." 31 Jones added:

We have a most worthy task to perform, the fruits of the successful design and implementation of a national technology strategy
will be harvested by generations of Australians. Failure to
proceed with development of such a strategy will result in us
and our coming generations descending always downward on the
ladder of economic growth. That is a cost I am sure none of us
wishes to bear. 32

The second conference never came. Richard Joseph, who worked on
the discussion draft at the Department of Science and Technology
(DST), noted, in hindsight, that "this draft document was formulated
within DST in isolation from the rest of the bureaucracy". 33 This
action was seen variously as a bold calculated move by Jones "to
crash through the institutional barriers which had hampered his
Department", or as an oversight by his DST senior management in
allowing a junior ministry to attempt, on its own, to formulate a
document which would affect the actions of the entire government,
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industry and the community. 34 It meant trouble for the strategy,
and for Jones.
Jones released the draft strategy in April 1984. It covered four
broad areas: the strengthening of Australia's technological infrastructure, the role of new technology in economic development, social
aspects of technological change, and cooperation between all organisations concerned with technological development. 35 "I believe," said
Dr Greg Tegart, Secretary of the DST, to the Applied Physics Conference in Melbourne in

December 1984:

I believe that the development of a National Technology Strategy
represents the most significant step in Australia towards a
national commitment to technology as a means of ensuring the
future of a healthy and prosperous Australian society. 36

W.N. Hurst, from the Science Development Division, in the Department
of Science, commented later: "we took the view that the Strategy
should be assertive and forward-looking. It was to be a strategy
statement not a

justification". 37

The overriding aim of the strategy was a "national commitment to
technology as a means of achieving social and economic goals". 38 To
achieve this the strategy set a number of specific goals to be
achieved by 1995 (twelve years hence): 50% of students completing
high school, 20% of school-leavers entering tertiary education, 1% of
the workforce being retrained annually, rapid growth in key technologies, a healthy venture capital market, total R&D at 2% of GDP with a
fivefold increase in business R& D brought about by tax incentives,
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and the equitable spreading of the social impacts of technological
change. 39
The first of 13 "elements" considered in the statement was the
R&D system: "A vital and flexible R& D system is needed to underpin
our overall technological capability". 40 The statement then recommended what must have been seen by academic and other research
scientists as the solution to many of their major concerns: attention
to "the level and quality of staffing, research equipment and facilities" in tertiary education, and measures to redress falling staff
morale; an increase in funding for basic research through the ARGS
and CTEC; and increased "relevance of R&D in tertiary education
institutes to commerce, industry and the community [not through
Draconian measurements but] through arrangements such as the National
Research

Fellowship Scheme". 41

Joseph noted that "sunrise" industries were mentioned only once.
"sunrise industries and key technologies,"

he wrote, "had been

absorbed into a broader policy framework, making them less spectacular than

they

were

in

the political debate some

12 months

earlier.. " 42 It was part ~of a progression within the Department of
Science and Technology away from Jones' sunrise industries policy
which was so unpalatable to Treasury and Finance, to selected key
technologies, and then to general technological development. Joseph
concludes that this process "may have just helped to confuse and
.
. h
obscure the. issues
over whic

d'isputa t 'ion too k

p 1 ace. .. 43
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3.8.

Reactions to the National Technology Strategy

The draft strategy appeared initially to have the Prime Minister's full support. He wrote the Foreword and said on its release:

While acceptance of an overall strategy will depend ultimately
on an appreciation of the major issues facing Australia in this
area by all the parties involved, the release of this paper is
an important part of the process of developing an active and
coherent approach to technology issues and their relevance for
Australian industry growth. 44

But soon afterwards he began publicly qualifying this support. It
became known that he was "reluctant to give his full backing to the
document." 45 "r think," he told the CSIRO executive at the opening
of the CSIRO Clayton Laboratory on 18 May 1984:

I think it very important that this statement of priorities be
submitted to the closest scrutiny. On the basis of a constructively critical dialogue around the issues involved, the development of a relevant, well co-ordinated policy approach in this
46
important area should become possible.

Immediately upon its release, the document had ruffled the
feathers of some powerful members of the Canberra bureaucracy, who
saw it eroding their authority. The document cut across many departments (such as education, industrial relations, and industry and
commerce) and yet it had been released without their approval.
Members of the Prime Minister's own department saw it as "woolly and
lacking teeth" and were annoyed at the lack of consultation. Their
disapproval wa.s clearly reflected in Hawke's reluctance to continue
backing the draft document.
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On the other hand, the general reaction of the research community to the document was much more favourable. Put simply, the paper
was important to scientists because it placed science and technology
in an important and central role in the management of Australia.

During his presidential address to the 54th ANZAAS Congress in
Canberra, on 14 May 1984, Sir Gustav Nossal described the paper as
"one of the most significant and courageous statements to come out of
Canberra on any topic in the last decade." 47 He went on to justify
his assessment in these words:

The Minister's paper is important because it identifies both the
essential role of science and technology to long-term economic
health and the serious quantitative and attitudinal deficiencies
within Australia that currently limit the contribution which our
science sector can make. It is a courageous document because,
rather than being couched only in general terms, it includes
some quantitative indicators by which progress towards goals
will be able to be measured and, even more intrepidly, it seeks
a change in social perceptions and values that can only be
described as truly monumenta1. 48

Professor T.W. Cole (of the School of Electrical Engineering,
University of Sydney), at a meeting of the Royal Society of New South
Wales, described the draft strategy as "a major contribution to the
discus~ion" of t:t:ie future of science and technology in Australia. The

strategy document was recognised as one of an increasing number of
recent "calls' for action"; the meeting responded by considering ways
in which the Society could answer these calls. Among the possibilities listed were: that the "society should lobby governments" (as it
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had done in the past) and that the "society could set up interdisciplinary groups to promote research and development and foster communication between specialist societies and industry." 49 Ideas for
concerted action within the science and technology community were
continuing to grow.
The reaction amongst academics -to the document, however, was not
universal approval. Dr Richard Badham, of the Department of History
and Philosophy of Science, at the University of Wollongong, in a
letter to Search wrote that the major weakness of the document was
that it . did not specify how the public would be consulted on technology issues. The danger was that decisions would "merely represent a
pragmatic compromise between the major power brokers [government,
business, and trade unions} in Australian society." 50 Just as the
"pro-strategy" scientists had focused in on the R&D aspects of the
paper of greatest interest to them, so Badham had selected the issue
central to his concerns: publi,c participation in decision making. 51
The Centre for Technology and Social Change at the University of
Wollongong accused the authors of the draft document of allowing
technological change to be decided in detail by private industry,
according to market forces, with only a limited and passive role for
government

and

the

public.

"In

sum,"

the

Centre

argued,

52 Th
"'lip-service
. ' 'is. being
'
pai' d t o consu l· tat 'ion an d consensus. "
e
authors of the draft were also accused of being internally inconsistent in that the draft assumed technological change was socially
beneficial, and would generate economic growth, which in turn would
increase employment, while, at the same time, admitting that technological change was "increasingly capital intensive and labour displac-
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ing .•• and unlikely to flow to the community in the form of increased wages and employment." 53 The Centre advocated that the
National Technology Strategy "start with a clear assessment of social
goals, and then fit the strategies into meeting these goals." 5 4
Speaking on behalf of the ACTU, Len Ringley, Federal Secretary
of the Australian Bank Employee's Union, said the ACTU supported the
education and training aspects of the strategy but was dismayed at
the prospect of new taxes to fund the policy, the lack of provision
for technology impact studies, and the lack of mechanisms for consultation between employers and unions over the introduction of new
technology. "unions," he told the press, "are 'fed up' with employers
and governments paying lip service to consultation with workers over
the impact of new technology on the workforce." 55
The Science and Technology Committee of th,e Business Council of
Australia criticised the document for not placing industry and
economics in a central role. By considering science and technology
policy in isolation, the Committee claimed, "the draft distorts the
value of technology treating it as an end in itself rather than as a
.
.
.
.
,.55 In
means o f improving
our economic
per f ormance an d prosperity.

reading the draft it is difficult to find where this criticism could
be justified. On the contrary, it appears the Business Council of
Australia responded unfavourably to the draft simply because it was
not couched in economic and business language more acceptable to
them, since much of the Council's published criticism was a restatement of parts of the draft strategy in this "more acceptable" language. The Council went further: it criticised the draft strategy for
"excessive emphasis on research"; it suggested the proper role of
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government in technology policy was "the removal of impediments to
the efficient operation of the market process" while simultaneously and apparently without awareness of the inherent contradiction in
their proposal - recommending the government provide incentives "for
investment in high risk high technology areas". 57 Underlined in
their text is the statement:

The most serious missing ingredient in the

curren~

debate and

the Draft Strategy is the reward structure necessary to optimise
the motivation of the nation's entrepreneur i a l forces. 58

Roger Shipton, speaking for the Opposition in ?arliament,
described the draft National Technology Strategy as disappointing and
unsatisfactory. He accused the Minister for Science and Technology of
having achieved nothing in his year of office: "He has made no
decisions. The strategy is just a repetition of very similar and
familiar rhetoric which we've heard before from the minister." 59

3.9.

The AIP and the National Technology Strategy

In April 1984, Professor Wilson decided to make the most of the
AIP's submission to the National Technology Conference by sending
copies of the submission to all state branches of the AIP and to a
variety of

o~ganisations

both within Australia and overseas, ostensi-

bly to solicit their response. The accompanying letter said, in part:
"The Institute believes that it is very important to promote the
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contribution that Physics makes to economic and technological development and as well as participate in ongoing dialogue and the exchange
of

.d
l.

1160 T h us b egan t h e idea
.
.
.
.
eas wi. th o th er organizations.
which

eventually led Wilson to recognise the need for the AIP to amplify
its voice by joining with other organisations.
The Science Policy Committee's formal response to the draft
National Technology Strategy offered strong support for all aspects
of the strategy, differing only in emphasising key technologies, the
importance of physics, and the need for measures to address the
"grave shortage of secondary teachers of physics." 61 Professor
Peter Mason, of the Department of Physics, Macquarie University,
unable to introduce social issues sufficiently into the committee's
discussions on the strategy, felt obliged to make a personal submission to the Department of Science and Technology, to emphasise the
need for _c reativity in the workforce, for a "critical" welcoming of
high technology, and for an active role for public involvement. 62
Occasionally, Richard Joseph would invite outside speakers to
address the AIP Science Policy Committee: amongst these, for example,
were Dr Keith Suter, of the Wellesley College, University of Sydney,
who spoke to the Committee about his involvement in the "Nuclear Free
Zones" campaign; and, in September 1984, Randall Wilson, Director of
Technology Policy, in the Department of Science and Technology, who
spoke about progress on the revised discussion draft of the National
Technology Strategy. He told the committee that over 200 submissions
had so far been received in response to the first draft document,
including about 60 from government, 50 from academia, 40 from business, 30 from public interest groups, 20 from individuals, and 8 from
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trade unions; most were favourable. He foresaw the final strategy
document developing rapidly, though, he added, it was not yet clear
what form it would take: a Technology Accord, an Action Plan, or a
White Paper. 63
Towards the end of 1984, the Department of Science and Technology invited the AIP to form a Review Committee to report on the
scientific value of physics research being conducted by Australia in
the Antarctic Territories. Smith was Convenor of the three-person
committee. "To the best of my knowledge," he wrote to the AIP, "this
the first occasion that the Institute has been invited to conduct
such a review. It is to be hoped that future invitations to offer
advice or opinion to government bodies will be forthcoming." 64 In
her government-sponsored review of Australian technology, in Scientific American, Jane Ford listed the Australian Institute of Physics as
one of the organisations involved in government policy-making. 65

3 .10.

The

Re~ised

Discussion Draft

The Department of Science released the revised discussion draft
of the National Technology Strategy in May 1985. The new document had
lost the rough but pithy appearance and style of the original and
assumed the more formal academic, bureaucratic appearance of other
DST and Department of Science publications, such as the Department's
Science and Technology Statement. It differed radically from the
original draft, though it kept the same basic structure of four
sections: S&T capability, economic development, social aspects of
technological change, and intergovernmental relations.
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The revised draft relied heavily on the responses to the first
draft. It was more specific in its priorities; it emphasised education, industrial R&D, greater utilisation of new technology by
industry, increased interaction between government R&D organisations
and industry, the social aspects of technological change, and integration of the S&T strategy with other government policy areas.
The change in tone of the document may be seen in the first of
fourteen "policy conclusions", where the emphasis on increased
support for basic R&D so pleasing to scientists in the original, had
been altered to:

the overall level of basic ... and applied ... research in
Australia is generally satisfactory and should be maintained in
real terms, but needs to be translated more effectively into
economic and industrial benefits. An increased emphasis on
commercial potential or application is needed in both universi.
ties
an d

government researc h

.
.
.
66
institutions.

Commenting later on the revised draft, W.N. Hurst, of the Scientific
Development Division, in the Department of Science, said the draft
was part of a continuing trend from "policy for science" to "science
for pc;>licy." 67
But despite Jones' · intentions, the document remained only " a
base from

which

a

Government endorsed paper could now be

developed." 68 With the dismemberment of his Department of Science
and Technology in November 1984, the document came under the influence of the broader industry strategy then being developed _within the
new Department of Industry, Technology, and Commerce, and was subsequently abandoned.
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Smith, by then President of the Australian Institute of Physics,
mourned the loss saying that the decision to abandon the National
Technology Strategy highlighted "the widening gap between science
policy and technology policy that is developing now". The task of
achieving a national technology strategy was never going to be easy,
he wrote, "but it would now appear that there is little chance that
an

integrated

attempted.

.,59

policy

for

science

and

technology

will

be

Joseph, who also lamented its loss, concluded that

the National Technology Strategy was popular "only while the 'crisis'
atmosphere prevailed" and while high technology was seen as "the"
solution to the economic crisis. By the end of 1984 more conventional
economic management approaches were considered adequate. 70

3.11.

The Budget 1984

In early August 1984, speculation grew that a tough science and
technology budget was about to be brought down. Cabinet had notified
all ministers that new programs would only be funded through cuts to
existing programs. Jones was thought to have over $40 million of new
initiatives, but his Department could find few areas to offset these
in existing programs. Moreover, Jones had had trouble within the
Department over his desire to give the proposed Commission for the
-

'

Future top priority. Many senior Cabinet ministers considered the
Commission for the Future a "mickey mouse" project, and this lost
Jones support for other funding proposals before Cabinet. "rn fact,"
Scitech reported, "it is believed that only eleventh hour talks at
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the

beginning

of

this

month

saved

a

number

of

(existing]

programs" . 71 Joseph commented, later: "There was a general feeling
within DST that its Minisber could not argue successfully for funds
in Cabinet and that he was becoming somewhat of a liability." 72
It appears the characteristic most wanted by public servants in
their minister is that he or she be successful in Cabinet. Public
servants, quite naturally, become frustrated when after months of
work their efforts are wasted because their minister "failed to carry
cabinet." 73 When ministers approach Cabinet, either for more money
or for approval for new programs, they are almost invariably opposed
by the minister for finance and the treasurer "who will argue for
restraint." In particular, the prime minister, the treasurer, and the
minister for finance, together, are virtually unbeatable. At budget
meetings, Davis et al. comment, it is difficult for junior ministers
''to prevent cuts to their departments when opposed by determined,
well informed, senior governments figures." 74 The task was especially onerous for Jones; as minister, he had to argue before Cabinet
but, not being a member of Cabinet, he had no vote in Cabinet. One of
the political lessons Professor Smith learnt from the 1984 budget was
that just "because Barry Jones says something or it comes from the
Department of Science doesn't mean it is government policy ••.• This
is where Barry was his own worst enemy: he was a splendid advocate
and there were so many people agreeing with him but none of his
ministerial colleagues were taking any notice." 75 Jones' failure in
Cabinet, Joseph concludes, "highlights the apparent unimportance of
trying to 'prove' something in politics to the point where there is

.
unanimous
agreemen t • 1176
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At 8 pm, on Tuesday 21 August 1984, Paul Keating brought down
his second budget. The S&T portfolio was given just under $600
million, an increase in dollar terms of only 1.6% over the previous
year. The CSIRO appropriation was $323 million, a dollar increase of
1.8%; the ARGS $22.8 million, an increase of 6.6%; the AIRDIS $67.5
million, down 6.0%; the NH&MRC $45 million, up 16% (following a 28%
increase in the previous year). Inflation was estimated at 6 .5 % per
annum. The S&T portfolio had, therefore, received an overall cut of
5% in real terms, or

8% relative to GDP, and the ARGS had effective-

ly received no increase at all. The Commission for the Future was to
be established, in early 1985. In marked contrast, Senator Button,
highlighting the new prominence of industry restucturing in government policy, was able to announce a number of industry initiatives:
taxation reforms, extension services, revised assistance to the
automotive industry, export and trade promotion, training and retraining, bounties, and management development. Button, in his media
release, said the Budget should be seen "as providing further

,

.

posi-

tive' assistance to encourage industry revitalisation and restructuring " • 7 7
The Commission for the Future was announced in the Budget, the
seven members of the Commission were appointed in February 1985, and
the Director in May 1985, and during the remainder of 1985 several of
the secretarial staff took up their positions. One of the seven
members appointed to the new Commission was Professor Peter Mason,
Foundation Professor of Physics, at Macquarie University, and member
of the AIP science Policy Committee.
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The initial funding allocation for the Commission was $250,000.
The aims of the Commission were to promote community awareness and
understanding of science and technology, to stimulate discussion, and
to disseminate information about the social and economic aspects of
science and technology and "their potential impact on Australia in
the future." 78 Jones remarked: "It'll continue doing what I've been
doing when I drop off the perch"; and in typical confronting mood, he
added: "sometimes it is bound to raise questions that the Government
won't like but this will be within the right questioning framework
with the options clearly laid ou t • .. 79

3 .12.

Reactions to the Budget

Two days after Budget night, on 23 August 1984, Barry Jones
addressed the National Science Forum in Canberra. "I wouldn't pretend," he began, "that this has been an overwhelmingly expansionary
budget for science and technology in 1984/85." The budget, he said,
had been framed with an election in mind, "with the utilitarian test
of the greatest good for the greatest number and in the shortest
time, with the maximum political impact." A Minister for Scienc,e and
Technology, he .explained, was a "Minister for the Future", and
therefore represented a constituency without political clout. SO He
was critical of members of the Ministry and bureaucracy who saw the
economy as self-correcting and who thought that all that was required
of government was to create an economic climate conducive to investment. 81
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In his prepared speech, despite his disappointment, Jones
attempted to emphasise the few positive aspects of the S&T Budget,
such as the increase in the number of National Research Fellowships.
During question time, however, he was asked a series of pointed and
emotive questions which brought increasingly agitated responses from
the unhappy Minister. It is not clear which question brought about
the now famous outburst, whether it was in response to a question by
Kim Burgman, Capital 7 TV concerning "short-term pragmatic budgetary
decisions" (as reported in search 82 ) or in response to comments
about poor funding and career prospects for young researchers by Dr
David Fayle (then a Research Fellow at ANU but later a member of
DITAC), but the meaning of his outburst was quite clear: scientists
"are the wimpiest collection of lobbyists you can imagine." Given the
impact of his statement, and his comments on interest groups, it is
worth quoting at length:

look at the way in which interest groups are organised throughout the community. If pressure comes from a powerful union, or
from a very powerful trading partner overseas or from some
important sector in private investment, then this is significant. But if you sit there in your office waiting for the people
in the scientific community to come and exercise pressure you
may be waiting a very long time. As I've said quite often to
people in the scientific and academic community, you are the
wimpiest collection of lobbyists you can imagine. And you 're not
even able to apply threats. The CS I RO Executive doesn't say,
'Unless you do so-and-so we're going to take a vow of silence
for a month'. People would say, you took a
anyway. 83

vow of silence
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The impression this statement made on Wng.-Cmdr.(Rtd.) Dr Ron
Christie, Vice President of the Australian Computer Society (ACS),
was that Jones was in effect saying, "no matter how hard he fought in
parliament, nobody else was supporting him in the scientific area. He
wanted support, he felt he wasn't getting that support, that we
.
.
weren 't b e h.in d h.im. " 84 Don Aitkin,
Pro f essor o f

.
1 science,
.
Po i·itica

at the Australian National University, however, saw Jones' statement
quite differently: "Barry Jones .•. appeared to lay the blame on the
scientists and educators themselves, much as the previous Government
had seemed to blame t~e unemployed for being without jobs." 85
Jones' outburst prompted Dr Ken McCracken to present a paper, at the
Applied Physics Conference in late 1984, entitled, "Whimp s of Au stra•
n 86
Barry Jones I
lia. Arise.

It

Sleepers Wa k e! , it seems, h a d b ecome
IT

•

"whimps Arise!".
Scitech described the Budget as "one of Australia's worst
science and technology Budgets on record" and reported that Jones had
been very disappointed with what he described as a "gloomy" s &T
Budget, that he had threatened to resign, or, at least, "of not
standing for the ministry after the next election", and that he was
"disillusioned with the whole budgetary process." 87 The Opposition
picked up on Jones' remarks and hammered the government during the
Budget debate in parliament; and Jones was reprimanded by his Prime
Minister. 88
The

CSI~O

estimated it had received a cut of 3.2% in salary and

operating funds. An irate CSIRO Chairman, Dr Paul Wild, commented:
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What really dismays me is that this Budget is further evidence
that electorally science and technology count for almost nothing
in Australia. Despite all efforts by our Minister this is one of
the worst budgets in our history, not only for CSIRO but for the
whole area of science and technology ...• A 3 per cent cut means
further stagnation: staff cuts, no new blood, little scope to
change direction and, most serious of all in a research organization, wilting morale.

CSIRO staff feel that the reward for
all their efforts has been a kick in the teeth. 89

All 42 divisional chiefs of the CSIRO signed a telex to the Prime
Minister condemning the cuts to the CSIRO. From that point on, as
Peter Pockley records, the CSIRO began "some overdue direct lobbying
to key ministers with influence in the cabinet (other than their own
1y
.
re 1 a t ive

1 ow 1 y

· ·
.. go
ran k e d minister).

Facing a 21% increase in applications, the ARGS

Chairman,

Professor Peter Sheehan described the S&T budget as one of the worst
on record and criticised the government for not honouring its election promise to increase ARGS by 10% above inflation. "At a time when
the Government should have been rescuing the scientific reputation of
Australian research it seems bent on regressing it", he said. 91
Incensed, he wrote to the Prime Minister condemning the low Budget
allocation: "Productive work is being prematurely stopped and new and
exciting developments in research cannot be supported". 92 Another
member of the ARGC, Professor Don Aitkin wrote in The Age:

Those interested in the future of the system had

~ome

hopes

·that a change of Government in 1983 might allow an infusion of
new blood into the universities, colleges and the CSIRO, since
the Labor spokesmen had made a good deal of noise about the
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ALP' s commitment to a scientifically and technologically strong
Australia.
But soothing noise is so far the sum of Labor's contribution: the recent Budget was a woeful document ... 93

The ARGC responded to the Budget by awarding its controversial 'nil'
grants to 256 researchers. 94
One of the first to respond to the Budget was Professor Arthur
Birch, President of the Australian Academy of Science, who issued a
Media Release just two days after Budget night. He described the
science budget as "disastrous" and criticised "the government's
contemptuous incomprehension of the long term aspects of Science."
"we in Australia," he concluded, "are now busy eating our seed corn,
and on behalf of my grandchildren, I protest." 95 The analogy with
seed corn is explained in astronomer Professor R. Hanbury- Brown's
after dinner speech in 1985: "basic research is the seed corn of the
future practical benefits which society expects to gain from applied
science." 96 A little later, Birch wrote to The Age, on behalf of
himself and nine other members of the Academy's Council, to express
the Academy's

"grave concern" over the ARGS

allocation:

Failure to provide adequate funding for creative scientific
research in our

te~tiary

institutions will not only erode our

ability to be truly innovative but, equally seriously, steadily
reduce the number of competent and experienced Australian
scientists. 97

.

On 29 August 1984, Professor Wilson, President of the Australian
Institute of Physics (AIP), issued a Press Release strongly attacking
the S&T Budget. 98 The Press Release was based on comments he made
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at the opening of the AIP National congress at Griffiths University.
The statement is quoted here in entirety because of the important
role Wilson played in the formation of F.A STS and because it reveals
his attitudes to the economic benefits of research and to the role
played by the AIP in the National Technology Strategy; it read:

Professor Wilson said that the Commonwealth Government would
have us believe that the current economic recovery was due to
its good planning and management rather than to chance factors
such as the ending of the drought. To believe this one needs to
see evidence of proper long term planning rather than panic
measures linked to short term electoral advantage. The current
budget for Science and Technology must lead to the conclusion
that the government has put short term popularity above the
future economic and technical strength of Australia.
The Minister, Barry Jones, has correctly stressed repeatedly
the importance of Science and Technology Planning to the future
of our economy and employment recovery. However, the drastic
cuts to the Australian Research Grants Scheme (compared with the
original promises of the Labor Party Platform) and to the CSIRO
must have the effect of running down our level of technical
sufficiency to a level well below its present pathetic state.
Professor Wilson said that the Australian Institute of
Physics had made a strong contribution to the National Technology Strategy. He called on the Common wealth Government to urgently reverse the damaging effects of the budget, pointing out that
without a strong national commitment to Science and Technology
our future prospects for a strong economy, a high quality of
life and low levels of unemployment will just be an illusion.
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The issuing of press releases on political issues was unusual
for AIP presidents. Talking about those days, Professor Wilson said:

"r believe I happened to be President of the AIP at the time that it
was suddenly expected of me. There was enormous pressure. Scientists
were beginning to feel they were being left behind." 99 Professor
Smith added: "The budget of 1984 started to stir people up because
they recognised, in spite of being a vocal advocate, Barry Jones on
his own wasn't getting anywhere."lOO
The same day as Professor Wilson's Press Release, all 15 heads
of physics departments in universities and institutes of technology
sent a letter to Barry Jones voicing their concern over the "severe
decline in support of physics research" since 197 8, and urging the
government to reverse the trend "by making adequate funds availa bl e. "101

The

sentiment

was

well

intended

but,

under

the

circumstances, the target, Barry Jones, was surely not well chosen.

3 .13.

Why this Reaction?

Professor Ken Green, a British academic, visited Australia
shortly after the 1984 budget crisis. He interviewed 30 people in
various R&D fields around Australia including the Canberra bureaucracy, and was able to form an outsider's perhaps more detached view of
the crisis, and to make some comparisons with related international
trends, especially in the United Kingdom. 102 He began his _report on
the crisis with a provocative quote from the book by American, Harvey
Averch, A Strategic Analysis of Science and Technology Policy:
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Minor changes in budgets are taken as a major crisis within the
scientific and technical communities .••. Any percentage drop in
funds is seen as disastrous for scientists and research performers, particularly those at universities. They speak as if they
have little capability to adapt, substitute and compensate. In
contrast, for an increase of a few percentage points, they
promise truly significant differences in performance or rate of
discovery, and yet the new resources will not be used mu ch
differently than the old resources. 103

The remainder of Green's paper, however, suggests - at least in the
Australian context - that this accusation is unfair and inadequate.
Green identified three aspects of the R&D debate in Australia (in
common with advanced capitalist countries overseas): a slowing of
growth rates for R&D expenditure in the 1980s compared with the 1950s
and 1960s; close scrutiny of the way R&D budget funds were distributed; and greater emphasis on linking R&D to national objectives,
especially

"economic

ones". 104

These

considerations

would

inevitably lead, he wrote, to "a redistribution of R&D resource" with
increases in some areas and cuts in others. "However," forecasting
troubled times ahead, he added, "the means of evaluation and
redistribution, the institutional mechanisms for setting objectives,
and whose interests should be represented in objective-setting, are
not clear and · are bound to be the subjects of considerable
controversy." 105 Green concluded that the most pressing issue was
an agreement between scientists and the community on priorities for
R&D:
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It would be most undesirable if the protracted debates over the
levels of research funding that have characterised the last few
years in the UK were to be repeated in Australia, risking grave
damage to the country's research infrastructure. 106

The emotional side of the response to the crisis within the
science and technology community in 1984 was based on a feeling that
scientists, in some way, were being blamed for Australia's economic
woes, and on frustration from the knowledge that the protests of
scientists had no coherent voice to deal with this criticism. "What
science has done,"

said

Wilson defensively,

is make a country which is pretty inhospitable into the most
efficient agricultural and mining country in the world.

Now

that we are being asked to do something in manufacturing we are
delivering the goods there too. For us to be blamed is ridiculous. What scientists have done is what has been expected of
them in this country. 107

In his opening address to the AIP National Congress in Brisbane
on 27 August 1984, Mike Ahern, Queensland Minister for Industry,
Small Business and Technology, and future Premier of Queensland, told
the 200 physicists attending the Congress that the Queensland sugar,
mining and cotton industries were "world class performers" largely
because of university research and innovation. But, he admonished:
"scientists have been pitifully shy, almost negligent, in promoting
the very real contributions of universities to national advancement."108 The case for science, he said, "should have been mounted
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on the public stage. It should have been widely broadcast."

He urged

the phy .s ics community "to lobby governments to improve the funding
and status of scientific research." 109
One way to form an impression of the general interests and
concerns of Australian scientists is to scan through their in-house
journals, such as Chemistry in Australia, or The Australian Physicist, or the ANZAAS publication, Search. A glance through t!"le latter
two, for the six years from mid-1980 to mid-1986, reveals over 600
articles or parts of articles of a non-technical nature of relevance
to science, technology and social issues. Of these, about 25% deal
with industry and technology (including government
industrial

R&D,

the

need

to

improve

the

sup~ort

links

for

between

government-funded and industrial R&D, and the impacts of tec:-inological change). A further 25% deal with science and technology policy
(including priority setting, the proper balance between pure and
applied research, and the levels of R&D funding). About 20% consider
the nature and social role of science and the need to communicate
science to the public. About 8% cover government organisations, such
as the CSIRO; 6% FASTS and NSTAG; and surprisingly few deal specifically with university research (2%). The Australian Physicist, much
more so than Search, displays a strong concern for nuclear issues
(16%); women in. science (6%); and the teaching of physics in high
schools (5%), in particular the need for more physics-trained teachers to teach physics.
As an example of these concerns, the New South Wales Education
Department adopted, during the 1980s, the concept of a generalised
Science teacher, that is a teacher capable of teaching all aspects of
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science: biology, chemistry, geology, physics -

despite these being

examined as separate subjects for the Higher School Certificate. This
concept of a "generalised" science teacher was unacceptable to the
physics community; it preserved a concept of the universality of
science, imposed on the science community by educationalists - that
is, non-scientists - when scientists themselves saw science rather as
a network of well-defined specialities, or subjects. The physics
community was further alarmed at the shortage of physics-trained
teachers in New South Wales schools. Writing in The Australian
Physicist, R.A. Brown, of Macquarie University, said: "This policy
will lead to a further and catastrophic decline in the standard
of physics teaching". 110 When later the AIP approached the New
South Wales Education Department, it was refused permission to
conduct a survey of the qualifications of science teachers in New
South

Wales.

The Council of Australian Postgraduate Associations ( CAPA)
released a 150-page report entitled, "The Role of Postgraduates in
Australian Research". The report stated that postgraduate scholars
contributed a major part (40-50%) of university research and, through
this, a major part (12-15%) of the national research effort.

111

Despite this, they were poorly remunerated, were poorly accommodated,
and were provided with poorly maintained and inadequate equipment. Dr
George A. Christos, a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of
Theoretical Physics, at the Australian National University, wrote a
long and compelling article in The Australian Physicist outlining
"some of the appalling conditions faced by non-tenured researchers in
academic life in Australia, [and] the ways in which the situation is
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steadily worsening

nll2

The conditions and career prospects for

postgraduate students and post-doctoral fellows were a major concern
to academic scientists, as was the fear of a brain-drain of talented
young

people

away

from

their

science

or lost

overseas. 113

Scientists could not help but feel concern for their young colleagues
experiencing

such difficulties.

Hence the emotional response within the S&T community to the
1984 Budget was based in part on these other concerns, for these
other troubled areas of science and technology. In commenting on the
eventual split within the Department of Science and Technology,

Smit~

wrote:

it not the prospect of inter-departmental rivalry between
Science and Industry, Technology and Commerce that I regard as
the most alarming situation for the future, but rather the
policies being followed by the Department of Education. The
shortage of appropriately trained physics teachers and the
emphasis on a qualitative, descriptive presentation; the
restrictions on the number of places in tertiary education; the
pressure to reduce post-graduate numbers; the ageing population
of university physicists; these are all gloomy portents for the
future of Australian physics. 114

Aitkin expressed these broader concerns in a letter to The Age:

the universities and colleges are greying, recruitment of young
researchers has almost come to an end, and the research output
of the tertiary education sector, which was something to rejoice
at in the 1960s, is no longer remarkable. Australia's capacity
·to cope with the scientific and technological challenges of the
future - let alone to profit from them - is growing daily more
doubtfuL 1 15

162

The scientific community in Australia is sufficiently small for
difficulties being experienced in one sector to generate a sympathetic response throughout the whole community. Difficulties within the
CSIRO or the universities, for instance, are rapidly communicated and
felt by other scientists outside these organisations. This communication is not be so much between scientists of different disciplines,
such as between biology and physics, but between scientists with
similar or related interests in different organisations, who meet on
committees or at conferences, or ring each other for advice on
research problems.
Commenting on a similar crisis in Britain, Ince wrote in 1986:
"The scientists themselves seem to be undergoing a crisis of confidence" brought about "by what they see as an acute shortage of funds"
and by the uncertainty resulting from all the inquiries into science
and scientific organisations. 116 The disappointment over ARGS, in
Australia, was merely the final straw added to their concerns.

3 .14.

The Budget in

Context

Aside from the announcement of major new programs, much of the
impact of Commonwealth Budgets, especially in the non-industrial
sector of S&T, occurs through small shifts in emphasis, that is, a
little more here or a little less there. When these shifts continue
for some years, they have far-reaching effe.c ts on the overall balance
of S&T activity, not just within major government agencies such as
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the CSIRO or major granting schemes such as the ARGS but within all
government departments, agencies, and socio-economic objectives.
Consider, by way of illustration, two agencies or schemes which
initially have identical budget allocations. If the first of these is
allowed to grow annually at 3% per annum while the second is reduced
by 3% per annum, then after ten years the first agency will have
nearly twice the budget allocation of the second.
To place the 1984 S&T budget in perspective we need to go ahead
several years and then look back, a luxury unavailable to the people
of 1984. From this perspective the changes announced in the 1984
budget appear as relatively small shifts amongst a number of overall
long term trends. 11 7
The determination of long term trends, however, requires some
means for converting actual expenditures into so-called "real" or
"constant" figures, and growth rates into "real" growth rates.
Normally this involves adjusting expenditures for inflation, relative
to some nominated year. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is often used
informally for this purpose, though the CPI is merely a basket of
price

~ndicators

chosen to represent average consumer spending, and

is not necessarily valid for S&T which has a different balance of
costs. One could therefore choose from amongst a number of available
S&T inflation indice.s ; these generally give similar long term trends
but can differ markedly from year to year. A better measure for
"real" trends in S&T is Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a measure of the value of goods
and services produced in Australia less the cost of their production.
In more technical language it is "gross national expenditure plus
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exports of goods and services less imports of goods and services" . 118
Growth in GPO would seem an ideal measure of R& D (and S &T) growth
since one aim of R&D - particularly business R&D - is to increase the
value or quality of goods and services and to reduce their production
cost. The more goods and services there are, the more R&D and S&T
necessary to monitor, control, maintain, improve, modify, or find
alternatives to, to meet changing demand and competition.
GDP also includes a component due to population increase, or
more specifically to increase in the work force. For the six years
from September 1979 to August 1985, the Australian labour force grew
at an average of 1.9% per annum. 119 If a budget allocation is
maintained only according to increases in the CPI, while the population increases, then in fact, the per capita budget allocation will
decline in real terms. The ten year trend, from 197 6/7 7 to 1986/8 7,
in the growth in Australia's GDP is remarkably constant at 3.0% per

annum, except for a drop in 1982-83 associated with a high annual
inflation of 11.5%. The GDP recovered quickly after 1983-84 when
annual inflation dropped dramatically. A large part of the growth in
GDP is attributable, therefore, to the 1.9% growth in the Australian
labour force.
For the ten years 1976/77 to 1986/87, the increase in Commonwealth Support . for R&D, compared with GDP, was .:..o.1% per annum.
Commonwealth support for R&D was therefore essentially keeping pace
with GDP. Wh'en compared with Commonwealth outlays, however, the R&D
rate dropped to -0.8% per annum. Thus, while successive budgets over
this period showed a continuing commitment to increased support for
R&D, it is apparent that government support for R& D was not seen by
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government as a solution to Australia's economic woes since R&D was
not allowed to take a larger share of the budget outlays. This is not
to suggest that R&D support should be tied to budget outlays, merely
that trends in budget outlays indicate trends in government priorities.
It should also be noted that the official category "Common wealth
Support for R&D" used over the period does not include the amounts
which the universities and other tertiary institutions spend on
research from their general recurrent grants and equipment grants.
The R&D component of teaching and research academic salaries, which
is calculated at an average of 0.3, is a significant component of
this figure. Much of this funding comes under the control of the
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission ( CTE C). This additional
expenditure represents another 39% on top of the Commonwealth Support
for R&D and despite the questionable nature of the figure of 0.3 for
all university academic salaries, the amount is too large to ignore.
When this extra amount, plus tax incentives for industrial R&D are
included, the real long-term growth rate in "total" Commonwealth
budget support for R&D becomes 0.0% per annum, compared with GDP.
This "long" term trend, relative to GDP, in constant 1985-86 dollars,
is shown in Figure 3.1. The position on the graph of the 1984 budget
contribution gives no indication of the ensuing crisis.
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the R&D expenditures, relative
to GPD, of the six Commonwealth agencies with the largest R&D budgets. Table 3.1 highlights the progressively difficult P.osition of
these agencies; overall, the agencies were behind by 1.1% per annum.
The long term growth in the Antarctic Division reflected government
awareness of the political significance of the Antarctic Territories.
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The long term trend in total Commonwealth budget
. suppo.+t for R&D in Australia, relative to GDP.
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Table 3.1

The Long Term Trend in R&D Expenditures of the Six Commonwealth
Agencies with the Largest R&D Budgets, Relative to GDP 120

Agency

Long term trend
1976-77 to 1986-87
(%

per annum)

CSIRO

-1.6

DSTO

- 3 .s

Telecom

-1.6

AAEC (now ANSTO)

- 4 .0

Antarctic Division

1.3

Bureau of Mineral Resources

0.6

Total, all Agencies

-1.1

Table 3.2

The Long Term Trend in the Major Commonwealth R&D Granting
Programs, Incentives and Bounties, Relative to GDP 121

Department

Long term trend
1976-77 to 1986-87
(%

Industry, Technology and Commerce

In~ustry

Science
Education
Resources and Energy
Transport
Total

12 .3

8.9

Health
Primary

per annum)

-0.4
1. 7

-2. 7

6.5

-17 .9

s.o
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A summary of Commonwealth expenditure, relative to GDP, of the
granting programs of the various Commonwealth Departments is provided
in Table 3.2. Over the same ten years 1976-77 to 1986-87, the major

Commonwealth R&D granting programs, including incentives and bounties
to industry, grew at 5.0% per annum relative to GDP. During this
time, several Departments showed major gains in their R&D extramural
schemes, notably: Industry, Technology and Commerce, Health, and
Resources and Energy. Wool Research (in Primary Industry) and Postgraduate Awards (in Education) both declined at -3.0% per annum,
while the level of Transport R&D grants dropped away from its high of
$8.3 million in 1977-78.
The two largest Granting Programs were the National Health and
Medical Research Council (NH&MRC) grants and the Australian Research
Grants Scheme (ARGS) grants. Growing jealousy over the success of the
NH&MRC amongst physical scientists supported only by the ARGS (outside CTEC) had disturbing consequences for FASTS in its formative
years, particularly when it was learned how many members of FASTS,
especially its biologists, increasingly depended on NH&MRC grants.
For the ten years 1976-77 to 1986-87, NH&MRC grants increased from
$10.3 million to $59.0 million, 122 that is, at 7.9%

per annum,

relative to GDP. The ARGS declined for the same period from $11.6
million to $30.0 million at a rate of -0.7% per annum. Through
reductions in overheads from $4.5 million to $2.5 million, 123 the
actual ARGS grant allocations grew at the marginally better rate of
1.4% per annum. During those ten years, the combined humanities and
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social sciences component of ARGS grant allocations grew from 12% of
grants to 21% of grants, so, as a consequence, the combined physical
and natural sciences component of ARGS grant allocations grew at only
0.2% per annum.
Since 1984 the main target for the government has been Australia's manufacturing industry, whose total R&D effort was recognised
as lagging far behind that of most of Australia's major trading
partners. Business spending on R&D had dropped from 0.42% of GDP in
1968-69, to 0.24% of GDP in 1976-77, then to a long term low of 0.19%
of GDP in 1983. In 1976, around 44,000 people (or 0.72% of the
workforce) were employed in R&D in Australia. Some seven years later,
in 1983, despite a 14% increase in the Australian workforce still
only around 45,000 people (or 0.65% of the workforce) were employed
in R& D.
A lack of competitiveness in parts of Australia's manufacturing
industry and declining profitability in the primary sector, overall,
had pushed Australia's export-import position down to dangerously low
levels. In 1983-84, the annual current account balance, a

main

indicator of our trade position with the world, contained a deficit
of $7,283 million. By 19_8 5-86, the annual deficit had increased to
$14,364 million. 124 Through 1983-84, despite the efforts of the
then Minister for Science and Technology, B.O. Jones, and others to
raise

awareness

of

the

need

in

Australia

for

competitive

technological' development, Australian business appeared unable or
unwilling to increase the level of its R&D spending.
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Beginning in 1985, to create a more favourable climate for
innovation and entrepreneurial endeavour, the Commonwealth government
introduced the 150% taxation deduction scheme for industrial R&D, the
licensed Management and Investment Companies (MICs) scheme, and the
National Research Fellowship scheme to promote more effective interaction between industry and academic research. But since total Commonwealth support for R&D was maintained constant relative to GDP with
an increasing proportion going to assist industry then the increase
for industry (and Health) was at the expense of R&D support for other
areas, namely the major research organisations, the CSIRO, DSTO, and
AAEC, and a number of granting schemes, including Wool Research, the
ARGS, and Post-Graduate Awards. The budget of 1984 was merely a part
of this trend.
In his analysis of the trends in university research expenditures, for the years 1974 to 1981, Professor Ron Johnston concluded
(in 1985) that "the available data do not support the (academic)
scientists' views that basic research is grossly underfunded and has
suffered a dramatic decline." 125 His conclusion was based largely
on trends in university expenditures, relative to constant dollars
rather than GDP, and on a comparison of Australia's higher education
expenditure with the average expenditures of medium and large OECD
c ,o untries, this time relative to GDP. The discrepancy -

between the

data and the scientists' views - he attributed largely to a concentration by the scientists on the ARGS and other "free" funds and their
neglect of indirect expenditures - salaries and overheads -: incurred

by the government in supporting academic research. These indirect
expenditures Johnston showed had had the biggest increase. In 1983,
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Australia was estimated to have spent 0.29% of GDP on higher education. This percentage has fluctuated only slightly, around 0 .3 % ,
since 1968.

126

So Johnston was correct in saying there has been no

dramatic decline, overall, in higher education R&D spending, although, as Johnston also points out, there has been a tightening of
"free" money. The total figure also does not account for changing
numbers of university staff.
A true comparison with other countries is less obvious, and more
fraught with inconsistencies in accounting for social and political
differences between countries. The expenditures recorded in the
1986-87 Science and Technology Statement show medium R& D countries

spent an average of 0.39% of GDP on higher education R&D, and large
R&D countries spent 0.38%. 127 Australia is classed as a medium R&D
country, and, contrary to Johnston's analysis, its 0.29% is well
below both these more recent figures. Indeed, on a GDP basis one
might expect little difference in the grand averages between OECD
countries since GDP partially accommodates the differences in the
sizes of countries, whereas the definition of medium or large R&D
performance is based .s imply on total dollars spent on R&D, so Australia's trailing position is even more disconcerting. Grand averages
also tend to disguise the differences between countries, and one
should note that . the USA, Japan, F.R. Germany, Sweden, Switzerland,
the Netherlands, . and Austria spend considerably higher percentages of
GDP on higher education R&D than does Australia. Which merely raises
the question, should Australia trail the average or should it join
the leaders?
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CHAPTER 4.

THE MEETINGS OF CONCERN (NOVEMBER) 1984 -

(APRIL) 1985

There is no doubt that as a community science and technology
society members have been singularly unsuccessful at influencing
government and convincing the media and the public of their
importance.
T.F. SMITH, 1985 1

Part 1: (November-December)

4.1.

19 84

Rumours of a New Department of Industry, Technology and

Commerce

With growing government interest in the restructuring of industry, rumours of ·a giant department encompassing trade, industry and
technology continued to spread. Senator Button was known to favour
the combining of industry with technology and to be embarrassed by
.

--

"

his department's continually quoting programs from the Department of
Science and Technology in its reports. The new super department would
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resemble Japan's MITI (Ministry for International Trade and Industry)
which so impressed Hawke during his visit to Japan earlier in the
year. Opponents of the new department were concerned that it would be
too big and that the innovative parts of the Department of Science
and Technology would be overwhelmed by the older style, "bureaucratic
thinking" of the

Department of Industry and

Commerce. 2

During October the rumours on DITAC gained conviction and there
were further rumours that Barry Jones and the Minister for Defence,
Mr Scholes, would not be re-elected by Caucus to the next ministry.
The Minister for Trade, Lionel Bowen, it was said, was fighting hard
to prevent parts of his Trade department from moving into Industry.
In the bureaucratic tug-of-war over the reorganisation of portfolios,
a compromise was suggested for the Department of Science and Technoiogy to hand over only the operational areas of technology but retain
technology policy. Some members of Jones' own department, however,
were rumoured to want another minister, one with more "clout", which
weakened Jones' position further. Finally in a city of rumours,
Canberra, it was rumoured that Senator Button was considering standing down after the election. 3
Scitech reported that the rumours about Jones' shaky future had
created "mixed feelings within the bureaucracy and the scientific
community":

Everybody acknowledges that he has done a superb job at
talking up science and technology and raising public and parliamentary awareness of its importance to economic and social
development.
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However, many, even his ardent supporters, also admit that
he seems incapable of putting any of his rhetoric into action
and of getting Cabinet support for his proposals. He is known to
abhor the whole numbers game in Cabinet and this is seen as a
major weakness. 4

4.2. ·

The Debate on Tax Incentives for Industrial R&D

Professor Ralph Slatyer, Chairman of ASTEC, returned from a
visit to Israel, Austria, Norway and the Netherlands, convinced that
the government needed to increase its support for industrial R& D. All
four countries had various forms of government support for industry,
including grants, tax incentives, cheap loans, subsidies, and adequate venture finance; they had also learnt that success depended on
market pull rather than research push. This implied research directions should be more tailored to the market. The visit also strengthened Slatyer's awareness of the need for closer ties between government R&D and industry. 5
Support for tax incentives was also forthcoming from members of
the Department of Industry and Commerce, and Hawke was known to be
sympathetic; but the Departments of Finance and Treasury were opposed
on the grounds that the proposal was open ended in cost and therefore
difficult to plan and estimate. The proponents of the scheme argued,
in return, that an increasing cost in the scheme would at least mean
that .industry was responding by increasing its R& D, something not
achieved so far with any other scheme. 6 Treasury countered by
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arguing that there had to be a choice between tax incentives and
grants; that government could not have both. 7
In October 1984, Jones instructed his department to prepare a
submission detailing the case for and against tax incentives. Jones
himself had been unenthusiastic about tax incentives, Tegart, Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology (DST), was opposed
to them, and other members of DST were arguing that tax incentives
would only confuse the industrial R&D scene. The DST submission
helped decide the Prime Minister to defer any decision about tax
incentives until after the proposed Tax Summit planned for 1985. T h e
DST submission had the further effect of aligning the DST against tax
incentives in opposition to the Department of Industry and Commerce.
The subsequent introduction of tax incentives and their immediate and
apparent success further pushed the DST into the background of
decision making. 8

4.3.

More Relevance in University Research

In September 1984, Hawke met with the Australian Vice Chancellors Committee (AVCC). He told them that the universities must look
to obtaining more research funds from outside sources. Universities
needed to conduct more "collaborative projects with business and
industry," 'he suggested, and continued more pointedly:

For too long research in Australia has been too much divorced from development. If measured against the yardstick of
relevance, there is clearly a need for our scientists to lift
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their game .... The fault lies on both sides -

with researchers

disinterested in the application of their product, and with
industrialists not sufficiently aware of the benefits to be
derived from a vigorous research

effort.

This problem will only be overcome if researchers reach out
more deliberately to understand and provide for the needs of
industry and if industry itself puts much greater effort into
defining its requirements more precisely and embarks on the even
more difficult task of persuading educationalists and researchers to redirect their interests. 9

His final remark plainly suggests researchers were more resistant to
change than industry to restructuring; and, therefore, if in the past
both parties were to blame for the gulf between them, in the future
any continuing difficulty between research and industry would mean
researchers must carry much of the blame. Clearly researchers would
no longer be allowed to avoid industry.
Continuing the theme of relevance, Ruth Morschel, of the Strategic Policy Branch, in the Department of Science and Technology, wrote
in Ascent: "Knowledge generated by research should be effectively
applied so that the society which sustains that research effort reaps
the benefits." The absence of links between government and academic
R&D and industry, she wrote, prevents the widespread "industrial
.
.
application
an d

. 1°isation
.
comm~rcia

of

new t ec h no l ogy " . lO

If scientists, particularly academic scientists, were slow to
take on industrial research, it was because of the innate and
long-term value they continued to see in basic research. For some, to
abandon basic research would be to abandon science. But would they
acquiesce, this time, "with astonishing ease" as Haberer alleged they
had always done in the past?: "permitting, with only token opposi-
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tion, the destruction of colleagues and scientific institutions, and
the perpetuation of obvious assaults upon the integrity of science
itself." 11 The concentration on benefits in Marschel' s paper and in
others around this time is totally focused on economic advantage.
Scientists were being asked to change their directions in an atmosphere where the culture of science benefits of science -

and the educative and social

were being subsumed into a hoped-for quick

economic return. The individual scientist's response to this may well
have depended on how urgent he or she perceived Australia's economic
troubles to be, necessitating in one extreme an all hands to the
pumps approach, and in another, a continued search for long term
solutions which accounted for social and cultural values besides
economic ones. The government, notwithstanding, gave the impression
of wanting the R&D

scene to change direction abruptly.

The appropriate balance between pure and applied research was
one of the most frequent debating issues for scientists at this time.
The Australian Physicist carried a series of articles on the subject
through the 1980s and it is clear that Barry Jones read at least some
of this materiai. 12 The editor of the journal in 1986-87, Dr Trudi
Thompson, commented in her editorial column: "This debate has continued ad nauseam ever since I started my career in Physics during World
War rr." 13 Dr J.I'. Wild, Chairman of the CSIRO, for example, wrote
a paper entitled, "Applied Physics or Physics Applied?" in 1981, his
theme was "there is nothing impure about the applied, and nothing
inapplicable about the pure " ; 14 Pro f essor R.E. Collins, at the time
a member of the AIP Science Policy Committee, wrote, in 1983, "Is
applied physics academically respectable?", in which he disagreed
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with the attitude that applied physics "was a lower level activity
involving poorer science or a less scientific approach"; 15 and
Dr A.G. Klein, future AIP President, wrote, in 1985, "Pure, leading
to Applied Research", 16 of which the title speaks for itself, and
represents the most common argument used by scientists in support of
pure research. But this protracted debate within science on the
relative merits of pure versus applied, in
.
17
B ri"t ain,

appe~re

d

Australia, as in

.
to resolve nothing.

Industrial research in our universities threatens the present
"cultural" and normative v~lues of science. Science, and physics in
particular, is a craft or trade. Postgraduate research training is an
essential part of learning this trade. As M.J. Mulkay writes: "Membership in a scientific research community entails acceptance of the
intellectual standards defining what kinds of problems and solutions
are legitimate" •18 In attempting to break new ground in fundamental
research, the student is imbued with this "universality" of his or
her subject. Manufacturing industry, on the other hand, is concerned
with the production efficiency of particular process lines, these,
after all, are where their products for commercial gain are produced.
Research into the particular and unique properties of any one production line has no intrinsic scientific value unless the results
obtained can be related to the generic properties of all such prod uction lines. There is a danger that industrially trained postgraduate
scientists will have too narrow a view of problem solving and be out
of touch with the broader scientific community. It would be unreasonable, however, to expect politicians who have not undergone an
apprenticeship within the scientific community to recognise or
understand the socialising aspect of basic research.
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One interesting off-shoot of the debate on pure versus applied
science was that it was often assumed that universities did only pure
research. 19 A study at the University of Melbourne in 1984 suggested, on the contrary, that universities did a considerable amount of
strategic and

applied

R&D,

as

much

as

67%

of all academic

research. 20 It was also generally assumed that industry did little
pure research, but if pure research is identified with the unplanned,
the undirected and the hopeful, as distinct from research with a
particular and immediate industrial application, then, in my personal
experience, Australian industry has pursued a large percentage of its
research in this way, in the past. Again, from personal experience,
the trend in academic research towards short-term industrial problems
has occurred even more so in industrial research, which leaves one
pondering:

who will be left to do the long-term work?

Much more important at stake than some abstract debate on pure
versus applied research was the very value of research, itself. It
was generally assumed by scientists that research, in providing new
knowledge and insights into the world, was inherently good, irrespective of its immediate or eventual utilisation.

Barry

Commoner,

Professor of Botany at Washington University, expressed this scientific conceit back in the 1960s:

Behind every technological innovation

is the source of the

knowledge which technology applies to the solution of a given
problem - the free inquiry into nature that we call basic
science. 21
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So well recognised was the value of all research amongst scientists,
that many scientists when pressed to justify the value of their work
would immediately respond by describing some supposed economic and
technological benefit lying somewhere down the track. The specific
fruits of the research were not be predictable but the value of the
work was unquestioned.
Salomon suggests that governments support scientific research
for four reasons (in order of priority}: "military objectives" (less
relevant in Australia, with its relatively small component of defence
R&D), "prestige" (less relevant, surely, in Australia with its tall
poppy syndrome, and especially in times of economic difficulty),
"economic motives" (a dominant theme in Australia in the 1980s), and
finally, "the advancement of science for its own sake". 22 But, for
government, even the last of these is essentially utilitarian in
character because of the economic "benefits" which might some day
flow from basic research. Science as a

cultural or educational

activity, he writes, has "no greater claim for state support than any
.
" . 23 As a consequence, in
.
1 ] activity
. .
other cultural (or e d ucationa

the utilitarian/managerial climate of the 1980s, scientists felt
constrained more and more to offer only economic justification for
their work.
· At the heart of their defence, though they may not have expressed themselves in these terms, was the discredited linear model
of inn~vatio'n. 24 This
model
presented the development of new
,
,
technology as a linear chain, starting with discoveries from scientific research, then progressing through development, and demonstration,
to market application. Scientific research, as the initiator of the
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new technology, was seen therefore as the most important step in this
process, with the resulting danger that development of the discovery
into commercial gain would be so down graded by comparison as not to
be followed up, allowing the commercial value of the discovery to go
overseas. It represented a "science-push" perspective, and failed to
acknowledge modern scholarship on the importance of "market pull" in
technological development. An alternative attitude contrasting,
sharply with the science push perspective (and in marked contradiction to Commoner's statement above), was expressed by Trevor Cole,
Professor of Electrical Engineering at the University of Sydney, in
his talk given to celebrate the centenary of the university in 1985:

technology develops mainly from technology and only occasionally
does an input from science make a significant shift in technology.
Indeed, it is often the technology which drives and extends
.
25
science ...

One might have expected an engineer to value technology over science.
The two forces, science push and market pull, when combined,
have been called the "boot strap" model of innovation, in which
science and technology both benefit from advances in either.

26

All

such models oversimplify the complex social and political interactions which relate scientific and technological advances. "The major
point of relevance here," as Johnston writes, "is that many politicians and increasing numbers of the public no longer accept the
'science push

I

model. " 27 Throughout the period of interest, 1983 to

1985, scientists employed the linear model in their defence, perplexed, in their naivete, in the ar_g ument's lack of success.
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The traditional arguments used in favour of basic research, and
hence of the ARGS which in part supports it, were social, cultural
and economic. But given the economic climate of 1984 these arguments
could be easily overturned, by saying that Australia could no longer
afford expensive, nonproductive sociocultural activities, nor rely on
the vagaries of possible long-term return. If we accept Professor
Fred Smith's alternate argument that the principal role of university
research was the training of postgraduate researchers in leading-edge
science, then this argument too could be overturned by arguing that
Australia could not afford to have some of its best talent unproductively occupied on some esoteric topic of minuscule community interest and of doubtful economic return when they could be just as well
occupied on an applied science topic of direct relevance to Australian industry. After all, applied research, as many academics then
acknowledged, could be just as challenging as basic research. The
question of funding for university research -

or the CSIRO - then

became one, not of justification, but of politics, of who should
decide how university research is conducted. Should academics, as
experts in their fields, be left alone as in the past to decide their
research for themselves or should government policy direct research
to fulfil national objectives? And then, who should determine these
objectives, and who should decide if particular research efforts meet
these objectives? Instead of bemoaning the absence of national
objectives, for R&D, or science and technology, scientists could have
taken a lead here. It was clearly this political dimension which
scientists, in repeating worn-out justifications, were not addressing.
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4.4.

The Science Crisis Grows

In October 1984, Professor Peter Andrews, of the Victorian
College of Pharmacy, formed a new lobby group: Workers in Medical and
Pharmaceutical Sciences (WIMPS), with the combined aims of lobbying
politicians for more funds for drug research, and of supplying the
media with information to "raise public awareness of the importance
of science and technology". Another member of the new group, Dr John
Funder, of Prince Henry's Hospital, Melbourne, in good humour suggested an alternative name, Bloody Awful Negative Government Endangered
Research (BANGER) and Professor Andrews added, "This has some support.

We'd rather be BANGERS than

WIMPs." 28

In an editorial in Chemistry in Australia, Professor Athel
Beckwith, President of the Royal Australian Chemical Institute
(RACI), discussed the question, "Are we wimps?". He agreed with Jones
that "scientists in general .and chemists in particular are notoriously reluctant to speak out, believing that the rectitude and validity
of what they advocate is so transparently obvious, as indeed it is to
them, that there is no need to enter what some see as the rather
disorderly area of public debate."

But, he added, "scientists,

including many chemists, are willing, indeed eager, to express their
views publiciy i f sufficiently provoked". 29 Such a provocation, he
said, was the shock of the 1984 Budget: members of the Council and
Branch Committees of the RACI had immediately written to ministers
and the press expressing their dismay "at the recent cuts in research
funding". JO
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But the mood was changing, as Peter G. Lehman noted in his final
editorial for Chemistry in Australia. Lehman reported a shift he had
noticed in the Engineering and S&T (E,S&T} community "from rage to
rational argument."

31

Following the Budget there had been "heated

exchanges, recriminations, threats and apportioning of blame, from
both sides." This rage had produced heat but nothing productive. Now,
since August, the Engineering and S&T community had returned to
reasoned argument. Prophetically he concluded:

To me, the emergence of this new-found and redirected voice of
educationists, scientists and industrialists, heralds the
beginning of a movement, or at least a groundswell of informed
opinion. Provided it can be sustained and fully developed it
could eventually convince even the most intransigent government
of

singular
Australia. 32

4.5.

the

importance

of

E,S&T

to

the

future

of

The CSIRO Speaks Out

Dr Paul Wild addressed the National Press Club on 24 October
1984. He told the audience that his recent outbursts and those of
others within the CSIRO were not, as commonly assumed, a knee-jerk
reaction "to the Budget and Barry Jones' challenge that scientists
were the wimpiest lobbyists he's come across" but the articulation of
a concern which had been growing for some time. Since 1978 the funds
for C'SIRO research operations (after adjusti,n g for inflation) had
been cut by one third. Including university research, he added, "the
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whole area of science and technology in Australia has been sorely
neglected." 33 He asked: "Why are there no votes in Science?"

The

answer he provided, towards the end of his speech: "neither side
considers it important enough to make an issue of. "34 He may also
have added that Thomson's well-meaning bipartisan approach before the
election of 1983 had removed the controversy necessary for political
debate. In past budgets, cuts to the S&T portfolio had come mostly in
the final, arbitrary, pruning stages of the budget preparation, Wild
claimed, "because scientists don't squeal, they only whimper. But all
that has got to change." In a radical initiative -

given CS IRO 's

history - to bring about that change, Wild announced that CSIRO
officers were to be encouraged to talk publicly about their work and
to participate in public debates "on issues relevant to their expertise."
Five days later, on Saturday, 29 October 1984, Lewis T. Chadderton, Chief of the CSIRO Division of Chemical Physics, a

highly

respected division of the CSIRO and home of the much vaunted Atomic
Absorption Spectrometer, spoke on the ABC's "science Show". His talk
was entitled, "Research in the CSIRO death by a thousand Budget
cuts." As The Australian Physicist reported when publishing his
paper, the opinions he expressed closely reflected "the attitudes,
concerns and opinions, of many of the officers of the CSIRO, and of
the lay public." 35 Chadderton began, and I

quote at length:

"sleepers Awake!" was the exhortation. And we thought they
~ad!

The charismatic Barry Jones was appointed Minister. A

national science and Technology conference confirmed the need
for the harnessing of science for the nation. At last -

a
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government of consensus - a government with the guts to gear up
technologically for a real Australian future!
Can it truly be a cause for wonder that Australian scientists · should so vehemently vilify Mr Keating's budget?

It is

unprecedented, and uncharacteristic, that with one voice,
scientists from both CSIRO and the universities should howl with
fury at such mean myopia. A leading newspaper columnist has
alluded to some well orchestrated and most successful publicity
campaign on the part of the CSIRO. It's simply not true!

The

spontaneous outrage expressed revulsion at the sacrifice of a
brightening Australia on the altar of short term political
gains. 36

Progressive budget cuts, he said, had reduced the numbers of
permanent research and support staff, had cut vital and viable
projects, prevented the hiring of young researchers and stifled
creativity. He supported Jones' enthusiasm for high technology, and
for moving the emphasis in the CSIRO from primary to secondary
industry - a pity the support came so late. He accused industry, the
users of government R&D, of being unwilling to spend their own money
on R&D and of maintaining a "silence of guilt" during the cuts to
government R& D. Fulfilling Daniel Greenberg's prophecy about the
cosmos Club simmering with talk of a new Dark Age, 37 he concluded
his talk with these words:

It would seem, for science and technology, to be the threshold, of a New Dark Agel
If the sleepers ever wakened - then they slumber once
again!
~nd

so would the last sleepwalker pause, for pity's sake,

snuff the candle out? 38
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J.J. Landsberg, of the CSIRO Division of Forest Research, in a

guest editorial for Search, described the 1984 budget cuts to science
as myopic, wrong, and dangerous. He argued for continued R&D support
for the rural sector, which accounted for 45% of GDP and was responsible for the 1984 economic recovery following the breaking of the
drought. Australia, he wrote, was an inhospitable land, with areas of
poor soil, foreign pest species, soil erosion, salinity, and other
problems: "The rural industries will not remain productive without
research support." 39
The outcries from the CSIRO met with little sympathy from Hawke
as he prepared for an early election. He preferred his government to
concentrate on the more direct task of industry restructuring. 40

4.6.

The Combined Meetings of Staff

In October and November 1984, mass meetings were held in Sydney
and Melbourne to protest at cuts in funding for the ARGS. The meetings wer,e called to def.e nd basic research, not to tackle the broader
political issues of science nor to address national objectives in
R&D. Dr Harry Edwards, Opposition spokesman on Science and Technology, addressed both meetings and called on Barry Jones to resign in
protest at the poor funding of the ARGS. 41 At the combined meeting
of universities staff (convened by FAUSA on 1 November 1984), in the
Stephen Roberts theatre at the University of Sydney, Professor Peter
Sheehan, Chairman of the ARGC, told the gathering that the erosion of
basic science was nearing crisis proportions. Allowing for inflation,
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the average ARGS grant was now 64% less than when the scheme began 18
years earlier, in 1966. Then, the ARGS provided 23% of research funds
for state universities; now the ARGS provided only 14%. The government, moreover, had not honoured its election promise to increase the
ARGS by 10% per annum above inflation for each of the next three
years. 42
In a related speech - the Charles Joseph La Trobe Memorial
Lecture in Melbourne -

Professor Sheehan said (quoting from the

Science Council of Canada) there were two reasons for supporting
basic research: "the search for a deep and penetrating understanding
of the world" and as "a profoundly significant investment that leads
to

future

practical

benefit". 43

It

was

vital,

he said, that

leading-edge research be seen as an investment rather than as consumption:

What could be important in the future shouldn't always be
replaced by what seems urgent at the moment, and allowance has
to be made for innovative and exciting research projects conducted simply for their own sake.
The proper orientation to science is to view pure and
applied research as feeding back into each other, so each may
benefit from the other. With adequate funding of both basic and
applied research, Australia will be better able to face the
future as a country that is informed about its own problems and
.
44
the problems of the world.

Dr Peter Pockley, outspoken Advisor on Public Affairs, at the
University of New south Wales, also addressed the protest meeting of

univer~ities

staff in Sydney. 45 In a similar speech delivered about

two weeks later (Sunday 18 November 1984) on the ABC radio program
"ockham's Razor", he said:
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The members of the academic community ... are slipping seriously
in their capacity to influence governments . . . [We need to J
accept that politicians .... are seldom moved by abstract
notions or the cool rationality of academic discourse. They are
influenced most by the immediate pressures on them. As Mr Barry
Jones says, "in politics, the important always gives way to the
urgent." 46

The position could be retrieved, he suggested, by concerted and
sustained effort in the media and by efforts on two fronts: the
lobbying of all ministers with influence on R&D funding, and the
promotion of increased public understanding of science and technology. To achieve this, he said, academics and government scientists
needed to overcome institutional barriers:

.
" or
in reality, there is no such thing as, say, "CSIRO science
"university of Sydney medicine" or "university of New South
Wales technology"

or "Macquarie University history"

or

what-have-you. We proclaim the universality of our subjects, and
that is how we should be presenting ourselves and our work to
the public, cutting across institutional boundaries. 47

And it was to the scientific societies he then turned to undertake
this task: "The resources of bodies such as the academies and societies may be limited, but, put together, they would constitute a
formidable force".
Pockley ·had justified his appeal to the societies on the naive
basis of the "universality of science", or rather, in his words, the
"universality of our subjects", but the very existence of specialist
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societies, or subjects, testifies against the universality of his
cause. The overcoming of institutional barriers and the bringing
together of the science community through their societies would not
be an easy task to accomplish or maintain.

4.7.

The ARGS

Case for 1986

In November 1984, the ARGC released its Case for Funds for 1986.
It began with a quotation from a recent letter to the Committee from
Prime Minister Hawke, dated

28 June 1984:

It is the Government's objective to encourage and

support

excellence in research wherever possible. Quality and opportunity will be key criteria for this support. 48

Hawke's words to the ARGC ran counter to his relevance rhetoric at
the earlier AVCC meeting and wrongly gave the impression that he
appreciated the importance of excellence in academic research, which
scientists associate with peer recognition. The Report challenged
Hawke to match his promise with increased funding for the ARGS. The
Committee judged $56 million was needed to fund all excellent programs at an adeq_uate level in 1986, more than double the $24 million
received for 1985 grants in the 1984 Budget. "Basic research maintained through the Scheme," the Report stated, "sustains the skills
base of science in Australia and the national interest of the country
. ds
d epen

.
.
"49
on its
preservation.
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4.8.

The Meeting of Australia's Major Scientific Societies

John Barker, in an editorial in July 1984, challenged his
readers in The Australian Physicist to define science and technology. so I responded by defining what, in my own view, constituted a
scientist and a technologist. 51 In so doing, I

recognised there

were at least two distinct definitions in vogue. For the professional
or practising scientist, a "scientist" is defined by his or her area
of study, be it physics, chemistry, biology, geology, etc; physicists, especially -

in my experience -

have a particularly strong

sense of identity with their subject. This idea of identity with a
particular scientific community was used by Thomas Kuhn in the
development of his concept of the "paradigm":

A scientific community consists of the practitioners of a
scientific speciality. To an extent unparalleled in most other
fields (except within a religion), they have undergone similar
educations and professional initiations; in the process they
have absorbed the same technical literature and drawn many of
the same lessons from it. 52

The "scientific community", then, exists within a scientific speciality rather than -across the whole S&T population. The alternative
definition, which. I called the sociological view, was more determined
by what the scientist did, rather than by the field of study: by his
or her scientific method. Hence sociologists, economists, medical
practitioners, lawyers, could consider themselves scientists if they
applied analytical methods or, more particularly, if they expected
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analytical solutions to problems in their field. When science is
defined in terms of subject and those scientists seek a public voice
for science, it follows naturally that they will seek to express that
voice, not through an amorphous science body, such an Academy, but
through the scientific society which represents their subject. A
federation of like-societies is merely an extension of this view of
science; it is not a proclamation of the universality of science.
Professor Wilson's media release, described earlier, from the
AIP Congress in Brisbane, was discussed shortly afterwards in an ARGC
meeting at which Professor Wilson was present. The committee, evidently in like-mind with Peter Pockley, discussed at length the merits of
lobbying and what the scientific societies should be doing about it.
After the meeting, Professor Bruce Stone, of the Biochemistry Department, La Trobe University, decided that Wilson (and the AIP) was the
obvious person (and society) to organi.s e the scientific societies.
"Bruce was a very persistent character," Prof ,e ss .o r Wilson told me,
"he began telephoning me every week and writing to me nearly every
week: 'Why haven't you got the societies meeting to form a lobbying
group, yet?'. I must say, it was the pressure from Bruce Stone that
got me fired

up". 53

Prompted by stone, Wilson wrote in his President's Column in The
Australian Physicist: "Lobbying by the AIP has been increasing for
quite some time and I have no doubt that this trend will continue;
there are now suggestions that the various scientific professional
institutes combine to improve the effectiveness of their lobbying."
In this, he wrote, the scientific societies would not be acting like
most lobbyists who consider only the interests of their clients with
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one-sided arguments: "rn our case the motivation is not financial
self-interest but a firm desire to see Australia with strong science
and technology". 54
Wilson convened a meeting of scientific societies on Wednesday
21 November 1984. Quite simply he contacted the heads of a small
number of societies that he knew personally and informed them of the
meeting. "They were all very enthusiastic," he said. "They all turned
up and with almost zero publicity a number of others rang me from
areas I wasn't even aware of, in the biological sciences, to ask if
they could please come. It seemed no one wanted to miss out." 55
Prior to the meeting, Wilson - as President of the Australian
Institute of Physics -

issued a press release entitled, "Historic

Meeting of Australia's Major Scientific Societies". The meeting, the
statement announced, would be attended by six societies (Physics,
Mathematics, Chemistry, Biochemistry, Cell Biology and Microbiology),
representing "over 20,000 of Australia's scientists" • 56 The societies would meet for the first time: "to discuss a common approach to
continued representation of scientists to Australian Governments."
The meeting was called, it continued, because "of concern over the
erosion by successive federal governments of support for basic
research" and as a response to "the recent disappointing budget" and
"the low profile being given to basic science".
One of those invited to the first meeting was Professor R.G.
(Gerry) Wake, of the Department of Biochemistry, University of
Sydney, and President of the Australian Biochemical society. Like
Wilson,· he became involved only after a good deal of prodding from
Professor Bruce Stone who, as a biochemist, wanted the Australian
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Biochemical Society involved. Wake was acutely aware of the detrimental effect the distraction and time such involvement would have on
his research work. He, like many of the scientists involved in the
formation of FASTS, would much rather have been left alone, to
carrying on with their research. In this regard, he told me: "rt is
virtually impossible, at least in the area of biochemistry that I
work in, to really do anything of significance unless you dedicate
yourself totally to it." 57 For Wake, politics was not an integral
part of science, but a burden to be carried in unusual circumstances
when imposed upon scientists from outside. The seriousness of the
plight of science in 1984 was perceived to be such that scientists
like Professor Wake were prepared to give up a considerable amount of
their time in support of a

more public voice for science.

By Wednesday morning of 21 November 1984, the six societies had
become eight, adding Agriculture and Parasitology. They met in the
Australian Academy of Science building in Canberra and were joined by
representatives of the Academy, who voiced strong support for the
plans of the societies. The meeting decided "to act as an ad hoc
steering committee to initiate cooperative actions of all of Australia's scientific societies", 58 in effect a Federation of Societies
was decided upon, and the delegates then spent much of the remaining
part of the morning discussing a statement (drafted largely by
Wilson) which would be released, afterwards, at a Press Conference
(also arran'ged by

Wilson), scheduled for 2 pm.

The press release issued by the meeting accused politicians of
not coming "to grips with the fact that basic science underpins high
technology" and of allowing the funding of the ARGS to drop to an
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alarmingly poor state, where the rejection rate for new applications
had "risen from 54% to a record high of 74% for 1985". The statement
called upon "the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition to
state their specific policies on future support for the ARGS, NH&MRC,
the CSIRO and University research .•. " The statement concluded with
the pledge: "For our part we wish to stress the determination of
Australia's scientific societies to work together to ensure that
science plays its full role in guaranteeing the future economic,
.
"5 9
cultural and educational prosperity of Australia.

Wilson,

President of the AIP and convenor of the historic meeting, told the
afternoon press conference:

We would prefer to continue with a

low profile, doing

research that we consider of genuine benefit to the community.
But other groups have become more vocal and scientists must now
come out of the woodwork. 60

At this stage, the embrionic Federation was a federation of science
societies only, principally concerned with gaining recognition for
the importance of basic research and with increased funding for the
ARGS.
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4.9.

The National Committee for the Promotion of science and

Technology

In October 1984, the Science Policy Committee of the Australian
Academy of Science formed a National Committee for the Promotion of
Science and Technology (NCPST). The Committee was to be chaired by
the newly appointed Fellow, Professor Max Bennett FAA, Director of
the Neurobiology Research Centre, University of Sydney, and would
fulfil three terms of reference:

1.

To take actions to raise the esteem in which science is held
in the Australian community.

2.

To persuade the present and future Australian Governments of
the necessity to fund science adequately.

3.

• •. to collect information over a broad range of science
illustrating Australian excellence, and the beneficial
influence Australian research and Australian scientists have
had,

and are
society. 61

likely to have,

on our technology and

The committee aimed, in effect, to take on Lakoff' s first political
role for

scientists, that of " advocate " . 62

In his formal report detailing the formation of the NCPST,
Bennett expressed the three concerns which most prompted the Academy
of Science to act: first, 'the lack of recognition within the Australian community of "the achievements and goals of scientists and
technologists" has had "serious repercussions in the way Governments
view the scientific and technological community"; second, "no readily
identifiable means exist for dialogue to take place between scientists and Government"; and third, "not enough is known of the state
of Australian science and technology, in order to reach sensible
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conclusions concerning financial support." 63 Bennett also expressed
to me a further concern within the Academy, an anti-science attitude
growing within the Australian society and the government. 64
Awareness of an anti-science attitude worried many in the
scientific community at this time; for some it was the continuation
of the anti-science sentiment of the 1960s, and the tightening of
government control of science in the 1970s, for others it was "a
swing to irrationality" in the 1980s. 65 The external expression of
this anti-science attitude was therefore not restricted to just the
low funding of science and a lessening of the regard for pure research, but extended to the blaming of science and scientists for all
the negative products of technology then plaguing the world: nuclear
weapons, nuclear power, pollution, unemployment, etc., and further,
to alternative movements such as fundamentalist revivals, creationism, UFO societies, occultism, and the "New Age". Professor A.J.
Birch,

President

of

the

Academy,

revealed

his

concern

for

anti-science when he wrote:

Australian governments ... are almost anti-science. This is not
surprising, since they presumably represent the views of the
general community. Scientists are dismayed, since to them the
results of science -

cultural and practical 66
. overwhelmingly beneficial.

appear to be

As a relatively new member of the Academy, Bennett's .e fforts to
involve the Academy in overt political activities, which the NCPST
represented, were roundly criticised by a number of the more senior
members of the Academy. He was told it would take many years to get
an effective science lobby going and that it would probably be a
fiasco. 6 7 It is hard to think of a greater indictment of scientific
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elitism and hierarchy then this, that a leading Australian scientist
recently rewarded for his contribution to science by being elected to
the Academy should be subjected to such criticism, or of the depths
some members of this hierarchy would descend to, to maintain the
supposedly apolitical nature of science. Professor Howard Worner, in
the unique position of being a member of the Council of the Australian Academy of Science and a foundation member of the Council of the
Australian Academy of Technological Sciences, described Bennett as a
"real champion", with very strong views on the funding crisis. He
attributed Bennett's enthusiasm for the Academy's involvement in and
support for the Federation. Wake also commented: "r think it was just
fortuitous that Max Bennett came in as a Fellow of the Academy ... I
think that without Max Bennett ... things probably wouldn't have got
going." 68
The Council of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences,
on the other hand, was likewise concerned with the trends in S&T
funding but did not wish to be seen to be too strongly involved. The
Academy of Technological Sciences was supportive of the meetings of
concern, of the NCPST, and of the Federation but lacked a champion
like Bennett to convince it to make a strong commitment. As a young
academy, dependent on the government for grants, and with a number of
extremely conservative members of Council, the Academy could not
afford to be offside with the government or be seen to be too radical. 69
The NCPST held its first meeting on 1 December 1984. The members, corresponding members, and observers (or ex officio members)
totalled 21 people, selected to represent "the entire Scientific and
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Technological community", including: the universities (10), CSIRO
(4), high technology companies ( 2), medical research
(1), ASTEC (1), NH&MRC (1), and ARGC

(1).

( 1), astronomy

Many were Fellows of the

Academies and several were Presidents of professional societies.
Among the 21 were: Ors R. W. (Bob) Crompton FAA (Head of the Atomic
and Molecular Physics Laboratories, Australian National University)
and Ken G. McCracken, both active in the AIP; Professor Athel L.J.
Beckwith FAA, President of the RACI and a member of Wilson's ad hoc
committee and future member of the Interim Federation Committee; Dr
Steve J. Redman FAA, another future member of the Interim Federation
Committee; Dr Jan M. Anderson, future Vice-President of FASTS; and
Professors Worner and Sheehan and Dr J.P. Wild. Professor Bennett
also sought advice from the Medical Research Advisory Council whom he

described as "the most effective Scientific lobbyists in the count ry. "70

The meeting on 1 December 1984 established three further working
parties to deal with each of the three terms of reference. Dr Peter
Pockley was to chair the working party on the media; Dr Bob Crompton
on science and government relations; and Dr Terry Beed (from the
Australian Social Research centre, REARK Research), in association
with Professor Bennett, the state of Australian science and technology, beginning with physiology. The working parties met frequently
from January to March 1985.
The meeting on 1 December 1984 also considered the formation of
two secretariats, one in Canberra to handle Science and Government
Relatio·ns, and the other in Sydney, to provide a Science Information
Service. These two secretariats, it was estimated, would cost about
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$400,000 annually to run. To maintain the independence of the secretariats from pressures outside the S&T community, it was thought
appropriate that the S&T community should provide the necessary
finance itself. It was also decided that a Federation of S&T societies

should

be

formed,

to

organise

the

secretariats. 71 As a first step, · the Academy

financing

of

the

set aside $33,000

"from special bequest funds" to aid the establishment of the secretariats. 7 2

4 .10.

The Federal Election 1984

Hawke called an early election for 1 December 1984, just 19
months after winning his first federal election in 1983. The rural
recovery -

following the breaking of the .drought -

and good GDP

figures, which Keating claimed made Australia the fastest growing
economy in the world, allowed the Prime Minister in his election
speech to announce that the crisis, "the worst economic crisis for
more than fifty years", was over. 7 3 The decision facing Australia,
he told the electorate, was how to ensure that the benefits of
recovery were "fully and fairly shared by all sections of the community". Just as the. Labor Party had been the best and only party to
manage the crisis, now the Labor Party was the best and only party to
manage the recovery. Part of this management process would be the
control of a national industry reconstruction and the application of
the world's best technology:
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To succeed in building a dynamic, prosperous and secure
Australia it is essential that we have available and apply the
world's best technology. The strengthening of technical and
applied scientific education is essential to this end. our pure
scientific research effort has been at the forefront of the
world, and we will continue to maintain the very large Australian Government effort in scientific research through our
Universities and CSIRO. But we have to recognise that our
application of new technology to many areas of industry has
lagged behind.
Sustained high growth in Australia will require greater and
more systematic application of the best technology to all our
industry. 74

To this end, Hawke announced increased funds for Management Investment Companies (MICs), a 150% tax incentive scheme for industrial
R&D, and a continuation of AIRD IS. The high technology strategy of
the 1983 election platform was gone, replaced by applied R& D and by
management of the economy. 75 Hawke's words promised continued
pressure on government £unded research to move towards industry.
A secret Labor Party poll in August ranked the three most
popular ministers after Hawke as: Paul Keating, the Treasurer, Bill
Hayden, Foreign Affairs, and Barry Jones, Science and Technology.
Jones' popularity within the Labor Party membership was also confirmed at ·the National Conference in July when the Party endorsed his
.
' h on l y minor
'
S&T po 1 icy
wit
amen d men t s. 76 D espi' t e

h'is l agging
.

popularity with his parliamentary colleagues, Jones was so obviously
popular with the electorate that it was decided to employ him extensively in the election campaign, at a variety of fund-raising gatherings and academic conferences. 77
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The Federal election on 1 December 1984 saw a small swing (2%)
against the Labor government and a loss of seven seats, leaving Hawke
a comfortable 16 seat majority in an expanded House of Representatives. 78 The electoral setback caused some disquiet within the
Labor ministry and some ministers publicly criticised Hawke' s handling of the campaign. 79 But, undeniably, the government had a
clear mandate to continue with its policies.

4 .11.

DITAC

Formed

Early in December 1984, Hawke announced his second ministry. The
Technology Development Division, MIC scheme, AIRDIS, and other
technology programs of the Department of Science and Technology were
moved into a new Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce
(DITAC), under Senator Button. The remaining science programs, the
CSIRO, the Commission for the Future, the Australian Patents Office,
the ARGS, and the Antarctic, were maintained within a new "rag bag"
Department of Science, under Barry Jones who was also made Minister
for Small Business and Assistant Minister to Senator Button. It was a
severe demotion for Jones, and hence for Science, while Technology
gained by . joining the portfolio of a Cabinet Minister, ranked third
in the Cabinet.
The split between Science and Technology caused a great deal of
controversy within the science community, but characteristically
little action. I proposed at an AIP Science Policy Committee meeting
shortly after the announcement of the new ministry that the AIP
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should protest publicly at this new disaster for science. Painstakingly science, with Jones' prodding, had begun to establish closer links
with technology and hence with industry. All of these gains were now
threatened if technology could be seen to exist without close links
with science. Despite my entreaties, the Committee simply moved onto
other items on the agenda. The message seemed cold-bloodedly clear:
Jones was not worth fighting for; Jones was dead, long live Button.
The absorption of technology within the bureaucratic, conservative, DITAC meant the end of "the spectacular rhetoric of the Jones
era"; the emphasis shifted from grand visions of technological change

and the post-industrial society to one of specific programs and
reviews of performance. 80 But, in some perverse way, the split
between Science and Technology within the government, strengthened
the desire of the scientific societies to work with the technological
societies and explains, at least in part, why FASTS became a federation of scientific and technological societies.
After the announcement of the new ministry, Senator Button
explained why Technology had been joined to Industry; it was as if
Jones' success was his undoing:

In that regard I would like to pay tribute to my colleague
Barry Jones for what he has done in the course of initiating
that process of change -

his very boundless enthusiasm, his

knowledge and his ability to overview the field in the manner of
an historian; .•• He has had a major part to play in initiating
debate and understanding on science and technology issues.
One of the logical outcomes of that heightened awareness is
that technology must move much closer to industry, both in the
81
world of industry and the world of government.
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4 .12.

The OECD Report on Science and Technology

In a strange coincidence, the split between Science and Technology occurred as an OECD committee was reporting on the first OECD
review of Australian science and technology since 1974. The committee
described the split as "perverse"; Science and Technology were too
closely intertwined to be separated in government. The committee was
strongly supportive of Jones' efforts "in stimulating discussion of
technological questions in 1983-84". 82 They were critical of the
low level of industrial R&D, of the cultural blocks to interaction
between researchers and industry, of the low funding for universities, and of the prevailing attitudes which undervalued Australia's
technological achievements and capabilities. They recommended that
industry should provide more of the funding for R& D, that the CSIRO
should obtain more of its funding from industry, that university
funding especially for equipment should be increased, and that
support for basic research through the ARGS should be increased.
During a one day meeting in April 1985 to discuss the OEC D
committee's draft report, a dispirited Jones told the meeting he "did
not hold out much hope for increased funding [for science] and
pointed out that science was not part of the political culture of the
1980s." 83
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4.13.

The Economy 1984

On 5 December 1984, four days after the election, John Menadue,
Secretary of the Department of Trade, warned a meeting of the Export
Development Group of New South Wales, that Australia's increasing
foreign debt threatened Australia's standard of living. In 1983-84,
Australia's gross foreign debt stood at $41,000 million, up $13,000
million since 1982-83, and 48% of export earnings were now going to
repay interest and foreign capital debts. Australia, he told them,
must increase its exports or reduce its standard of living. 84
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Part 2: (January-April)

4 .14.

1985

The Restructuring of Industry

Shortly after the announcement of his new, enlarged department,
Senator Button addressed a National Science Forum luncheon and called
on Australian industry to raise its low level of R& D. He criticised
business for regarding R&D as an expendable item "which can be cut
when the going gets tough", and large business, in particular, for
not doing enough R&D. He also blamed the Federal Government for not
setting the right financial environment for innovation. 1
He had convinced Hawke to include the new 150% tax incentive
scheme for industrial R&D in the ALP's election promises, and the
scheme, he promised the audience, would play a key role both in
encouraging the level of industrial R&D and of developing links
between companies and government funded researchers and academics. 2
"This is tremendously important," he declared a little later. "The
companies will begin to employ researchers from the universities and
CSIRO and this will start the whole process of interchange and
industry interaction." 3 The development of links between groups is
a key to Button's policies at this time.
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But despite Button's optimism, his Department, the Department of
Industry, Technology and Commerce (DITAC), was reportedly having
problems with the details of its new taxation scheme, due for commencement on 1 July 1985. The difficulties hinged on the definition
of R&D, specifically what would be acknowledged as R&D within the
scheme; and on mechanisms to prevent abuse of the scheme. Treasury
and Finance, the old bugbears of the Department of Science and
Technology, were concerned about its potential for abuse and the
open-ended cost. 4 Throughout the first half of 1985, Paul Keating
and the Treasury reportedly made concerted attempts to have the
scheme deferred until late 1986. Fortunately for

Button, Hawke

continued to back the scheme, because of his election promise, and
several business leaders spoke out against deferral of the scheme;
big business had most to lose from any delay in the implementation of
the new scheme. Harris Bolton, a Director of the Confederation of
Australian Industry, declared:

We would be horrified if the [150% tax) concession was not
introduced this year. It has widespread support amongst our
membership and many companies are planning to expand their
research facilities because of the tax concession.
Mr Keating's move raises the question of who is running the
country ••• If the concession is delayed it means that all the
good · work that Mr Hawke has done in recent weeks in restoring
5
.
.
business confidence will
go d own t h e d rain.

Button and his Department continued pressing hard to gain

Cabi~et commitment to the new scheme. 6 Eventually, Button won. He
did, however, have to accept some restrictions on the scheme, suppos-
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edly to prevent abuse. These included the registration of all companies claiming R&D expenses, a minimum spending of $50,000 on R&D by
each registered company, and the exclusion of equipment not used
exclusively for research. This latter condition was insisted upon by
Treasury despite the wishes of DITAC.
News that the scheme would come into force on 1 July 1985 as
promised was met enthusiastically by business and industry. 7 Delays
in presenting the final details of the scheme, however, led to a
great deal of confusion during the first 18 months of its operation.
Companies were forced to grapple with the accounting complexities of
the scheme without proper guidelines from DIT AC or the Taxation
Off ice.

4 .15.

Still More Relevance in Academic Research

At the National Science Foundation luncheon, and afterwards,
Button hinted at changes to the CSIRO: "r'm concerned about the need
for change in CSIRO. It's always been a sacred cow that has debarred
people from asking critical questions about what it is doing". He
also targeted CSIRO's international pu.b lications: "It is a horrifying
thought," he said, "that through the publication of these papers
overseas international companies have been able to pick up some of
our best ideas." 8 Here was an attack on the very international and
open nature of science. Here at last was a truly powerful critic of
the CSIRO, determined to bring about major change. But this time
there was no attempt to bail out into the Prime Minister's Department
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or covert attempts to undermine the Minister. Why? Had the CSIRO
executive learnt its lesson with Jones? Was the less articulate and
retiring Button less of a threat? Or, had the tide run

so much

against the CSIRO and scientific research that they dared not risk
another confrontation?
Shortly afterwards, Senator Button was invited to meet the
Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee (AVCC), the first time a
minister for industry had ever addressed such a committee. He told
them of the need to direct university R& D to be more involved with
industry:

We have entered a time when the links between the intellectual
products of advanced research in the sciences and engineering
and the physical products of industry are becoming closer and
more direct. 9

The funding situation for universities will improve, he said, once
"universities have demonstrated their participation in national
challenges", and suggested the ARGS's single criterion of excellence
should be broadened to include national benefit.
Taking his lead from such statements by Senator Button, and
similar ones by Senator Ryan, Minister for Education, that universities should become more accountable in their research activities,
Professor Noel Dunbar, Head of the University Council of CTEC (the
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission), wrote to university
vice-chancellors suggesting universities should review the way they
distributed their research funds.

He wrote:
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Clearly, not all research projects can be expected to yield
results of immediate usefulness, but it is not clear that the
present approach, which characteristically allows staff to
follow their individual interests, is likely to result in the
best use of the limited funds available. 10

He suggested that funds could be concentrated to support researchers
with proven research ability while allowing others to concentrate
more on teaching. Was this a first sign of acquiescence or a reasoned
response to the need for change? The letter was greeted unfavourably
by both the AVCC and by FAUSA, who saw it as undue interference in
university internal affairs.
Professor Smith's response to Dunbar, published in The Australian Physicist, was to restate his principal position on the role of
university research:

I would maintain that the primary role of the university is to
provide an undergraduate education and post-graduate training.
These activities, in particular the latter, are best served by
involvement with the mental discipline and rigours of original
research. This is not to deny the intellectual challenge of
applied research. Indeed, there are ample opportunities for
research of a fundamental nature that is directly relevant to
problems faced by industry. However, such research cannot be
undertaken .successfully without the interest and commitment of
industry beyond short-term pragmatism. This has been sadly
lacking. 11

Smith's criticism of industry's lack of response followed _months of
effort to interest industry throughout Victoria in the expertise and
facilities in his department at Monash University, and to establish
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joint tactical research projects with industry. His efforts met with
almost total indifference.
In the February issue of The Australian Physicist, Dr Brian
Window, of the CSIRO National Measurement Laboratory, Sydney, published a stinging attack on the irrelevance of much of physics
research in Australia:

Physicists are anything but fools. With a sole criterion of
excellence, they avoid areas of technological relevance, with
all the competition, aggression, patents, secrecy and even
espionage, and concentrate on the more gentlemanly pursuit of
technologically irrelevant knowledge, with its friendly international club of researchers. Life is much more pleasant. But does
the [Australian] community want all the best talent in what have
been called "sheltered workshops for intellectuals"? 12

The government's response on recognising this, wrote Window, has been
to "discard the established academic community (including CSIRO) and
to stimulate industry research [instead]." 13

4.16.

The CSIRO 1985

At the end of 1984; Dr Paul Wild formed five working groups
(composed of CSIRO staff and outside representatives) to review the
CSIRO's operations, with the purpose of transforming the organisation
through a 5-year strategic plan into a business structure aimed at
national benefit rather than academic research. The working groups
would have till May 1985 to consider such issues as: the balance

222
between rural and manufacturing programs, priorities, assessment of
resear·ch performance, staff redundancies, and the linking of the
CSIRO with industry. 14
Early in 1985, Jones made a dramatic and unsuccessful attempt to
bring legislation before parliament to reform the senior management
of the CSIRO and to place a non-scientist at the head of the organisation. It was to be the first of a series of steps to reform the whole
organisation of the CSIRO.

(His move has curious parallels with

attempts in 1917-1918 by Prime Minister William Hughes to appoint a
non-scientist as head of the Advisory Council -

forerunner of the

CSIR and of the CSIR0). 15 Jones' move was strongly opposed by
Button and Hawke, and Jones was reported to have received another
reprimand from the Prime Minister, this despite Hawke' s unhappiness
with the performance of the CSIRO and despite Jones' earlier belief
that both Button and Hawke were behind him. 16 Dr Paul Wild, Chairman of the CSIRO, and Professor Arthur Birch, President of the
Australian Academy of Science, were both known to be unhappy with the
idea of a

non-scientist running the CSIRO.

At a meeting attended by Hawke, Button, Jones, and Professor
Ralph Slatyer, Chairman of ASTEC, it was agreed that, before any
major changes were made to the CSIRO management, ASTEC should conduct
a major, six-month inquiry into the structure and future directions
of the CSIRo. 17 Jones was unhappy with the idea of yet another
enqui~y

' Button bac k e d
but

.
18
Haw k e on t h e issue.

J

When the requests for submissions to the enquiry were posted on
7 May 1985, the ASTEC review of the CSIRO had broadened to a more
general "Review of Public Investment in Research and Development in
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Australia", with initial reference to the CSIRo. 19 The Prime
Minister's media release of 7 May 1985 stated:

Despite the changes [within CSIRO], there has been growing
questioning in recent years of CSIRO's role in relation to the
needs of the Australian community and industries, particularly
the manufacturing sector. 20

Wild wrote of the ASTEC review: "csIRO is without doubt one of the
most reviewed organisations in the world. I know only too well that
many of our staff are sick and tired of reviews, ••• " 21 Nevertheless, he welcomed ASTEC; presumably, the CSIRO had less to fear from
ASTEC than

some other less sympathetic government bodies.

In March 1985, Wild addressed a meeting of the Australian
Industrial Research Group (AIRG) At the meeting, he dismissed the
current atmosphere of criticism of the CSIRO as being based on
current policies and priorities rather than on the policies and
priorities operating when the research work

was initiated. 22

Professor Smith, sympathising with this point · of view, wrote in The
Australian Physicist:

The incessant criticism that is being directed at the research
scientists for their failure to direct their efforts towards
investigations of social benefit ignores the very considerable
contributions that have already been realised from scientific
researc h

.
in
Austra l"ia. 23

0
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Wild continued, defending his organisation's research record and
criticising industry "for its failure to take up commercial opportunities and interact with the organisation." Business was not making the
same effort to get close to the CS I RO, he told the meeting, as the
CSIRO was in getting close to industry. Professor Slatyer also spoke
at the AIRG meeting, commenting on the low level ~f industrial R&D
and the need for Australian companies to become more competitive and
export oriented. 24

4 .1 7.

Preparations for the National Meeting of Concern

Following the first meeting of the National Committee for the
Promotion of Science and Technology (NCPST), its chairman, Professor
Max Bennett, contacted Professor Wilson, head of the "ad hoc" committee of scientific societies. He presented Wilson with the NCPST's
detailed plans for two secretariats. They then discussed the possibility of a joint meeting of their two groups to consider the establishment of the NCPST's two secretariats and the Federation of Scientific
Societies. Wilson later said of Bennett's plans:

The Academy's plans were extremely ambitious and would have cost
the world; and the Academy didn't have any money on that scale.
So Max's line was: "Why don't we combine and get a Federation
25
going as a consequence of the two separate initiatives."
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Wilson then contacted the other members of his committee who
approved the idea of a combined meeting. Bennett, for his part, was
impressed . with Wilson's placating manner and his ability to overcome
the fears of some of the more skittish people involved . 26 Wilson
and Bennett then issued a joint letter on 18 January 1985 to a number
of scientific societies informing them of the activities of both
groups and of the planned joint meeting.
When the NCPST next met on 1 February 1985, it was recommended
that technological societies should also be invited to the joint
meeting. Dr Ken McCracken, Professor Howard Worner, Wilson and
Bennett then compiled a list of 68 scientific and technological
societies, and, on 8 March 1985, issued invitations to the joint
meeting which was to be called a Meeting of National Concern on
Science and Technology. 27
In a guest editorial for Search, Wilson wrote of the aims of the
joint meeting:

The aims of this meeting will be to establish a Federation of
Australian Scientific Societies and to discuss the relationship
between this Federation and the NCPST. It is hoped that this
relationship will be such that the societies, through the
Federation and the NCPST, will work together to ensure success
in raising the esteem of Australian science and in the provision
.

of adequate fun d ing.

28

He concluded:

The desire of Australian scientists and their societies to
cooperatively promote science has gathered significant momentum.
It may not be an easy path but it is imperative that this
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momentum be maintained and directed to successful cooperative
ventures. 29

On 6 March 1985, Wilson and Bennett issued a second joint letter
announcing details of the meeting of National Concern to be held at
the Australian Academy of Science centre in Canberra on Tuesday 16
April 1985. The letter said that both Button and Jones were expected
to address the meeting.
Bennett had hoped Wilson's committee would organise the details
of the proposed Federation, and, in particular, the selection of
nominees for the Federation's first Executive. Unfortunately, Wilson
was heavily occupied with his duties as Rector of the Australian
Defence Force Academy and had then left for overseas at this critical
time. Alarmed that nothing was being done, 30 Bennett decided to
approach a "number of Presidents and Councillors of Scientific and
Technological Societies during early April, in order to form an
Interim Federation Committee". 31 As a consequence Bennett spent
much of the time in the weeks leading up to the joint meeting on the
telephone. 32 One of the presidents he contacted was Professor Fred
Smith, the newly appointed replacement to Wilson as President of the
Australian Institute of Physics (AIP). Smith agreed to Bennett's
request that he nominate as chairman of the Interim Federation
committee. "r wa.s incredibly pleased," Wilson said later, commenting
on smith's nomination, "because I thought I
job I

might be heading for a

would' not be able to do properly because of the time in-

volved." 33
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By the time Bennett had approached Smith, Smith had already
formed some strong opinions on the proposed Federation and the two
secretariats. On assuming the position of President of the AIP he had
come across the joint letter of 6 March 1985 by Wilson and Bennett
and wrote immediately on 15 March 1985, to Dr John Harries, the new
Honorary Treasurer of the AIP, and other members of the new and old
AIP executive:

While I favour the concepts embodied in the two [secretariat) proposals, in particular that concerned with relations with
government, I am concerned at the level of funding required. If
both Secretariats are to be formed a total of close to $400,000
will be required. The meeting of the eight major scientific
societies claimed a total of 20,000 members, which would mean
approximately $20 per member and this makes no distinction
between the level of membership. I do not believe this would be
acceptable, or appropriate.
My view is that we should first establish the Federation of
Australian Scientific and Technological Societies (FASTS) before
embarking on the sensitive area of funding. As far as I

am

aware, there has been no formal structure proposed for such a
federation and obviously such matters will have to be resolved
before a united approach to the establishment of the Secretariats can be contemplated. 34

In discussions with AIP members and with members of a number of other
societies, Smith ·found a unanimous view that the societies were not
prepared to put a lot of money into a venture run by the Academy. One
member told Smith: "This is what the Academy should be doing and why
should they come to us just to pay for it." 35
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Smith then discussed these responses with Crompton and Bennett
and, as a consequence, the Academy agreed simply to put forward their
proposals for two secretariats and allow the societies to finance and
take responsibility for the venture. The Academy would facilitate
wherever possible and then bow out. so the direction had changed,
from a Federation which did the work of the Academy to one which
cooperated with the Academy. 36
Crompton and Pockley continued working on separate proposals for
the two Secretariats. At the meeting of the NCPST on 28 March 1985,
and in a telephone conversation on 2 April 1985 between Bennett and
Crompton, it was decided that the joint meeting on 16 April 1985
should be asked to establish only an interim committee to work out
the details of the Federation. The meeting would be asked to establish a Trusteeship for the Secretariats, and agree in principle to
the formation of the Secretariats, to establish a finance committee,
and to compel each society to make "an immediate financial commitment
to provide the necessary working finance". The finance committee
would aim initially at getting soc per member from each of the
scientific societies, but up to $5 per member was thought possible.
overriding these matters, it was considered "imperative that the
Federation be in operation before the end of the year" and that a
second meeting of the societies be planned for September 1985, at
which "the full financial structure and the legal basis of the
Federation:

would be determined.

37

On the night before the National Meeting, Wilson, Crompton and
Bennett met to revise the constitution for the Interim Committee and
the resolutions to be agreed to by the meeting, both the constitution
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and resolutions having been P.repared initially by Peter Vallee,
Secretary of the Academy.

4.18.

The National Meeting of Concern on science and Technology

The News Release of 9 April 1985 announcing the National Meeting
of Concern on Science and Technology proclaimed: "The first-ever
gathering of representatives of the entire scientific and technological expertise of Australia": 68 scientific and technological societies plus the two national academies with total membership of over
100,000. Allowing for cross-membership the total number represented
at the meeting was estimated at 80,000. The News Release emphasised
the role the NCPST had played in organising the meeting; Wilson's ad
hoc group of eight scientific societies appeared merely as an adjunct. Senator John Button was to address the meeting but Barry
Jones, who had also been invited to speak, was, unfortunately,
overseas. The primary goal of the meeting was to provide "the first
opportunity for scientists and technologists to bring their acts
together in the common pursuit of a broad base of public understanding and political support."
The meeting was held in the Ellerton Becker Building (popularly
known as the "Dome" because of its flying-saucer like shape) of the
Australian Academy of Science, Canberra. The meeting opened with
speeches from Professor A.J. Birch, President of the Academy, and
senator Button, Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce.
Professor Birch said it was "an historic occasion", a "groundswell
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from the grass roots" of science, with the Academy acting as a
catalyst.

38

The aim, he put simply, was "the public benefit": the

public, he said, would benefit from "authentic information and views
on science and technology" and from the long-term benefits which flow
from "adequate support for research in science and technology." He
defended fundamental research: "r believe too," he said, "that the
cultural importance of science is profound. Australians are missing
one of the major outcomes of human development if they do not realise
and enjoy the often unseen subtleties and beauties of our magnificent
and frightening Universe."
Senator Button said he, as an industry minister, was particularly pleased to speak at the meeting because it showed a developing
link between science and technology and industry. The meeting also
showed, he said, that scientists from a wide range of activities were
prepared to discuss the place of the profession "in Australian life
and industry." While admitting that one of the main purposes of the
meeting was to discuss funding, Button said that funding should be
seen within "the context of government industry and technology
policy". 3 9 In the past, he explained, Australian man uf act u ring
industry had relied on high tariff walls and import-replacement. A
strong, government funded R&D base had grown to support this. But
today, manufacturing industry must become more competitive internationally, or go under; industry must restructure, be outward looking
and do more. of the R& D itself. This process, he said, "will cost
money - public money ••• and in a tight budget situation it will have
implications for existing research bodies ••• It throws upon them the
onus for getting better value for money from their budgets, and for
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critical and continuous evaluation of programs." He admitted that the
CSIRO had experienced funding cuts; but, with projected government
expenditure of $135 million for 1985/86 on industrial R& D (including
$80 million for the 150% tax concession, in revenue foregone), the
government was increasing its overall R& D spending but in areas of
greatest need.
Less welcome to the audience, Button also expressed his reservations about the value of the current level of basic research, arguing
that it was a community decision and rejecting any one-to-one relationship between basic research and future benefit. Smith wrote
later, in The Australian Physicist, that Button was "quite blu.nt on
the subject of basic research in his opening address" and commented:
"There is no doubt that the basic scientific research community is
being placed under substantial pressure to move into applied Research
and

Development to

compensate for the poor performance in

industry." 40 Button ended his speech in his convivial fashion by
welcoming the planned Federation of societies and the opportunity for
dialogue with it.
The meeting was next addressed by Professors Bennett and Wilson,
chairmen of the two committees which had joined forces for the
National Meeting of Concern. Bennett, who also acted as Chairman of
the meeting, blamed manufacturing industry for the low level of
support for R&D:

the basic research community is being encouraged to move into
either applied research or experimental development, to make up
for the disastrous level of support of experimental development
from industry. The basic research community is deeply concerned
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that government support for its activities is about to decline
because of this national priority of getting the experimental
development effort moving. 41

But the purpose of the meeting, he reminded them, was not to discuss
the current concerns of the S&T community but "to put in place
mechanisms which will allow for such dialogue ... in the future."
Professor Wilson began by saying that this was a meeting of
"concern": successive Australian governments had "not shown enthusiasm over basic research", the level of private support for research
was "abysmal", and the concern of Australian scientists had risen to
a critical level "through the great disappointment over the last
Federal Budget". The government, he said, was stimulating industrial
research "at the expense of grossly inadequate support for basic
research." 42 The Australian Institute of Physics had tried for some
years to gain increased support for Australian research but the
recognition came "that no one society" could "adequately carry out"
this task on its own. He therefore recommended the formation of the
Federation of Australia's Scientific and Technological Societies and
of the two Secretariats, which would be operated by the Federation.
He said the two Secretariats were "of outstanding importance for the
future of Australia". He supported Professor Fred Smith's nomination
as Chairman, for "his ability and energy". He concluded: "r am
certain that the cooperation between Australia's institutes and
societies whi~h stems from this meeting will prove to be of lasting
significance."
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Drs Bob Crompton and Peter Pockley then spoke in support of the
two Secretariats: on Government Relations and a Science and Technology Information Service, respectively. Crompton began by saying that
"scientists as a whole have extremely poor channels of communication
w~h governments"

and then described the proposed Secretariat on

Government Relations as "a lobbying spearhead". In the political
climate of 1985, he said, because of the "enormous pressures" on
government, adequate funding comes only through "overt and well
orchestrated lobbying activities." His statement brings to mind a
pluralist democracy facing "economic difficulties" and "policy
overload". It also suggests the style of lobbying suited to Hawke's
consensus politics. The lobbying task of the proposed Secretariat,
Crompton proposed, would be conducted on three levels: news items in
newspapers, radio and television at critical times in the budget
process; personal contacts between scientists and government officials; and "the maintenance of a data base" on S &T funding

and

manpower. 43 The Secretariat was thus poised to fulfil the first two
of Lakoff's political roles for scientists: advocate and adviser. The
Secretariat would require three full-time staff and one part-time
consultant and cost an estimated $213,000 per annum. Crompton concluded:

It is ambitious and costly, but when the cost is spread throughout the whole scientific community the cost per head is trivial
compared to the benefits likely to accrue to science in this
country and therefore to Australia itself.

0
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Dr Peter Pockley began his speech with a striking image of the
anonymous figure of science and technology trying to gain the attention of a . passing audience, waving its arms and uttering "some
complicated words strung together in a tortuous syntax". When the
figure shouts, "Help!", the passersby pause for a

moment, some

heckle, and then pass on. 44 If we scientists, he explained, have
not painted a picture of our world for others to appreciate then we
should not expect them to understand our problems, or the value of
our work:

No artistic company, no public media service, no scientific
research program has any fundamental resources other than those
based on three factors, namely, the recognition of its quality,
the acceptance of its public standing and the loyalty of its
followers. One abandons any one of these at peril.

This view of science is far removed from the scientist's usual
position of the intrinsic and self-evident worth of scientific
endeavour. This science is on par politically with all other human
endeavours.
The Information Service, Pockley described, would provide a free
network of "reliable and articulate experts" on S&T matters and
collate information on R&D in Australia "in terms which are meaningful

to

reporters,

students,

teachers,

politicians

and

the

public." 45 The secretariat would require at least one full-time
director and two other part-time staff and cost an estimated $185,000
per annum.
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4 .19.

The Audience

Sixty eight societies were invited to the meeting and only 15 of
these sent apologies. The largest societies were the Institution of
Engineers, Australia with 35,000 members, the Australian Computer
Society, with 9,500 members; the Royal Australian Chemical Institute,
with 7 ,500 members; and the Australian Geoscience Council, with 7 ,000
members. Amongst the smallest societies were the Australasian Society
of Phycology and Aquatic Botany, with 104 members; the Society of
Crystallographers in Australia, with 120 members; the Australian
Society for Biophysics, with 150 members; and the Australian Academy
of Technological Sciences, with 154 members. Present, in addition,
were invited representatives from government departments, the CSIRO,
AVCC, ASTEC and others.
Amongst the attendees was Dr Colin D. Branch, President of the
Australian Geoscience Council (AGC) and Director (Resources) of the
South Australian Department of Mines and Energy. In late 1984, while
serving as an ex-officio member of the Australian Academy of Science's National Committee for Solid Earth Sciences, he had heard
"persistent rumours" that .concerned groups were meeting, but had, at
that stage, received no official invitation for the Australian
Geoscience Council to become involved. By persistently ringing
officers in the Academy, through February and March 1985, he eventually received an invitation for the AGC to be represented at the April
meeting. Three other geoscientific societies, all members of the AGC,
were also invited to send representatives, and they jointly agreed
that, as President of the AGC, Branch should speak on their behalf.

236

Before the meeting, a most unfortunate incident occurred which
caused Branch to be even more determined "to have the voice of
geoscientists heard clearly". He writes:

While talking to one of the organisers before the meeting (the
person is not identified] it was indicated to me that the
geoscientific societies had been omitted because their inclusion
could cause an adverse public reaction as a consequence of the
perception held by many of the environmental impact of mining.

For Branch this indicated "a narrow, biased viewpoint within the
organising committee", which afterwards created unnecessary ill-will
in the Australian geoscientific community. 46
Another society not well disposed towards the aims of the
meeting was the Australian Computer Society, represented by both its
President, Alan W. Coulter, and Vice President, Wing

Commander

(Retired) Dr Ron Christie. Both were of the opinion before the
meeting that the original Academy proposals were too extravagant.

47

And the Federation did not appear to be offering anything that the
Australian Computer Society did not already have: "We already have
media exposure," Christie explained, "we have an eye on publications,
we have our own offices, a national office and branch offices, we are
.
a national
body, and we have a

large number o f

mem b ers. 1148
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4 .2 0.

The Resolutions

The Academy's strategy for the meeting required that three
predetermined series of resolutions be put to the meeting, and
approved by the meeting. The first group consisted of three unobjectionable, broad statements on the need for greater cooperation and
communication between societies and for increased public awareness of
science and technology issues. These sentiments were agreed to by the
meeting and in addition the meeting affirmed:

1.

its belief in the importance to the community of maintaining
the quality of Australian science and technology, and its
wish to see their full potential for the national benefit
realised;

2.

its support for progressive and balanced expansion, in real
terms, of the nation's effort in basic research, applied
research and experimental development.

The second series of resolutions concerned the formation of an
Interim Federation Committee, to draft a constitution and organise
the finances of the Federation of Scientific and Technological
Societies, with the details of the Federation to be put before a
second meeting of the societies in six months time. The Interim
Committee was to consist of 10 members covering a broad range of
disciplines with a

mix of small and large societies.

The third series of resolutions concerned the Secretariats which would come under the control of the Federation - and the need
for a.n annual funding at a rate of $5 per member, with an · immediate
contribution of $1 per member to fund the Interim Federation Committee.
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Wing Commander Christie reacted strongly against this programmed
organisation of the proceedings:

We arrived at the first meeting and people stood up and presented us with a blue print: this is the order of business, these
are the fees, this is how we will do it, etc. It was well
thought out, ... i f you had an army all ready in being it was a
good plan of attack, but there was no army in being and it was a
presentation to a lot of very independent people. 49

Alan Coulter, President of the Australian Computer Society,
spoke in favour of the Federation, which he said could "be achieved
fairly quickly without a great deal of cost to the member Societies",
but said he was concerned that the meeting's papers and agenda linked
the Federation with the Secretariats which could undermine support
for the Federation: "The formation of the proposed Secretariats is a
matter of a wider debate which indeed could erode the basic demonstration

of

a

solidarity

of

purpose

by

forming

a

National

Federation." 50
Obviously still stinging from the academician's comments before
the meeting, Dr Colin Branch referred "to Button's address in which
he spoke of the mining and petroleum industries as producing a
considerable proportion of our national wealth"

and then spoke

strongly "about the way the geoscience sector had been ignored in the
lead-up to the meeting of concerned scientists," yet, he added, the
"AGC in its particular field had already established an organisation
which could be a model for other groups of scientific and technological societies." The AGC, he told them, consisted of 7 ,000 members in
nine societies and 12 related organisations which had formed into one
umbrella organisation in 1983.

51
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At one stage during the proceedings a good deal of dissent was
voiced, especially from the back of the auditorium. Christie recalls:

I can remember people standing up at the back saying: "Well, I
come from such and such Society [possibly Laurie Gillard of the
Royal Aeronautical Society] and we've got 120 members and if you
think our members are going to pay $10 a head to join something
which we don't even know what it's going to do and keep somebody
in beer and pretzels and talk to journalists then you've got
rocks in your head." There were a couple of people who weren't
quite as forthright as that but who spoke along similar lines.
In reality the whole thing could have folded

on that first

day.52

Dr M. Rickard, Senior Vice-President of the Geological Society of
Australia, said he was "cool" on the Government Relationships Secretariat proposal. Noel Herbst, Executive Director of the Australian
Institute of Metals (AIM), said he foresaw conflict if the Federation
was dominated by academics and the CSIRO: "There is a conflict here,"
he said, "and don't think you can push it under the carpet." 53
There were other calls for more industry/technology society representation. The Australian Academy of Technological Sciences, it was
suggested, should take responsibility for nominating more technology
societies. Herbst reported to the AIM:

The feeling of the assembled societies was that there was a
I

need for a

Federation of Australian Societies.

There was, however, a demand for a more balanced approach
than that originally proposed by the N.C.P.S.T. where there was
little representation from those organisations such as the
A.I.M. and the A.I.M.F. [Australasian Institute of Metals
Finishing], who were predominantly concerned with the manufacturing industry. 54
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Sally White reported in The Age that "the tension of sectional
interest vibrated during much of the meeting" . 55 And scitech
reported:

Overall, the meeting was enthusiastic about the formation of the
federation but the importance of sectional interests was very
apparent with much argument during the day over funding and the
need for the secretariats. 56

Professor Wilson noted some anti-academy feeling in some of the
comments made by societies: "societies wanted the recognition and
responsibility alone; there was some unhappiness initially that the
suggestions were coming from the Academy which had, in some minds, an
elitist view." 57
Considering the central role of the Academy in organising the
National Meeting and the general concern amongst scientists for the
funding of science, this anti-academy

s~ntiment

is curious. Bennett

said later that many people had unreasonable expectations of the
Academy. The Academy, he explained, was set up with the joint purpose
of the pursuit of excellence in research and the dissemination of
knowledge. The lobbying of government was not really within its
reason for being. It was proper, nevertheless, he argued, for the
Academy to assist in the setting up of an organisation outside the
Academy to lobby government on its behalf. 58 Smith also commented:

a lot of people in the Academy do not see the function of the
Academy is to represent the broad scientific community. The
Academy's function is first of all to serve as a body which
.
. .
represents leading members of the scientific
communi' t y. 59
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In a survey of the members of the Academy conducted in 1980 to
determine what the members saw as the principal role of the Academy,
Ann Moyal found:

half of the respondents saw this [role] as the promotion of
excellence in scientific research, while the remaining half saw
it variously as giving independent and responsible advice to
government, maintaining and advancing Australia's international
contacts in science, providing a national centre for scientific
discussion and debate, and informing the public about the
development and the social implications of science. GO

Many of these activities they were now proposing to hand over to the
Federation.
The meeting finally approved the setting up of the Interim
Federation Committee (IFC) but not the Secretariats, leaving it as a
matter for the IFC to consider. Indeed the meeting determined that
the Interim Federation Committee should not be constrained to the
format suggested by the NCPST. The Academy responded by saying that
if the format adopted by the Federation was too far removed from its
proposals then the Academy reserved the right to consider its own
organisation. When, later, FASTS failed to establish an information
service, the Academy went ahead to form its own National science and
Technology Information Service.
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4.21.

The Interim Federation

Committee

The preliminary selection of the ten societies for the Interim
Federation Committee was organised by Crompton prior to the meeting,
to ensure representation of a broad range of scientific fields, but
the final selection on the day was influenced by Bennett's desire to
have some of the strongest critics of the Federation inside the
committee where their criticism could be employed constructively.
Smith was elected Chairman; he told me afterwards: "I must confess at
that time I felt singularly unprepared for the whole business because
I had not been intimately involved in the planning." 61 Professor
Geoff Wilson was elected Co-Chairman. Branch stood because of his
desire to give the Australian Geoscience Council a voice in the
Federation. 62 Christie accepted nomination, explaining later,
somewhat incredulously, in the light of future events: "I'm one of
those volunteers that are always pushed from the backgroun d . n63 Dr
Bob Anderssen, President of the Australian Mathematical Society, was
appointed Treasurer. Laurie Gillard, of the Royal Aeronautical
Society of Australia, accepted but later withdrew; and

Dr E.N.

Fitzpatrick later replaced Dr G. Thomas as agriculture representative. The meeting allocated one position on the IFC to an industry
society. The Australian Institute of Metals later nominated H.
Campbell Coe, Director of BHP Melbourne Research Laboratories; Coe
was also a

m~mber

of the Australian Industrial Research Group. By an

unfortunate oversight the Interim Federation Committee did not
contain a representative :from the Institution of Engineers, Australia. Of the original eight scientific societies at the historic
meeting in November 1984, five were represented on the IFC.
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A constitution for the IFC was put to the meeting and approved
subject to two references to the Secretariats being removed. This
left the primary aim of the IFC the formulation of a constitution for
the Federation and consideration of its financing. The constitution
did, however, give the IFC some latitude in initiating other activities:

The Interim Federation Committee shall also give further consideration to the activities proposed by the Meeting for the
Federation and initiate such activities as it considers reasonable provided that adequate funds are held by the Interim
Federation

4. 2 2.

Committee.

Reactions to the National Meeting of Concern

Sally White wrote in The Age newspaper, and I quote at length
because of the personal insight it gives:

Professor Fred Smith looked rather lugubriously into his
champagne glass. "I feel rather stunned. It seemed to be such an
enormous leap and it was done so quickly."
Since Tuesday his colleagues have been offering their
congratulations - and commiserations because the professor will
have his work cut out in the six months the committee has to
draft a constitution acceptable to its diverse membership.
It is hard for the outsider to realise the significance of
the scientists' decision to join forces to explain the value of
science and technology to an often

unreceptiv~

nation.
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One of the greatest problems with scientists, Professor
Smith says, is the lack of cross-fertilisation between diverse
specialities. "very often they simply do not understand the
thinking or the approaches of other scientists outside their own
disciplines,"

he says.

But a start has been made with the endorsement of a f ederation. That, in itself, was something for which it was worth
breaking out the champagne. 64

And Smith himself wrote in The Australian Physicist:

I was honoured to be asked to act as its (IFC] chairman. I see
this not merely as a personal honour but more as a recognition
of the leading role that the Institute (of Physics) has taken in
stimulating discussions on science policy. 65

In a

guest editorial for Search, he added:

I will not pretend that fulfilling the obligations placed upon
the Interim Federation Committee is going to be easy. From the
outset, it must be recognised that FASTS is for the benefit of
all members of the scientific, engineering and technological
communities. It is not intended to serve the aims and interests
of one selected segment. This will necessarily require good will
and an effort at understanding by all involved. I believe that
the successful establishment of FASTS is so important for the
future of Australia that the Interim Federation Committee must
not fail. 66

Jeffrey Skellar, reporting in Nature, concluded: "The scene is
set, then, for the emergence of science (and some scientists) from
the shadows where they have languished politically for s _o long." 67
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Chapter 5.

CONCLUSION

It needs no critical exertion to reduce utterly to dust any
deductions drawn from history. It is merely necessary to select
some larger or smaller unit as the subject of observation ...
L. TOLSTOY, War and Peace, 1869 1

The dominating influence on the Australian economy and politics
through the period 1983 to 1985 was the economic downturn and the
threat this posed to Australia's world position and internal standard
of living. Australia faced growing debt abroad, and higher inflation,
interest rates, and unemployment, and the growing social problems
which accompany difficult times, low morale, crime, family conflict,
and a growing disparity between rich and poor, within. The economic
downturn brought calls for increased government intervention, from
some, and calls for more conservative monetary and free market
policies from others, particularly from within the major economic
agencies, the Treasury, Finance and the Industries Assistance Commission. The response of the new leader of the Labor party, Bob Hawke,
to th.e economic downturn was "consensus". During the 1983 election
campaign, he promised consensus would bring all Australians together
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again to tackle their common economic problems; but, after the
election, this public consensus became in effect a consensus amongst
the major power brokers: government, big business and the ACTU. Some
saw this as a thinly veiled form of corporatism and warned against
the loss of democratic power it threatened for the Australian public.
The Hawke consensus also accompanied an historical trend amongst
insider groups to form larger, more influential umbrella organisations; the Hawke initiative accelerated this process, especially in
the case of FASTS.
As an early step towards consensus, the new Labor government
convened a National Economic Summit in May 1983. The Economic Summit
served to emphasise the marginal role of science and technology in
Australia. Science and technology organisations were deliberately not
invited to the Summit, and Jones and his controversial technology
paper were specifically excluded, by Hawke.
In response, Jones called his own National Technology (Summit)
Conference. Out of this rose the even more controversial National
Technology Strategy which, because it put so many government departmental noses out of joint, contributed to Jones' loss of influence
with cabinet. For the Australian Institute of Physics, the National
Technology Conference had the fortunate consequence, however, because
of the Institute's submission and Wilson's presence at the conference, of raising the prestige of the Institute within the science and
technology community.
The economic downturn in Australia was matched by the continuing
spectacular rise of Japan. Hawke's enamour with Japan's economic
success led to an emphasis within government policy on industry
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restructuring, rather than on Jones' much criticised sunrise industries policy. This emphasis led eventually to the formation of DITAC
(the Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce), and the
consequent demise of Jones' Department of Science and Technology. It
represented a

major blow to Jones' fortune.

Within all this, the science and technology community was
struggling to come to terms with the new economic and political
situation, which promised, especially after 1984, less money for
basic research and less autonomy for all government funded resea:=ch
bodies, in particular in the way this reduced amount of money would
be allocated and increased the need for priorities. The new situation
threatened not only the distribution and growth of Australian research but attacked the very nature of that research and of the
supposedly free and apolitical science which nurtured it.
Up to this point, leading scientists had formed parts of official insider groups, ASTEC, the ARGC, ad hoc S&T committees; they had
influenced government policies through their involvement in policy
communities, and in formal responses to government enquiries. But in
the new climate, they were, as Jones accused them, "politically
naive", and not good as a "pressure group". Specifically, the science
and technology community lacked a central, and powerful, voice with
which to speak to government, to business, and to the Australian
public. But at the very time when, driven by the threats to science
funding, scientists were beginning to speak up and take a more active
role in science policy, they came under increasing criticism for the
apparent irrelevance of much of their research. The criticism succeeded in undermining their authority, their prestige and hence their
influence.
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Principal amongst the scientific organisations being criticised
was the CSIRO. Historically, the CSIRO has maintained a major research effort in primary industry, and has claimed many successes in
this area; but, partly because of the long-term nature of scientific
research, partly because of the non-transferability of scientists
between different scientific disciplines, partly through conservative
management, and partly from its sheer size, the CSIRO struggled in
its efforts to shift its direction towards more industrial research.
It was not quick enough or early enough for the government's liking.
In addition, the CSIRO lost credence over its handling of the
multi-million dollar Australian Animal Health Laboratory and for its
mistreatment of Stuart Macdonald and his criticism of the CSIRO 's
dung-beetle program.
But the CSIRO was not alone. University research was also coming
under increased criticism for poor management of its research funds
and for the irrelevance of its research to the pressing economic
needs of the nation. Leading university researchers responded, in the
main, by defending the value of basic research discredited linear model of innovation -

often via the

without addressing the

underlying political problem of who should decide what research is
done, with public money.
The government continued on with its program ignoring their
outcries. Given the tight economic position, the R&D cake would not
be increased. Given the need to raise the low level of industrial R&D
to foster industry reconstruction, through increased government
suppt?rt for industrial R&D (chiefly through the 150% tax · incentive
scheme), there would of necessity be less money for basic research.
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Leading academic researchers decried this decision as economic
pragmatism, as sacrificing the long-term future of the country for
short-term political gain. Their disappointment meant even more
trouble for Jones, because of his election promise to increase
funding for basic research through substantial increases to the ARGS.
But the government agenda went further. Since the value of basic
research is largely unrecognised outside the academic and science and
technology communities, there appeared, to outsiders, no strong
arguments in favour of academic scientists being allowed to continue
to decide the direction of their own research work, using public
funds without reference to public need. On the contrary, it was
argued this laissez-faire approach had led to no readily identifiable
major economic advantage to Australian industry, and had instead
contributed to what was well-recognised, the gulf between academic
research and commercial exploitation. Despite scientists arguing that
this gulf was largely the fault of industry with its low level of
industrial R&D, the government began pressurising academic scientists
to redirect their efforts towards industry.
Academic scientists had lost twice: money and autonomy. They
came to feel they were being blamed for Australia's economic woes.
This emotional aspect of the science debate was further fuelled in
their minds by an awareness of the general aging of the academic
community, of the plight of their post-graduate students, and of the
poor prospects for their undergraduate and post-graduate students for
careers in science. High school and undergraduate students were
increasingly turning away from the sciences to the more . lucrative
fields of economics, business, law, medicine, and computing.
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They could expect little sympathy from the politicians. The
federal parliament - including Cabinet -

which sets broad policy

directions for the Australian economy consists largely of lawyers,
accountants, and professional politicians, who have little knowledge
or even interest in science and technology matters and who, as a
consequence, treat such matters as peripheral to their major concerns. Their backgrounds and interests force science and technology
into the background of federal politics.
Amongst the many, often conflicting, ideas influential through
1983 to 1985 - consensus, free market, intervention, economic relevance, the value of basic research -

of special interest to the S&T

community was the concept of a Post-industrial Society, pressed so
forcefully and articulately by Barry Jones. Post-industrial Society,
to them, represented profound technological change. Technology was
seen as central to a modern economy, and technological change the
most important long-term social issue. In its economic aspect, how
was Australia to adapt to this technological change, to remain
competitive internationally? The answer seemed obvious: through
science and a

scientifically literate society.

The Post-industrial Society thesis -

in conjunction with the

theories on long-waves in economic activity and the central role of
invention in generating economic activity -

produced Jones' Sunrise

Industries policy. It contributed indirectly to the first version of
the National Technology Strategy, and directly to the raising of
expectations amongst scientists of the essential and important role
scientists would play in the new and future society. Scientists were
therefore all the more frustrated at the apparent apathy even antipa-
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thy amongst politicians towards science and technology and the
obvious marginal nature of science in Australian politics.
When the science and technology community received its first
articulate and committed Science and Technology minister in Barry
Jones, in the main, it welcomed his arrival and agreed with his
policy directions. But when their expectations were unfulfilled in
the 1984 federal budget and Jones had fallen from political favour
and influence, they were prepared not only to dump their foremost
political spokesman in favour of the more powerful but scientifically
doubtful, John Button, Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce, but blamed their failure to back him on his shortcomings as a
politician. Jones had been opposed in Cabinet by t·..,o of Cabinet's
most powerful ministries, Treasury and Finance; it was a most unequal
fight. Throughout 1983 and 1984, Jones had repeatedly asked the
scientific community to speak up, to support his policies. They had
done so, largely ineffectually, merely as individuals; they had not
supported him en masse, simply because there was no mechanism in
place to do this. In hindsight, the scientific community should have
formed FASTS in the good times of the 1960s or during the less
certain years of the 1970s, so that it was there in place when needed
by Jones in 1984. The advantage he might have derived from this is
evident in the way Button was able to force his 150% tax incentive
scheme for industrial R&D past the Treasury and Finance with the
support of industry and the Confederation of Australian Industry.
The needs and concerns of the science and technology community,
though contested from time to time, as in the Australian Association
of Scientific Workers from 1939 to 1949, or, more recently, at the
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ANU Seminar on "science Research in Australia -

Who Benefits?" in

1983, are largely expressed through the heads of the scientific
hierarchy, the university professors or their equivalents in government laboratories and the heads of scientific societies. These heads
of science, though the most politically active of Australia's scientists, nevertheless tend to speak up for science in defence of the
status cruo. Hence, it was largely through their efforts that basic
science was defended in 1984 and

FASTS

formed in 1985.

Geoff Wilson, along with Fred Smith, met Barry Jones in April
1983, soon after his appointment as the new Labor Minister for
Science and Technology. Wilson attended the National Technology
Conference in 1983, contributed to the National Technology Strategy
through his society's submission, was outspoken following the 1984
federal budget, called together a small number of heads of leading
societies in November 1984, joined with Max Bennett to call the
National Meeting of Concern in April 1985 (which approved the Interim
Federation Committee), and served on the Interim Federation Committee. For his contribution to the formation of FASTS, he was appointed
to the inaugural position of Past-President of FASTS. His efforts and
those of Fred Smith, who chaired the Interim Federation Committee and
became FASTS's first President, as well as the many reports of the
AIP Science Policy Committee, helped raise the prestige of the AIP to
the point where the scientific community looked to the Institute for
leadership in forming

FASTS.

Peter Pockley recognised early the need for an increased public
voice for science in Australia. His persistence was influential not
only in the eventual formation of the National Science and Technology
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Information Service but in galvanising the more reticent leading
members of the S&T community to speak up for science.
Paul Wild disrupted Jones' early attempts to raise the profile
of science and technology within the government program when he
attempted to bail the CSIRO out of Jones' department immediately
after the election in 1983, and entered a very public dispute with
Jones over changes to the CSIRO, damaging both the prestige of the
CSIRO and the support for Jones. He was, however, outspoken after the
1984 budget in support of greater R&D funding and encouraged other
officers of the CSIRO to be equally outspoken on trends in government
support for R&D.
Another campaigning for increased R&D funding was Peter Sheehan.
His concerns, especially over inadequate funding for scientific
equipment, were communicated to the scientific community, through
Smith and the AIP Science Policy Community to the physics community,
and through

Frank Larkins to the Chemistry community.

Members of the ARGC, particularly Bruce Stone who pressurised
Wilson and Gerry Wake into action, played a crucial role in the
formation of FASTS by providing the early motivation of more funds
for the ARGS and by providing a meeting place for leading scientists
to discuss the parlous state of Australian science.
Also outspoken, especially after the 1984 budget, was Arthur
Birch who protested through media releases and letters to politicians
and newspapers. Another and newer academician, Max Bennett, then took
on the challenge to form the Academy's National Committee for the
PromC?tion of science and Technology. It was his enthusiasin, despite
criticism from others within the Academy, which brought the Academy
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of Science into such an open and political position in the science
and technology debate and to support so generously the formation of
FASTS. He joined with Wilson to call the National Meeting of Concern
and was responsible for much of the preparation leading up to that
crucial meeting. Within his National Committee for the Promotion of
Science and Technology, Bennett was well supported by Peter Pockley
and Bob Crompton who took on the responsibility for building cases
for the two aborted Secretariats.
Though FASTS represents the political interests of a community
of 60,000 Australian scientists and technologists, a surprisingly
small number of names from this large community recur repeatedly in
the events leading up to the formation of FASTS: Wilson, Smith,
Pockley, Bennett, Birch, Farrell, Wild, Sheehan. When one considers
the leading position of many of these in the science hierarchy and
the essentially non-political role adopted by most Australian scientists in the pursuance of their research and scientific careers, it
is soon obvious that the number of scientists actively involved in
politics, in science policy, in communicating science to the public
in Australia is remarkably small. Any criticism of those actively
involved must therefore be moderated by criticism of the many who are
not actively involved. If the voice of the many is not heard, who is
to blame?
The small active number involved in the formation of FASTS not
only had to agree on the need for such an organisation, amongst
themselves, but had then to carry the great bulk of non-active
scientists along with them. Yet, so convinced were these few of the
enormity of the crisis facing Australian science and of the extent of
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the disquiet within the Australian scientific community, they had no
hesitation in their claiming to represent the "grass-roots" of
Australian science. Their convincing other members of the executives
of scientific societies - most of whom held similar views on the size
of the crisis in Australian science - to go along with them would
clearly prove a much easier task than convincing the great mass of
scientists and technologists, over the long term, of the need for
FASTS.
The thesis began with the contention that science was intrinsically political, in its hierarchical structure, its networks, its
reward structure, its roles as advocate, advisor, and adversary in
science and technology issues, and its rational approach to politics.
It follows from this that the early failure by scientists to address
these political aspects of science doomed science to a marginal role
in Australian politics and gave an opportunity for non-scientists to
determine the politics of science. Up to 1984, an apolitical science
had meant there was no effective political voice for science, in
Australia. In facing up to the new politics of science, of which the
formation of FASTS is a major first step, scientists have had to come
to terms with a dilemma that hitherto they had held the highest form
of science to be disinterested, that is, apolitical science.
The magnitude of the crisis in 1984 which produced FASTS indicates the essentially internal nature of this crisis; it is not
explicable simply in terms of the reaction to the small shifts in R& D
funding in the 1984 federal budget. As Sally White reported in The
Age following the decision to form FASTS: "It is hard for the outsid er to realise the significance of the scientists' decision to join
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forces to explain the value of science and technology to an unrecepna t"ion. "2

.
tive

The

marginal

and

powerless

position

of the

scientific community in 1984 demonstrates the inadequacy of a definition of science which excludes the broader social and political
aspects of science. The politicalisation of science which FAST s
represents means scien-i:-ists, down to the grass-roots, will have to
come to terms with these broader aspects of science, not external to
science but internal to science, if FASTS, over the long term, is to
succeed and

survive.
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